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State Supplementation of Benefits Under
The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Program
by Adele M. Blong, Staff Attorney, Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law and
Howard Thorkelson, National Senior Citizens Law Center

Introduction
The Social Security Amendments of 1972,1 which
were enacted on October 30, 1972, provide for the
establishment of a new federally-administered income2
maintenance program for the aged, blind and disabled
effective January 1, 1974. This program, called the Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI), will be administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA) in the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Authorization for a service program for such individuals is continued
by enactment of a new Title VI of the Social Security Act,
which provides federal funding for a state service program
which meets the requirements set forth in that title, i.e.,
Title VI provides for continuation of a service program in
the pattern of the current federal-state cash assistance and
services programs authorized under the current Titles I, X,
XIV and XIX of the Social Security Act
The new federal cash benefits program provides for a
basic benefit of $130 for an individual and $195 for a

couple if both members are eligible individuals, ie., aged,
blind or disabled. There is provision for certain income
and resource disregards in determining eligibility, and a
grandfather clause for individuals already receiving aid
under one of the federal-state plans for the aged, blind or
disabled. 4 However, the federal benefits are nonetheless
below the current payment levels in many states and
operation of the federal program alone would cause both a
reduction of benefits for many people already on the rolls
and reduce eligibility levels for new applicants. In addition,
the federal program makes certain other changes, such as
the omission of any provision for essential persons, the
elimination of food stamp eligibility, and the assumption of
1.
Pub. L. No. 92-603 (Oct. 30, 1972).
2.
The term "aged, blind and disabled" will be used throughout
to refer to those individuals who are by virtue of such condition
eligible to receive benefits under the new federal program.
3.
Social Security Act, Section 1611, as amended by Pub. L.
No. 92-603 (Oct. 30, 1972). All references hereinafter, unless
otherwise indicated are to sections of the Social Security Act.
4.
Id. §1612.

income of an ineligible spouse, which further widen the gap
between current payment levels under the federal-state
5
programs and the benefits available under this program.
In order to avoid reductions, Congress has authorized,
but not required, a program of state supplementation of
benefits. Accordingly, in many states the question of
whether the new SSI Program represents a gain or a loss for
aged, blind and disabled individuals will depend upon the
action taken by the state to supplement the SSI benefits.
The following discussion is directed primarily to the
question of state supplementation and describes the ways in
which state-supplementation programs might operate. It is
based on our own best understanding of what the law
allows or does not allow as well as on the views expressed
by representatives of SSA in meetings in which we have
participated with other representatives of the affected
individuals. It should be remembered throughout, however,
that the agency's position is that it is still in the planning
stages and that few, if any of its decisions are final. SSA
expects to issue SSI regulations, including those for
federally-administered supplementation, in proposed form
in April 1973 and in final form in July 1973. Accordingly,
any of the agency views reflected herein are subject to
change. In addition, our own analysis of the statute and of
the consistency or inconsistency therewith of any projected
plans is far from complete.
However, the imminence of the new federal program
argues in favor of providing as much information to the
intended beneficiaries of the program as quickly as possible,
even at some risk of incomplete analysis, so that they can
form a judgment regarding the impact of the programs in
their state, and the need for and alternatives for state
action. Thus, as noted below, some state legislative action
prior to January 1, 1974 will be required in almost all states
in order to provide a transition to the new program.

5.
For a brief summary of the new federal program see 6
CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 478 (December 1972), and the
November issue of the Newsletter of the Center on Social Welfare
Policy and Law.
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Relationship of New SSI Benefits to Current Programs

General Description of State Supplementation

There appears to be some 35 states in which SSI's
replacement of current OAA, AB, APTD and food stamp
benefits, without state supplementation, would mean a
reduction in some recipients' income: 6 Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
In all states the replacement of OAA, AB, APTD and
AABD by SSI will release the state and local funds
currently expended in those programs and make them
available for reallocation. Even those states which maintain
benefit levels through state supplementation may realize a
savings in state and local funds compared with prior
expenditures in these programs. Accordingly, some of those
states may wish to consider utilizing some of this savings
for other social welfare purposes such as increasing payment levels in AFDC to narrow the gap between beneficiaries of that program and those covered by the new
federal program, and/or maintaining or increasing the level
of social services provided within the state where the new
federal ceiling would otherwise impose restrictions.
State legislative action in the current sessions may be
necessary to terminate the current state OAA, AB, APTD
and AABD programs by January 1, 1974 and to provide for
transition into the federal program on that date. It appears
probable that legislative action would be required in any
state to provide state supplementation after January 1,
1974 and to authorize a state to enter into an agreement
with SSA, where desired, to administer the program.
Legislation would also be required to authorize the state
agency to enter into an agreement with HEW providing for
state participation in SSI administration during a "transitional" period, which is required in order for the state to
qualify for matching funds under Titles IV, V and XIX
during that period.7 However, SSA expects that it will be
able to begin direct operation of the program on January 1
and that no such transitional period will be required.

State supplementation is basically a system of cash
grants to supplement or add-on to the federal benefits. The
amount of the state supplemental benefit when added to
the federal benefit would establish an overall "standard of
need" or "eligibility test" in a particular state. Any aged,
blind or disabled individual whose income and resources
were below that level, after application of the appropriate
disregards, etc., would be eligible for a benefit. Whether the
individual received both a federal benefit and a state
supplemental benefit or only a state benefit would depend
on the "budget deficit," i.e., whether his or her income was
below the federal level, or above the federal level but below
the overall combined level.
There are a variety of options open for a program of
state supplementation. The basic options, however, are
three: a state which elects to provide for state supplementation for the aged, blind and disabled will have to
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choose (1) whether to administer such a prQgram itself; (2)
whether, instead, to have it administered by SSA; and (3)
whether to simply maintain benefit levels at the January
1972 level or to provide for meeting increases in cost-ofliving since that time. Under either a state-administered or a
federally-administered supplementation program, payments
to SSI recipients are not counted as income for SSI
purposes; the amount of supplementation is simply added
on top of the SSI grant.
I.

State-Administered Supplementation.

A state-administered supplementation program is not
subject to federal statutory requirements with one exception. In order to be disregarded as income for SSI purposes,
payments must be "cash payments... made. . . on a regular
basis.., as assistance based on need.
8..-8
Otherwise the
8.
Social Security Act, §1616 (a), as amended by Pub. L.
92-603 (Oct. 30, 1972).
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state is free to establish and operate the program in any
way it sees fit. The program would have the same legal
status as a state's general assistance program now has, and
indeed, for all practical purposes might be regarded as a
part of such program.
II.

Federally-Administered Supplementation.

A state may elect federal administration of its
supplementation program by entering into an agreement for
that purpose with the Secretary of HEW, if its program
meets certain federal requirements. 9 There are possible
substantial financial advantages to a state which elects
federal administration. For example, the state will only
have to bear the expense of the supplementation benefits
paid out; the federal government will pay the entire
administrative costs. 1o In addition, the state is guaranteed
that it will be held harmless against any increase in state
costs above the level of state and local expenditures in
assistance payments in OAA, AB, APTD or AABD in
calendar 1972. 1 As further discussed below this "holdharmless" applies only to expenditures attributable to
benefit payments which do not exceed the state's January
1972 money payment level.
State Supplementation Under Federal Administration
If a state elects federal administration the federal
government becomes responsible for the entire operation of
the eligibility and payment process. The state establishes
the eligibility and payment standards subject to the
requirements discussed below, but SSA would be responsible for the acceptance and processing of applications,
eligibility determinations, issuance of payment, etc. In
effect, an individual would apply for both federal and state
benefits by filing an application with SSA.
The major federal requirements applicable to a
federally-administered supplemental program are as
follows:
Flat Grants.
SSA's view is that it is only authorized to administer
a state program which provides for a system of flat grants
that may be simply added on top of the federal SSI grant
and that it would not be authorized to make individual
special-needs payments which would require an examination of individual circumstances and factors which are
not relevant to the determination of eligibility for the
federal benefit.
This does not seem to necessarily rule out
consideration of all individual factors, such as a state
making provision for recognizing the needs of an ineligible
spouse or parent in its supplementation grant to an aged,
blind or disabled individual. Thus, the statute appears to
leave the state free to determine for itself the method or
factors which it will use to determine the extent of an
individual's need for supplementation. In addition, Section
9.

10.
11.

Id. §1616.
Id. §1616 (d).
Pub. L. No. 92-603, §401 (Oct. 30, 1972).
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1616 (f) provides for consideration of the income of an
ineligible spouse in determining an individual's eligibility
for SSI, so that SSA would have to obtain information on
the presence and income of such a spouse in any case. Thus,
the information required for the determination in the state
program would already be available to it.
Even with regard to true "special-needs" payments
there does appear to be some possibility that SSA might
accept responsibility for processing the payments if the
state would itself determine eligibility and designate the
individuals to receive the payments. However, the benefit
from use of the latter system might be outweighed by the
cost of maintaining a separate state administrative process
for this purpose. Assuming that the state was willing to bear
the administrative cost anyway, it might be more beneficial
to use these state funds to support a general increase in
payment levels.
SSA is also taking the position that a state must use a
single standard for all individuals in the same category in its
supplementation program. This means that states which
formerly had different standards or payment levels depending on whether an individual lived in a personal
dwelling, a boarding house, a hotel, etc., would be required
to come up with a single standard to be applied to all
individuals. It might appear at firsh blush that this presents
no problem since a state can simply establish supplementation at the level of the largest amount payable under
any of these circumstances or at least the amount paid to
the preponderance of beneficiaries, and thereby accept the
right of the individuals concerned to make their own
decision as to how best to budget their income and
otherwise select living arrangements most suited to their
fiscal and personal needs. However, as discussed below,
application of the provisions of the hold-harmless could
affect a state's willingness to proceed in such a manner.
The Level of State Supplementation.
There is no maximum or upper limit qua maximum
on the amount of supplementation benefits which a state
may pay. There may, however, be a very practical constraint on the state's selection of a supplemental level. A
state will be "held-harmless" against increased costs, resulting, for example, from caseload increases, only with
regard to the parts of the individual benefit payments that
do not exceed its January 1972 payment level plus the food
stamp bonus. Thus, there is a financial deterrent to
establishing a supplement benefits level which exceeds the
January 1972 payment level if it would increase state costs
above calendar 1972 expenditures. Indeed there may be
some deterrent effect even if no increased state expenditure
is entailed.
A question may arise as to whether a state which does
not have the combined program, AABD, and which has
different payment levels for the aged, the blind and the
disabled in its separate OAA, AB, and APTD programs
should be allowed to maintain these differential standards
in their supplementation programs. Indeed, as discussed
below the application of the hold-harmless may well

motivate states to attempt to retain such differentials. 12
Those states which now have the combined program and
are therefore required to maintain a single payment
standard will, of course, have to continue to maintain the
single standard.
Individuals Covered Under the Agreement.
Pursuant to Section 1616, the agreement for federal
administration of state supplementation may cover all those
"who would but for their income be eligible to receive
benefits" under Title XVI as well as all "individuals
receiving benefits" under the federal program. 13 Of course,
in the case of aged, blind or disabled individuals whose
income and resources are below the standard selected by
the state for determining need for supplementation but
above the federal benefit level, the only benefit paid would
be the amount of the state supplementation for which the
individual or individuals were eligible. 14
As pointed out in note 13, supra, the statute only
contemplates one variance between the eligibility standards
to be applied in the federal and state programs, the
authorization for a durational residency requirement in the
state programs. Otherwise the state must adopt the same
eligibility conditions and income disregards for purpose of
the state supplementation program as apply in SSI. Thus,
the state cannot, for example, establish lien requirements or
relatives' responsibility requirements (except for the
income assumption contained in Section 1616 (f) which is
referred to above). The statute also provides for the
federal-state supplementation agreement to include "such
other rules with respect to eligibility for or amount of the
supplementary payments... as the Secretary finds necessary. .. to achieve efficient and effective administration
of. . . State supplementation," 15 (emphasis added), and
permits the state to establish income disregards in addition
to those mandated by federal law. 16 (However, as noted
below, the costs of any benefits attributable to such
additional income disregards are not covered by the
hold-harmless.)
12.
It is at least an open question as to whether the rationale for
differential treatment relied on in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S.
535 (1972) would support differential treatment in state supplementation of individuals all covered by a unitary federal program.
13.
The statute provides that a state may impose a durational
residency requirement as a condition of eligibility for receipt of
state supplementation and that, in such case, it need not supplement
beneficiaries of the federal program who do not meet such
ondition. However, it seems clear that any such requirement would
be invalid under the doctrine of Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969). See also Cole v. Newport Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807
(1st Cir. 1970).
14.
While the statute on its face might appear to make coverage
of this latter group optional, it seems clear that a serious equal
protection issue would be raised if the state provided benefits only
to individuals receiving SSI and denied aid to other similarly
situated individuals whose income and resources were below the
state's definition of need.
15.
Social Security Act, §1616 (b) (2), as amended by Pub. L.
No. 92-603 (Oct. 30, 1972).
16.
Id. §1616 (c) (2).
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The new federal program does not make provision for
essential persons and the provisions of Section 1616 (a)
relating to the scope of a state supplemental agreement do
not make specific provision for the coverage of such
individuals or of any other needy individual who is not
aged, blind, or disabled. However, as noted above, there is
some possibility that the needs of related individuals could
be dealt with in the state program under the essential
person concept by defining the need of the individual as
including the maintenance costs of a person whose presence
is essential to the well-being of the eligible individual.
Federal Guarantee Against Increased State Costs As
Result of Supplementation, Hold-Harmless.
Pursuant to Section 401 of Pub. L. 92-603, a
state which enters into an agreement under which SSA will
administer the supplemental program is held-harmless
against the possibility of its costs for the program exceeding
its calendar 1972 expenditures for assistance in the adult
categories. States are held-harmless to the extent that their
costs result from those parts of individual benefit payments
which do not exceed the difference between the state's
"adjusted payment level" for January 1972 and the benefit
paid under SSI plus income which is not excluded in
determining eligibility for such federal benefit, that is,
countable income. In the event that a state's costs rise
above its 1972 expenditures, the excess costs will be borne
by the federal government.
Obviously, this provides no incentive to states to
increase benefits over the January 1972 levels or to
maintain benefits increased since that time, such as the
September and October 1972 increases to reflect the
increase in OASDI. However, it is not altogether clear
whether the hold-harmless should be a real consideration in
the decision as to where to set benefit levels under the state
program.
Since state costs under the new program are measured
against the total nonfederal share of assistance costs in the
adult categories, it seems unlikely that many states would
approach the level at which they would qualify for federal
funds unless their state supplementation level was far in
excess of the federal benefit level and/or there was a great
increase in the number of aged, blind or disabled individuals
who qualified for aid.
Obviously, the caseload might increase as the result of
such factors as increased acceptance of the "new" program
tied into OASDI, more liberal eligibility standards, wider
dissemination of information by the federal agency as to
the availability and benefits of the program, and better
access. However, there do not appear to be any reliable
estimates as to this factor at the present time. Some more
definite information may be available shortly, since SSA as
well as various state agencies are working on such projections. The Bureau of Social Science Research is also
developing an estimate of the cost of suprlementation. To
some extent, however, both the development of such
estimates and the resolution of many of the other questions
affecting supplementation is hampered by lack of a final

decision as to one critical factor-the amount of the
"adjusted payment level" which will be established for each
state.
Thus, if one assumes that a state's determination of
its supplemental benefit level will be influenced by the
availability of federal funds in case of increased costs, a
state will obviously want to know its adjusted payment
level before establishing its benefit level. This determination
in turn affects the estimate of costs since some of the
growth in caseload may depend upon the supplemental
benefits level.
As defined in Section 401 (b) (1):
...
the term 'adjusted payment level under the
appropriate approved plan of a State as in effect for
January 1972' means the amount of the money
payment which an individual with no other income
would have received under the plan of such State
approved under title I, X, XIV, or XVI of the Social
Security Act, as may be appropriate, and in effect for
January 1972; except that the State may... increase
such payment level. . . by...
(A)
a payment level modification...
(B)
the bonus value of food stamps in such
17
State for January 1972 ....

The question of how to determine "the amount of the
money payment which an individual with no other income
would have received" is still unresolved. SSA appears to be
unwilling to accept the highest money payment standard in
a category for across the board application to the category.
As noted above, this could affect a state's willingness to use
this figure as its supplemental benefit level. The agency,
however, believes that identification of a single dollar figure
is required. To those of you who have followed the
sometimes painful course of Section 402 (a) (23) 1 the
proposed answer should be obvious-averaging. SSA is
currently considering establishing the money payment level
for each state by conducting a study of January 1972
payments and arriving at some "average payment." As yet
there is no clear indication of how the payment data would
be collected and analyzed.
Whatever else might be said for or against averaging it
is clear that it cannot begin to produce a realistic
approximation of the money payment which would have
been made to an individual without income unless there is a
careful delineation of the items of payments to be included
in the study. This is necessary to ensure that all payments
made will be considered in the averaging and also that any
case in which the payment was based on consideration of
available income or an assumption of income will be
eliminated.
This question of establishment of the adjusted
payment level may present one of the most immediate
problems for all of those concerned with securing the best
possible program for the aged, the blind, and the disabled.
Thus, in view of the great variation in budgeting practices
among the states, it is doubtful that SSA could, within the
17.
This pertains to states which paid less than 100% of need in
the adult categories.
18.
42 U.S.C. §602 (a) (23) enacted in 1968 providing, inter alia,
for the updating of AFDC standards of need.
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time constraints, fully analyze and appreciate the significance of the various ways in which payment calculations
may have been based on a determination or assumption of
income. Therefore, in order to ensure that SSA is fully
aware of the need for careful delineation of the parameters
of any averaging process and to provide a basis for
identifying the particular problem areas it would be useful
for concerned groups to undertake an analysis of their own
state's budgeting procedure so as to identify those areas.
The information could then be used not only with SSA but
as a basis for any other action necessary to secure further
refinement of the state's data in the event that an averaging
process is eventually used. It might also be useful to
compare the results of budgeting analysis with the figures
for the state's money payments provided in NCSS Report
D-2. Although the tables in that report purport to represent
payments made for basic needs including shelter, it appears
that many states are now challenging the accuracy of these
figures. It is not clear whether they are asserting that the
report understates or overstates the amount of the money
payment. However, it would be far more efficient and far
less costly, provided the figures reported were an accurate
reflection of state payments, to rely on the report with
appropriate adjustments for "special needs" payments,
rather than undertake new studies to produce a new
ave rage.

different costs does not reflect the amount that would have
been paid to any individual under the state plan.
Since, as noted above, the "adjusted payment level"
is the upper limit on the state expenditures which will be
recognized for hold-harmless purposes, states which establish their supplementation levels at or above the adjusted
payment level may reap some benefit out of the holdharmless if the figure is a realistic reflection of 1972
payment levels and there is a substantial growth in the
caseload. On the other hand, if the adjusted payment level
is unrealistically low and there is a substantial growth in
caseloads, states may loathe to exceed this level in
establishing benefits since'they would have to finance any
increased state costs solely out of state funds.
This problem may be even further aggravated in those
states which increased benefits during 1972, because of an
anomaly in the statute for which there appears to be no
answer at present Thus the calculation of the state's
nonfederal share of expenditures in 1972 will include its
share of expenditures for increased benefits in that year
although the adjusted payment level will be set at the
January 1972 level. In such a state, the costs of maintaining
benefits at the January 1972 level under the supplemental
program would have to exceed the state and local cost of
providing benefits above that level during 1972 before the
state would become eligible for any federal relief.

The types of budgeting practices which should be
identified in order to assume elimination of payments based
on attribution of income would include cases of prorating
shelter or other household costs since prorating is no more
than an assumption that the extra person in the household
contributes his or her income to meet part of the costs.
Some states do this on a case-by-case basis; others incorporate this assumption in their standards, for example,
payment for one person living alone is $162, payment for
one in a household of three is $100. In addition, those cases
receiving personal needs only, because board and maintenance are met out of another program or assumed to be
provided, would have to be selected out. The same would
have to be done with so-called companion casescooperative budgeting now ruled out by Pub. L. 92-603.
For example, some states pay an adult in an AFDC
household a per capita share of the AFDC allowance rather
than his or her grant due under AABD.

Federally-Administered Supplementation
State-Administered Special Grants.

Any consideration of averaging would also raise other
problems such as proper allowance for geographic variations. For example, shelter is an item that is provided in a
large number of states on an as-paid basis and the payment
varies widely within the state not only on a case-by-case
basis but also as a reflection of regional cost differences
between areas. In some states this regional variation is
accommodated by fixing varying amounts by areas in the
plan itself. In other states, the amounts payable for shelter
are fixed by each one of the local welfare districts in the
state. In addition, shelter grants may vary depending on
whether fuel for heating is paid separately or included.
Obviously any averaging of disparate payments based on

Plus

The narrowest option for the state is full
federal administration of supplementation. This means the
payment of flat grants without the possibility of any
increase on the basis of special needs. In this case the
recipients' advantage lies in the level of supplementation
being set high enough to reflect the full amount of all
special needs currently considered, i.e., to assure that no
individual receives less under SSI supplementation. However, a state may have the federally-administered supplementation program described above and in addition a
state-administered program of special grants. The special
grants would provide for particular items of need that may
not be reflected, or only partially reflected, in the amount
of federally-administered supplementation. Payments to
SSI recipients would constitute additional supplementation
since they would not be counted as income for SSI
purposes. This is true whether such payments were made to
others in addition to SSI-supplementation recipients or
were available only to some SSl-supplementation recipients.
The state would bear the administrative expense of
determining eligibility for the additional payments and of
making the payments to individuals who are not SSIsupplementation recipients. However, in the case of SSIsupplementation recipients, it is still an open question as to
whether SSA would handle, and bear the expense of,
making these additional payments once the individual and
payment amounts are designated by the state.
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Mental Commitment Cases of the 1971-72 Supreme Court Term
by Kenneth R. Wing and Rod Carman, National Health Law Program
Even in areas where legal representation has become
available to the poor through the efforts of Legal Services
programs, there is still one group that is almost universally
denied representation: those confined under the various
forms of civil commitment and patients in mental health
institutions. Almost by definition in need of legal counsel
and predictably indigent, they are faced with interpersonal
and institutional barriers that further reduce their chances
to obtain representation.
It is the position of the National Health Law Program
that Legal Services programs throughout the country
should focus some of their attention towards this portion
of their communities, to assess the need for legal services in
the field of mental health and to develop a role in providing
these services. This article is intended to stimulate an
interest in the mental health field and to serve as an
introduction to the related law.
An analysis of a series of related cases handed down
in the 1971-1972 term of the Supreme Court dealing with
the power of the states to commit the mentally ill indicates
that the Court is willing to make a long overdue consideration of the substantive limits on the exercise of that power
and the procedural requirements that must be afforded to
those that are subject to it. In Jackson v. Indiana,' in a
statement destined to be often quoted, Mr. Justice Blackmun expressed both this willingness to examine commitment law and his dismay that the legal profession had not
brought this issue before the Court more often. He
observed: "Considering the number of persons affected, it
is perhaps remarkable that the substantive constitutional
limitations on this power have not been more frequently
litigated." 2
In that case, Theon Jackson, a mentally defective
deaf mute who had been charged with two counts of
robbery (the total value of the allegedly stolen goods was
five dollars), was committed after examination by two
physicians and a hearing on the matter as incompetent to
stand trial on the robbery charges. Indiana law also provides
for the civil commitment of insane persons and the civil
commitment of feeble-minded persons. Both of these
statutes differ from the commitment of persons incompetent to stand trial in a number of ways, including 1)
commitment under either civil statute would have been
according to a stricter standard of proof of the relevant
mental defect; 2) release under the civil commitment
statutes would have been easier to attain; and 3) the
treatment received under either civil statute would have
been different and, arguably, better for Jackson.
Jackson claimed that the procedure used violated his
rights under the fourteenth amendment. The Court agreed,

holding that the commitment of Jackson as incompetent to
stand trial under the Indiana law denied him equal
protection of the law and that the procedure used in this
commitment constituted a violation of due process.
In finding Jackson's commitment a violation of equal
protection, the Court was extending the principle established in Baxtrom v. Herold.3 In that case the Supreme
Court held that the State of New York had denied Johnnie
Baxtrom equal protection of the law when, near the
expiration of the term of his prison sentence, he was
summarily transferred, after a brief hearing, from state
prison to a hospital for the criminally insane to serve
indefinitely until adjudged sane. All other persons committed civilly under New York law were granted a review de
novo before a jury of the finding of mental illness and,
before commitment to the particular facility where Baxtrom was confined, it had to be judicially determined that
the individual was dangerous as well as mentally ill. The
Court found that a classification based on Baxtrom's status
as a confined prisoner was not a rational basis upon which
to discriminate between Baxtrom and all other persons
committed under New York law as mentally ill and,
therefore, to do so was a violation of equal protection.
In Jackson, the Court, citing Baxtrom, used nearly
identical logic: "If criminal conviction and imposition of
sentence are insufficient to justify less procedural and
substantive protection against indefinite commitment than
that generally afforded to all others, the mere filing of
criminal charges cannot suffice.' 4 In order to satisfy the
requirements of equal protection, the state must show a
rational basis for any procedure that deprives the committed person of substantial rights that would be available
to any other person similarly committed. The Court
rejected both the contention that Jackson's pending
criminal charges were sufficient basis upon which to
discriminate between him and all others civilly committed
and rejected the argument that the commitment was only
temporary (i.e., until Jackson recovered), primarily since on
the facts Jackson's recovery was highly unlikely.
In holding that the procedures used to commit
Jackson and his continued confinement were violations of
due process, the Court did more than reapply a recognized
principle of law. The Court examined the proceedings used
to commit Jackson and the reasons given to justify his
confinement in the light of the realities of that confinement, i.e., the treatment that would be afforded Jackson
and the likelihood that he would ever stand trial on the
original charges. While withholding explicit statement or
definition of the exact basis upon which justification for
commitment could be based, the Court very bluntly stated:

1.
2.

3.
4.

406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972).
Id. at 738.

383 U.S. 107 (1967).
406 U.S. at 724.
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We need not address these broad questions here. It is
clear that Jackson's commitment rests on proceedings
that did not purport to bring into play, indeed did not
even consider relevant, any of the articulated bases for
exercise of Indiana's power of indefinite commitment.
The state statutes contain at least two alternative
methods for invoking this power. But Jackson was not
afforded any 'formal commitment proceedings
addressed to [his] ability to function in society,' or to
society's interest in his restraint, or to the State's
ability to aid him in attaining competency through
custodial or compulsory treatment, the ostensible
purpose of the commitment. At the least, due process
requires that the nature and duration of commitment
bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for
which the individual is committed.
We hold, consequently, that a person charged
by a State with a criminal offense who is committed
solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial
cannot be held more than a reasonable period of time
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
probability that he will attain that capacity in the
5
forseeable future. (Citation omitted.)
The Court further required that any continued confinement
of Jackson as not competent to stand trial would have to be
based on a probability that he would return to trial and
could only be justified by progress towards that goal.
Thus, while it is possible that due process would not
be violated-although the Court was clearly withholding
judgment-by a proper procedure committing Jackson by
reason of a mental disability or because he was a danger to
the public or temporarily while he is recovering his ability
to stand trial, even these commitments would not only have
to be justified by their proper purpose, but also examined
as to the appropriateness of the conditions and duration of
confinement.
In a related case, McNeil v. Director, Paxutent
6
Edward McNeil, originally convicted on two
Institute,
counts of assault and sentenced to five years in prison, was
sent to Paxutent Institution for observation to determine
whether he should be committed indefinitely as a defective
delinquent under relevant Maryland law. McNeil flatly
refused at all times to talk to the Paxutent psychiatrists
and, at the expiration of the five-year original sentence, no
decision relating to commitment as a defective delinquent
having been made, McNeil claimed that continued confinement under the observation order was no longer valid. In a
unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court held that McNeil's
confinement violated the fourteenth amendment and constituted a denial of due process of law. Specifically the
Court held that it is a denial of due process to continue to
hold a person in a mental institution on the basis of an ex
7
parte order committing him solely for observation. Citing
its decision in Jackson, the Court acknowledged that if the
commitment had in reality been a temporary commitment
for observation the requirements of substantive and pro5.
Id. at 737-738.
6.
407 U.S. 245 (1972).
7.
In a companion case, Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court,
407 U.S. 355 (1972), the Court refused for reasons not related to
the merits to consider a more comprehensive challenge to the
defective delinquent law itself.

cedural due process might have been less; but since it was
clearly a long-term indefinite commitment, the state must
afford McNeil "required

(procedural) safeguards"

8

or, if

not, strictly limit the confinement so it is, in fact, for
temporary observation. Only then could the nature of the
process and the duration of the commitment be reasonably
related to the purpose for which the individual is
committed.
The state argued that McNeil could not claim a
violation of his rights since it was his refusal to talk that
prevented his examination, and thus prevented his hearing,
comparing this situation to that of civil contempt. While
leaving open the question of whether due process would be
violated by such a use of the contempt power and not
ruling on the applicability of McNeil's counter-argument
that he had a fifth amendment right to remain silent, the
Court rejected the state's argument holding that even if
McNeil's action were analogous to civil contempt, procedural due process would require a hearing to determine if
9
McNeil's acts had in fact constituted contempt.
Previously in the same term the Court had confronted
but not settled similar issues. In Humphrey v. Cady, 'o
Donald Humphrey was convicted of contributing to the
delinquency of a minor, but in lieu of a sentence he was
committed as a sex deviate under the Wisconsin Sex Crimes
Act. Pursuant to that Act, Humphrey was first committed
for observation and then, after medical recommendation
and a hearing before a judge (but not a jury), committed
for a period equal to his sentence. At the expiration of his
sentence term, the state applied under the Wisconsin
procedure for a five-year renewal of the sexual deviant
commitment. Humphrey claimed that both the procedure
used for the original commitment and the procedure used
to renew the commitment violated his fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection and due process. Specifically, he claimed that it was a violation of equal protection
to deny him a jury trial, that it was a violation of due
process to deny him the right to counsel incident to the
original hearing and to deny him the assistance of effective
counsel at the renewal hearing, and that the actual place of
treatment and the actual treatment received violated both
equal protection and due process.
The district court dismissed these claims without a
hearing as lacking in merit and because Humphrey failed to
raise these issues before the state courts. " The court of
appeals affirmed on the ground that there was no merit in
the claim. However, the Supreme Court found Humphrey's
8.
The exact procedural safeguards required for a long-term
commitment are not clearly defined in Jackson or McNeil. At the
least, a long-term commitment of a defective delinquent would
require all the safeguards afforded in any other form of civil
commitment in that jurisdiction.
9.
Mr. Justice Douglas in a concurring opinion found the fifth
amendment violated and would have ordered the release of McNeil
immediately on that basis alone.
10.
405 U.S. 504 (1972).
11.
The issue of waiver by failure to raise claims in state court
will not be discussed, but the Court's remand order indicated that
the issue be fully heard in the district court.
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claims substantial enough to warrant an evidentiary hearing
and remanded the case to the district court
The equal protection argument again focused on the
principle recognized in Baxtrom: the state must justify a
procedure for commitment that differs substantially from
procedures used by that state in other forms of commitment. In this case, the critical factor was that in Wisconsin
commitment of the mentally ill requires a hearing before a
jury, 12 while commitment and renewal of commitment of
sexual deviants does not. Wisconsin claimed that this
discrimination was justified first by the fact that the sexual
deviant procedure was for persons already convicted of a
crime (basically the same justification rejected in Baxtrom)
and second by the fact that a jury trial was not appropriate
for the issues to be determined during the commitment of a
sex deviant. The Court acknowledged that the fact that a
person was under sentence may be relevant to distinguishing the first commitment, ie., for observation, from
other forms of commitment, but doubted it would be
relevant as a distinguishing factor once the sentence had
expired. Likewise, the Court did not rule out the possibility
of justifying the lack of a jury trial on the basis of its
inappropriateness to some forms of commitment, but
found the argument unproven. Therefore, the equal protection issue raised by Humphrey was found to raise a
substantial constitutional objection to the original and the
renewed commitment procedures. The Court remanded the
case for a full evidentiary hearing, to develop the facts
relating to this and the other objections raised by McNeil in
order that they be given full consideration.
What are the implications of these cases? First of all,
the Baxtrom principle has been reaffirmed and extended to
apply to a different type of commitment, namely the
situation where the discriminatory procedure was used to
commit a person found incompetent to stand trial. More
importantly, the list of procedural rights that cannot be
denied to one category of committed persons unless
justified by a proper rationale has been expanded; at least, a
civil commitment procedure denying to one category of
committed persons the right to a jury determination of
mental illness, or applying to that category a lesser standard

12.
Subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court in
Humphrey, the district court in Wisconsin found that the Wisconsin
civil commitment procedure is constitutionally defective insofar as
it fails to require effective and timely notice of the "charges" under
which a person is sought to be detained; fails to require adequate
notice of all rights, including the right to jury trial; permits
detention longer than 48 hours without a hearing on probable cause;
permits detention longer than two weeks without a full hearing on
the necessity for commitment; permits commitment based upon a
hearing in which the person charged with mental illness is not
represented by adversary counsel, at which hearsay evidence is
admitted, and in which psychiatric evidence is presented without
the patient having been given the benefit of the privilege against
self-incrimination; permits commitment without proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the patient is both "mentally ill" and
dangerous; and fails to require those seeking commitment to
consider less restrictive alternatives to commitment. Lessard v.
Schmidt, No. 71-C-602 (E.D. Wis., Oct. 18, 1972).

of proof, or requiring stricter standards for release, is
subject to constitutional challenge.
Due process has now been held to require an
examination of the procedure for commitment and the
conditions of confinement in light of the purported
purpose of the confinement. If the procedure does not
relate to the purpose, e.g., the committed person is given a
summary hearing but the commitment is justified as serving
to protect society from a person found to be dangerous, or
the actual confinement does not relate to the purpose, e.g.,
long-term confinement where the purpose is to observe, it
violates due process.
But these cases are not particularly noteworthy
because of the principles they recognize. The Court has
previously recognized the applicability of the due process
and equal protection clauses to civil commitment. 13 What
is new is not the principles but their method of application
to the civil commitment process. The Court is now willing
to scrutinize the justifications and purposes for civil
commitment and require that they be made explicit.
Whether due to a reluctance to enter this area or, as Justice
Blackmun indicates, due to the lack of cases in this area,
there has previously been little law on this subject that
meaningfully examines these justifications. What is the
state's real purpose in commitment? Is it to protect society
from the individual? Or is it to fulfill the state's desire to
treat him? What are the limits imposed on these purposes
by the Constitution?
Similarly, the Court is now willing to look at the
realities of the confinement. The Court would not allow
Indiana to justify Jackson's confinement as a legitimate
confinement lasting until the incompetent individual recovered, since on the facts it was unlikely that Jackson
would recover and it was clear that the commitment was
more custodial than rehabilitative. Nor would the Court
accept Maryland's argument that McNeil was being held for
observation, since the confinement had lasted over five
years.
What the Court should do, and what the Court
appears ready to do should the issues be properly placed
before it, is develop these legal doctrines in at least three
broad areas. First, it will inevitably be decided exactly what
purposes are constitutionally permissible bases for civil
commitment. In this regard, it must be considered that one
parameter of civil commitment is its duration-for observation, temporarily, or indefinite-but another parameter that
must be considered is inherent in the fact that civil
commitment is really a generic term. The limits of
permissible purposes for civil commitment will differ,
presumably, depending on whether the commitment is of a
mentally ill individual, a sexual deviant, a defective delinquent, or other category of nonpenal confinement. Second,
guidelines must be established to determine the constitutionality of the various procedures used, and these guidelines must be related to the permissible purposes. Third, a
13.
383 U.S. 107 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605
(1966).
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more thorough examination must be made of the relation
between the purposes for and conditions of confinement,
particularly in regard to the treatment actually received.
Any time the length or character or place of confinement is
not realistically related to the purpose of confinement, the
commitment should be subject to challenge. This examination could go so far as to recognize the judically enforceable right to treatment recently recognized in some lower
courts. 14 To oversimplify, the theory of a right to
treatment is that due process requires that any commitment
whose purpose is to provide treatment for the individual is
invalid if adequate treatment is not provided. Recognition
of the right to treatment would be consistent with the
Court holdings in the cases cited above and, moreover, it
appears that the Court has taken a first step towards
explicitly accepting this doctrine. In Jackson, the Court
held that any further commitment based on a probability
that Jackson could soon stand trial "must be justified by
5
progress towards that goal."'1
Another area for consideration, less clearly visible
within the scope of "what the Court is now willing to
do," 16 but worth singling out within the context of what
the Court should do because of its potential impact, is the
principle of the least restrictive alternative. In a recent
article, 17 David Chambers argues that certainly as a matter
of good policy and possibly as a requirement of the
Constitution, 's the courts should require that in the
commitment of the mentally ill the state should impose no
greater restriction on freedom of the individual committed
than is necessary to fulfill the purpose upon which the
commitment is justified. As a specific example, commitment should not mean long-term in-patient hospital care if
a less restrictive form of care such as treatment in a halfway
house or a drug therapy program administered on an
out-patient basis, is sufficient to satisfy the objectives of
the state.
Chambers argues that, as in other areas of the law
where fundamental rights are curtailed by the legitimate
action of the state, 19 the Constitution requires that the
least restrictive means for accomplishing that end be used.
This is consistent with the approach to the constitutionality
of a civil commitment as outlined in the cases cited above.
The principle of the least restrictive alternative is a
requirement that the purposes for commitment be made
14.
See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 and 344 F. Supp.
373 (M.D. Ala. 1972). But see. Burnham v. Dep't of Public Health
(N.D. Ga., Aug. 4, 1972).
15.
406 U.S. at 738.
16.
Technically the Court has denied its willingness, State v.
Sanchez, 80 N.M. 438, 457 P.2d 370 (1968), appeal dismissed, 396
U.S. 276 (1969). But see, Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally lI. Practical Guides and Constitutional
Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1108, 1151 (1972).
17.
See Chambers, supra note 16.
18.
See Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966,971 (M.D. Pa. 1971);
but see, State v. Sanchez, 80 N.M. 438,457 P.2d 370 (1968), appeal
dismissed, 396 U.S. 276 (1969).
19.
See, Chambers, supra note 16, at 1145-68.

explicit and examined and that an examination be made of
the realities of the confinement and the treatment
received. 20 It does, however, go further than those cases. It
requires the recognition that civil commitment involves
interference with a fundamental constitutional right 25 and
an evaluation of the purposes for the commitment and the
resulting confinement in light of the seriousness of the
interference with that fundamental right. The argument
that civil confinement involves an interference with fundamental rights is nearly overwhelming; the weighing of
treatment alternatives, however, presents a problem of
justiciability that will make many courts hesitant to accept
this principle.
Nonetheless, the least restrictive alternative should be
a particularly appealing extension of the law of civil
commitment, both to the courts and to the counsel that
argue before them. In theory, it allows the courts to protect
individual rights while making little or no incursion into the
interests of the committing states. Moreover, in most
instances, it can be the basis for an attack on the legality of
a commitment that results in long-term custodial careprobably the source of the most egregious abuses within
mental health systems-without doing so at the cost that
many, if not all, courts are unwilling to pay, the complete
release of the individual from custody.
These needs for legal development and the challenge
issued by Justice Blackmun should be impetus enough to
litigation; but beyond that, one need only look to the cases
themselves for a far greater incentive. In addition to their
contributions to legal literature, the facts of these cases,
even within the context of judicial opinion, are a chronicle
of the abusive results that can occur when men are allowed
to control the lives of their fellowmen without the
sanctions of legal and social constraints. It would not be
surprising, for example, to find that the Supreme Court was
swayed as much by Indiana's outrageously indifferent
treatment of Theon Jackson, as it was by the legal
arguments that supported his contentions. 22 It is surprising
that so many others, witness to equally disturbing similar
situations, remain unaffected.
20.
See note 12 supra.
21.
Chambers lists as possibilities: the freedom to travel, the
freedom of association, and the freedom from physical
confinement.
22.
See also Mr. Justice Douglas' restatement of the facts in his
concurring opinion to McNeil v. Director, Paxutent Institute, 407
U.S. 245 (1972).
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Legal Assistants: The Experience of the Legal Aid Society of the City and County of St. Louis
by David A. Lander, Associate Director for General Services
and Community Development, St. Louis Legal Aid Society
The Plan
In June 1971, the Legal Aid Society of the City and
County of St. Louis adopted a plan to help handle the ever
expanding case load using a limited budget and limited
attorney staff. We realized we needed more good minds,
but a look at our budget forced us to find an economical
solution. We decided to hire persons directly from our
client community and train them to fulfill our needs. Our
hopes were that they could capably handle routine cases
and allow our lawyers to spend their time on more complex
individual cases and to engage in law reform and urban
development projects.
Selection and Training
We sought people of all ages who had high school
diplomas or equivalency certificates, but little or no college.
Although the starting salary was low we were besieged with
applicants. Our main criteria was sincerity, an identification
with our client community, and an ability to learn and use
legal skills. The legal assistants we picked live where they
work. They know our clients and have lived through many
of their problems.
The legal assistants spent the first weeks listening to
lawyers and law professors speak about the law and the
legal profession. Next, discussions were held with community leaders. The goal was to impart substantive legal
knowledge and an understanding of how the forces in the
community operate. In addition, they took an English and
Legal Technology course at a local junior college at night.
The next step was "on the job" training in each of
our offices. They learned how each of our units functioned,
met our personnel, and observed cases being handled. After
this they were given intensive interviewing experience.
After about four months they were given
semipermanent positions. Seven legal assistants were placed
in the specialized units of employment, consumer, housing,
welfare, and family law. We called three of the legal
assistants "circuit riders" and set them up to visit health
centers, settlement houses, public hospitals, welfare organizations and other gathering points throughout the metropolitan area. Each week the circuit riders follow a set
schedule and interview clients who previously had found it
inconvenient to visit one of our regular offices. We have
also used a mobile van to set up offices where no space is
available. As a result of these efforts we now have 30
additional offices with no additional overhead. We can send
legal assistants to centers where we cannot afford to send a
lawyer.
The legal assistants handle interviewing in most cases.
After consultation, lawyer and assistant decide whether the
case must be transferred to a lawyer or can be handled
completely by the legal assistant with an attorney's

guidance. They consult on the appropriate action to take
and follow up together when problems arise. Any letters
that are written by a legal assistant bear the signatures of
both the legal assistant and the lawyer. Interesting cases are
written up for the benefit of all legal assistants.
In addition to the great bulk of miscellaneous cases
that the assistants handle completely, they have developed
specialties in each of our subject areas. In consumer, they
handle most utility cases to a conclusion; in housing they
take care of most lockouts. We have worked out systems
for handling Section 518 (b) complaints and for dealing
with HUD and the mortgagees on FHA problems, and most
of the work is done by the legal assistants. In welfare they
do everything but present evidence at the fair hearing; in
family law they take all information in divorce, adoption
and name change cases and the lawyer need only meet
briefly with the client and then appear at the hearing. In
employment, we have worked out systems whereby nearly
all aspects of wage claims, unemployment compensation
and discrimination matters except hearings are handled by
legal assistants.
Evaluation of the Plan
Our evaluation of our plans shows that they have not
only met our original goals but have had numerous
unexpected advantages. Much of the lawyers' time has been
freed, allowing them to work on the more complex
individual cases and to engage in law reform and community development projects. An unexpected result has
been that the routine cases are being handled more
thoroughly than before. The legal assistant has more time
and interest in resolving the relatively small matters and
does a more complete job. A second unexpected advantage
is the better relationship we now enjoy with our client
community. The legal assistants can communicate with
poor people better than most of our lawyers. This
improvement in communications inspires renewed confidence. The "circuit riding" has made it possible to reach
people to whom we have never had access before. Some of
the centers are in small pockets of poverty far from our
regular offices; some are in areas heavily populated by
senior citizens who rarely leave their neighborhoods; some
are in settlement houses to which many people turn as their
sole source of help. As a result of this program new
individual and group clients are coming to us and, due
partly to the efforts of one circuit rider who has numerous
centers in one section of the city, a coalition of groups
throughout that area is in the formative stages.
Of course, there were unexpected problems, but even
these, for the most part, have turned out to be helpful. We
soon discovered that the legal assistants work more efficiently with a more highly structured program than we had
ever had. Our experience with this structure made us realize
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that a more highly structured program could help our
lawyers. An example of the structure of the circuit rider
program may be informative. The circuit riders visit centers
five mornings and three afternoons each week. On Tuesday
afternoon and Friday afternoon all the circuit riders meet
with their supervising lawyers and often one other lawyer.
First, all cases are entered and given case numbers; then the
fact sheet for each interview is reviewed; then a determination is made, often based on the recommendation of the
circuit rider, as to how the case is to be handled. Next, each
active case is periodically reviewed and all letters are
evaluated before they are sent. Finally, each case that is to
be closed is discussed. All actions taken in every case are
recorded.
In addition to this administrative structure we were
also forced to examine and commit to writing the questions
we normally ask clients and the steps we usually take in
resolving routine problems. This process has been very
educational. The manual which we have compiled contains
interview guides on many problems as well as guides for
handling most routine cases and has proved beneficial to
our entire staff.'

Our concern that our clients would feel shortchanged
by the use of nonlawyers has not proved to be justified. We
have explained our rationale for using legal assistants to our
clients through our excellent community services supervisor. She convinced them to withhold criticism until they
had specific problems and complaints and when the
program took final shape they were clearly and vocally on
our side.
The private bar presented the problem of charges of
unauthorized practice of law. We countered this in two
ways. First, we structured the program so that the legal
assistants work closely with lawyers and so that their
actions were taken only after consultation with a supervising lawyer; second, we have been working closely with
the state bar committee which is looking into the use of
legal assistants. We have shared our extensive experience in
this area with that committee and the president of our
board has been an active member of it.
While it is still early to draw final conclusions, it is
clear to us that our plan is a necessary step in trying to do
everything that a Legal Services office must do to be
effective.

1.
The manual, PARALEGAL MANUAL, by the St. Louis Legal
Aid Society, is available from the Clearinghouse, Clearinghouse No.

9696 (246 pp.), $3.00 to both Legal Services attorneys and to all
others.

The Credentialing and Licensing of Paralegals and Paralegal Training
by The National Paralegal Institute, Washington, D.C.
I.

The Advantages to the Legal Profession

The organized bar has three basic approaches to the
practice of law-related activities by non-lawyers. The first
approach is to decide (either unilaterally or by agreement
with another professional group) that the activity in
question is not the practice of law. The second is to define
an activity as the practice of law and attempt to proscribe it
by declaring it to be "unauthorized" and, if it continues, to
seek legal enjoinder. Concerns have been expressed that a
wide range of paralegal activities performed by non-lawyers
are "unauthorized practice" and the answer thus far has
uniformly been that most of these are permissible. In
general, Opinion 316 of the American Bar Association
(1967) and the Association's Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 3-6 (1970) indicate that,
aside from the most clear forms of legal practice (such as
going to court or giving legal advice to clients), paralegal
work is proper so long as it is under the general supervision
of an attorney and the attorney takes responsibility for the
work product. A third method of controlling activities that
cut into the legal field is to establish credentialing, licensing
and other requirements so the activity can proceed only
under control by attorneys. This essentially assures the legal
profession that the activity will be performed firmly within
the existing legal delivery system, and thus not threaten the

ethical control and standards set by the bar. The result is
that attorneys will not have outside competitors, but will
gain by ensuring that paralegal skills are only available
through lawyers.
Credentialing paralegals will also help to assure the
public that only persons who fully understand the ethical
limitations of their work will be "admitted to practice" as
paralegals. Credentialing, in this sense, is partially a technique to enforce the Code of Professional Responsibility as
it applies to paralegal activity. Credentialing can lead to
paralegals operating under set modes of conduct consistent
with the rules governing attorneys.
By helping to delineate job responsibilities and
carving out a sharply defined subprofession, credentialing
will assure attorneys of their place at the top of the legal
delivery hierarchy. Rather than being one type of specialist
among many, lawyers will be generalists, coordinating the
activities of specialists. This unique status has been imperiled in recent years by the encroachment of other
professional groups upon the lawyer's traditional claim to
exclusive capacity in the law. Strictly credentialed paralegals will be unlikely to challenge lawyers' claims of being
the most capable dispensers of legal service.
Another advantage to the lawyer will be the
establishment of a reliable talent marketplace. Credentialing
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will reduce a hit or miss hiring and will present the attorney
with several well-defined and certified types of assistants
from whom he may choose. Lawyers will have more
confidence in their ability to restructure their operating
procedures and experiment with new delivery techniques if
they are assured of a manpower pool that is guaranteed to
meet a certain minimum level of knowledge and training.
Lawyers will also be able to simplify their training needs by
sending their employees to accredited institutions for
specifically needed job skills. Once they determine what
they need, attorneys will be able to save time and
uncertainty by giving their employees a continuing education without losing work time. Also, the incentive will be
greater for the employee to take courses when they lead to
a recognized certificate or degree.
II.

The Advantages to the Paralegal

Without credentialing, and its concomitant promise
of specific expertise, paralegals are frequently viewed as
glorified office boys, investigators, or secretaries with
special capacity. Credentialing will supply the role definition that supports recognition for specific areas of
competence and a distinct use and treatment by employers.
From this distinction a certain degree of job security can be
expected. Credentialed specialties will be looked upon as
careers, rather than mere jobs. Just as a credentialed legal
secretary is looked upon as being superior to an ordinary
secretary who has picked up similar skills in a haphazard
way, those with paralegal specialties will have a sense of
worthwhile place with the legal field.
For those who have managed to meet all credentialing
requirements, a large paralegal career ladder may be opened
up. Upward mobility is improved because new levels of
technical expertise are available. And lateral mobility is
greatly improved because a credentialed paralegal is a
known quantity to prospective employers.
Once a reliable supply of qualified paralegals is
assured to the legal profession through credentialing, it is
likely that the demand for paralegal services will greatly
expand. Credentialing will serve to convince lawyers that
they can reduce cost by delegating tasks to approved
specialists. Once a paralegal is credentialed, he leaves a
large, mostly undifferentiated, manpower pool and joins a
select, though expanding, one. If the credentialing is of an
exclusory nature (uncredentialed person may not engage in
the practice) rather than of an ability certifying nature
(credentialed persons are best qualified to practice), the
paralegal's lock on a good job is even more secure.
Credentialing gives paralegals the assurance that when
they want to upgrade themselves by taking courses they
will probably not be wasting their money. It also makes the
task of finding the desired training easier, as well as
exposing new possibilities to those unsure of what they
want.
Ill.

The Advantages to the Public

Both the formal strictures placed upon a paralegal
during the credentialing process and the informal training
the paralegal receives while being taught the tools of the

trade will tend to protect the public. Paralegals who go
through a credentialed training program will be held to a
high standard of care in the conduct of their jobs and will
presumably be better aware of their responsibilities to the
public and the best ways to discharge these obligations.
Adequate credentialing assures the public that even though
the attorney delegates work which has been traditionally
performed by attorneys only, those to whom this work is
delegated are specifically prepared and competent to do it.
Assuming, for the moment, that the average
practitioner will pass on lower cost to the client in the form
of lower charges for identical end products, the introduction of paralegals into the typical law office will mean
cheaper legal services at no loss to lawyers. Systematization
and routinized delegation will mean that more and more
people will be able to afford lawyers for more of their legal
needs. Volume business is more practical and less subject to
abuse when paralegals are well trained.
IV.

The Disadvantages of Credentialing

There are three different ways in which credentialing
may be harmful. First, it may be harmful because it has
come too soon, even though it might be useful at a later
stage in the development of paralegalism. Second, it may be
harmful because, while some credentialing could be beneficial, the level of credentialing has been set too high. And,
third, it may be harmful if its effect is to exclude persons
from an activity legally rather than to certify the ability to
engage in the activity. An attempt is made below to show
where these three problems, when they occur, are
detrimental to the legal profession, to the public, and to
paralegals themselves.
A.

Credentialing too Soon

The development of paralegalism is in its infancy,
particularly when compared to progress in other paraprofessional fields. If credentialing is imposed before the field
is more fully developed, premature structuring and unnecessary rigidity may develop. The first place this may occur
is in the evolution of training programs and curricula. If
teaching methods, curricula, academic levels, or academic
settings (to say nothing of on-the-job training) are fixed
prematurely, or ruled out by simple omission from an
approved list, experimentation will be stifled. Furthermore,
useful specialization will be inhibited. Useful specialties
may not develop because they are prematurely defined out
of paralegalism and not accepted as certified paralegal
activities. At present, there are potentially over 30 different
paralegal specialty areas to be developed, as well as over 20
more useful only to the public sector. In such areas of
office administration, trusts and estates, SEC registration,
divorce, landlord-tenant, and many others, laymen are at
work today in both the public and private sector. It is not
yet known what paralegal promise can be made real in such
areas as drug addiction, prisoners' rights, anti-trust, FCC
licensing and consumer regulation.
Finally, premature credentialing may inhibit the
development of new delivery systems. Programs may be
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quickly credentialed to produce people well trained in
helping lawyers to serve their clients in a slightly more
mechanized, but still traditional way. Thus, early credentialing, rather than hastening a law practice revolution
called for by many within and without ABA, may help to
perpetuate old-fashioned service techniques. Paralegalism
should mean more than the production of super legal
secretaries. It may even mean more than the development
of new job specialties. For paralegals to be fully useful, the
structure and composition of the typical law office may
have to be revised. This is unlikely to happen if job roles are
quickly fixed.
Paralegalism should have the chance to work out
naturally the level of technical competence, degree of
formal education, and amount of experience necessary to
perform an adequate job at each career level. Terms such as
"lay associate," "lay assistant," "advocate" or "technician"
are not yet well defined although all of them are used by
lawyers to describe various kinds of paralegal work.
Attempts to freeze these definitions are bound to elude us
until we know more of what each job ought to mean.
B.

Setting Requirements too High

If legal paraprofessionals must possess high academic
credentials, most of the sorts of people who now choose
paraprofessional careers in other fields would be unable to
become paralegals. Most paraprofessional jobs require only
a high-school diploma to start and a specialized training
program (rarely exceeding two years) thereafter. As yet,
there is no evidence that academic credits are a valid job
criterion in the paralegal field.
If it were to set certification requirements too high,
the bar would risk creating two sets of legal workers. There
would be a small, elite class of paraprofessionals who enter
at the top, and another group of "new careerists" who
enter at the bottom, frequently in antipoverty Legal
Services entry level positions, and who have no way to
bridge the gap to the top. If there is no well defined,
graduated, and worthwhile midground between the academically trained, highly credentialed and the community
workers, lay advocates, and office aides, trained largely
on-the-job, the latter group will quickly reach dead-end
positions. While it is realistic to assume that the qualified
paralegal aspirants who enter with low academic credentials
will be able to afford and master two-year specialized junior
college programs while they work, it is far less realistic to
assume that they can either piece together a college degree
or the time to get one. The situation will be even worse if a
four-year college program is the prerequisite for paralegal
training (as it is now for legal training). This will close the
field to all but the middle class college graduate who is not
quite good enough for, or does not want to face the rigor of
law school.
Excessively high credentialing requirements will
virtually stop junior colleges, private training institutes, and
organizations that do on-the-job training from developing
paralegal programs. It is not at all certain whether four-year
colleges or law schools are the best place for any, let alone

all, paralegal training. Unless technically specialized programs are developed, similar to teacher or engineer training,
colleges-will not be sufficiently focused to do the best job.
Even if such programs are set up, it is not clear whether
four years of academic work before any intensive exposure
to the actual practice of paralegal work is the best method
of turning out a high volume of qualified paralegals who are
prepared to stay in the field for several years. Junior
colleges, on the other hand, are at present oriented to
prepare to turn out the sorts of graduates who can
immediately take productive jobs in law offices. Junior
colleges already offer courses that fully qualify people to be
paraprofessionals in several other fields. Further, junior
colleges have the greatest flexibility with regard to parttime or interrupted studies and as to integration with
on-the-job training.
Credentialing only law schools to do paralegal
training would be an even greater mistake. An analogy is
often made to the training of dental or medical paraprofessionals, but paraprofessionals in those fields most often
perform physical tasks that require specialized equipment
and a well protected person to "practice on." In both
medical and dental schools, the primary task of the
paraprofessional (and often the professional) is learning by
doing. This is not the case of law schools. The routinization
of legal tasks, for example, would be counter productive in
a good law school, where analysis and academic inquiries
are emphasized. If paralegal training is forced into the law
school mold, the law school will turn out, not well trained
paralegals, but poorly trained sub-lawyers drilled in blackletter law. And, if paralegal training is not developed on the
law school model of case analysis and rational inquiry, the
result will be the production of two classes of end
products: an elite corps of lawyers, and a resentful group of
paralegals who are not eligible for participation in the more
elite training going on around them. Because they are not
the primary concern of a law school, paralegals will be
treated as side products. And, with most law schools'
reluctance to change teaching methods in the direction of
practical training, it is unlikely that paralegal training in law
schools will be innovative. There is little hope, if paralegal
training is restricted to law schools, that the profession will
adapt to new delivery methods available.
C.

Exclusory Credentialing

If credentialing is seen as a process by which the bar
can fix the nature and amount of training one needs to be a
paralegal, rather than determine who is best qualified to be
a paralegal, several cost factors will sharply rise. The cost to
attorneys will rise in two ways. The raw number of people
who meet the paralegal educational requirements will be
reduced. Because the supply may be far less than the
demand, wage demands will be high. Also, exclusory
credentialing will result in the employment of only those
persons who have made a sizeable monetary investment in
their careers. A sizeable return on that investment will be
anticipated, especially if attorneys are not free to dip into
the larger pool of experienced workers who do not meet
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the formal requirements of a credentialed program.
Exclusory credentialing will also make entrance into
the paralegal field prohibitively expensive to poor people.
There will be no way for the majority of people who are
usually thought of as prime candidates for paralegal
positions to start at the bottom of a career ladder. And
there will be no incentive for them to do so, even if it is
marginally possible, because the goal of being credentialed
will seem too remote.
The general public may also suffer from exclusory
paralegal credentialing because it raises the cost of delivery
of many routinizable services. One promise of paralegalism
is the eventual passing on of savings gained by modernizing
legal delivery systems. This goal will not be realized if there
is no way to lower appreciably the delivery costs of the
paralegal component of the system. Poor people will be
especially hard hit by this. If the right to be a paralegal is
severely restricted, it will prove impossible to provide legal
services in any appreciable quantity to the elderly poor,
marginal workers, or welfare recipients.
Both the private bar and antipoverty Legal Services
have been experimenting with inhouse training of a variety
of paralegals. Exclusory credentialing could mean that not
only would the mobility of paralegals trained inhouse be
strongly curtailed, but that the right of those already
trained to practice their trade might be denied.
Exclusory credentialing could severly restrict the
entire concept of paralegalism. If a particular job role, such
as lay advocate or community worker, is not seen as
productive, it may be defined out of paralegalism by the
simple expedient of failing to credentialize any programs
that produce these positions. Credentialing lends itself as a
back door method of imposing unauthorized practice rules
when such enforcement is either legally or politically
impossible to accomplish directly. Questions of unauthorized practice should be decided on their own terms
rather than through the indirect method of credentialing.
If exclusory credentialing is accomplished through
state regulation, the interstate mobility of paralegals will be
greatly curtailed. In addition, it may prove difficult to undo
the damage of idiosyncratic state legislation in every area of
paralegal credentialing. The development of the field can be
effectively stunted by ad hoc state regulation, and locally
set limits will tend to be much more restrictive than a
national code of suggested minimum standards.
V.

Recommendations

Some credentialing of paralegals is probably
beneficial and certainly inevitable. However, great care
must be taken to avoid precipitous action that could throw
the development of paralegalism off course. Specifically,
credentialing should be avoided until experimentation in
training and paralegal use has proceeded far enough to
evaluate the effectiveness of several different types of
paralegals and legal delivery systems. Allowing enough time
for a wide range of paralegal activities to develop will
ensure that credentialing will not stifle potentially useful
types of training and work patterns. Further, credentialing

should be slowed until a systematic comparison and
evaluation can be made of differing approaches and
techniques now at use in public and private law settings.
At least for the next few years, and perhaps
permanently, credentialing should take the form of ability
certification, not legal exclusion. It would be an unfortunate loss of available manpower and experimentation in
learning capacity if paraprofessionals were drawn from only
a limited, exclusive segment of society and used for only
limited, traditional purposes. State regulation to this effect
should be discouraged.
Credentialing based on general academic level should
be avoided. Both entrance level qualifications and final
position certification should be based on the degree of
training and demonstrated ability to perform specific tasks,
not the ability to amass unrelated academic credits.
Paralegal development should be encouraged in the
junior colleges. Junior colleges have the potential to train
paralegals for a wide variety of useful job specialties. They
should be provided with technical assistance from the
organized bar, public sector, and law schools in order to
develop this potential more fully. Integrated law schooljunior college programs should be explored.
Experimentation in the private and public sectors
should be encouraged. Private firms, single practitioners,
Legal Services offices, and public defenders should be
encouraged and aided to develop new legal delivery systems
that effectively use paralegals. The organizcd bar should
avoid restricting such efforts and should provide facilities
for the rapid interchange of information and manpower.
Thousands of poor clients throughout the country are
turned away from Legal Services because the lawyers and
funds are not available to serve them. Often their problems
are simple and could easily be handled by well trained and
supervised paralegals. The funds to serve these clients by
traditional means will, by all informed estimates, not be
forthcoming. To restrict the use of paralegals is to deny
service to these clients and will place a heavy responsibility
on those who restrict.
Lawyers throughout the country are now spending
untold hours on repetitious low level work even to the point
of completing routine forms or endlessly drafting simple
standardized instruments. Time and scope for experimentation are needed to relieve lawyers of these burdens,
so that work more suited to the profession can be pursued.
The organized bar has a responsibility to oversee legal
paraprofessionalism and to ensure that the highest ethical
standards are met while justice is provided. It is consistent
with that responsibility for the bar to encourage experimentation and discourage excessive regulation while devoting substantial effort toward keeping fully abreast of
paralegal developments through evaluations of what lawyers
and paralegals are now doing.
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National Paralegal Institute Holds
Nationwide Meeting of Legal Services Paralegals
On January 15 and 16, 1973, the National Paralegal
Institute hosted the first nationwide meeting of Legal
Services paralegals. Representatives were invited from each
of the ten regions and several other participants came at
their own expense. The twin purposes of the meeting were
to inform the Institute of the range of paraprofessional
activities in LSPs around the country and to explore the
future role of paralegals within Legal Services and other
sectors of public and private law.
The meeting opened with presentations on new
careers and other paraprofessions; the history and development of paralegalism in public and private law; a summary
of what the Institute has already found out about LSP
paralegals; and a description of the work done by private
law paralegals.
The bulk of the meeting's formal sessions was
devoted to explorations of paralegal training and education.

Panels were held on welfare training techniques; the use of
videotape; an analysis of comparative curricula for use in
different training settings; and a discussion of trends in
credentialing and accreditation of paralegals. These panels
were then summarized and their results were translated into
a set of recommendations for future action.
Finally, the entire group took up the subject of the
viability of paraprofessional organization. This included
discussions of the definition of "paralegal" (does it include
secretaries, investigators, etc); the form that paralegal
organization should take (public and private combined,
local or national, etc); and career development and relations
within Legal Services.
Two reports will eventually be made available. The
Institute plans to summarize the proceedings and make
recommendations to the Office of Legal Services (OLS) on
the feasibility of setting up a paralegal organization and the
direction OLS should be following in the use and development of paralegals. The conference participants also plan to
issue a report on some of these same subjects which will be
addressed to the practicing paralegal.

Some Comments on the National Paralegal Institute's Memorandum
on Credentialing and Licensing Paralegals and Paralegal Training
by John A. Lee, Paralegal, Legal Services Center, Seattle, Washington
Credentialing, as a general phenomenon, has three
functions which were not directly discussed in the
Institute's memo. First, it is used in an attempt to
guarantee predictability in method of expression, type, and
style of interaction. For the existing legal structure, this is
obviously a benefit; for the active paralegal there are times
when unpredictability or rather the ability to chose
between differing approaches to a problem is a primary
asset. As John Kenneth Galbraith said, "A bureaucracy
under attack is a fortress with thick walls but fixed guns."
Second, the ability to credential implies the power to
bestow legitimacy. Paralegals already know the value of
their work, and derive their legitimacy from the people
they serve, not from any "superior" group or organization
which has historically ignored the needs of its clients.
Finally, an attribute of credentialing which is particularly
relevant to the legal profession is its use as part of a
socialization process. When used in conjunction with an
extended period of training, the credential stands for this
common experience as much as anything else.
The statement that credentials are necessary for the
provision of quality service is, as a general statement,
obviously untrue. None of the paralegals attending the
National Paralegal Institute's conference, and none of those
working for OEO have yet been credentialed, yet it
certainly must be admitted that a great number of them
have demonstrated competency in their area. The question
of whether or not credentialing will work to ensure a higher

general level of competency is something that should be
determined in relation to a particular proposal; it cannot be
assumed to follow from any method.
In the NPI memo on this subject, an attempt was
made to outline the desirable aspects of credentialing. It
seems that this section is directed to paralegals only in as
much as they can be "used" by "the legal profession,"
which rather obviously means attorneys in the private
sector. Some statements are made that appear to have no
basis in fact whatsoever, such as "[credentialing] makes the
task of finding the desired training easier." Other points
advanced assume changes that would only occur under very
specialized conditions of credentialing, and then only after
a complete restructuring of legal service delivery system-"a
large paralegal career ladder may be opened up."
A hope of greater prestige and increased job security
are really the only things held out to paralegals as
aadvantages of some credentialing system. It is suggested by
some that exclusory credentialing would be the way in
which these interests could best be served. The great
majority of paralegal workers do not have the narrow
self-serving view that would permit the imposition of
widespread exclusory credentialing. To suggest it as a
benefit implies that paralegals have fundamentally the same
pseudo-professional, elitist orientation that has been so
successfully maintained by the bar. Exclusory regulation
would be much more than "an unfortunate loss of available
manpower and experimentation in learning capacity"; it

668

Clearinghouse Review

HeinOnline -- 6 Clearinghouse Rev. 668 1972-1973

would be a denial of the paralegal role of community
educator, a rejection of the hope that the law can be
demystified, and an excuse for further erosion of the rights
of the individual.
At present there are some areas of paralegal activity
(such as welfare hearings) that are legally open to all
persons. Paralegals should be trying to expand these, not
aiding in the formulation of mechanisms to make the
average citizen even less of a participant and more of a
victim in the legal process. I agree with the stance that the
Institute took on exclusory credentialing, but the language
used was such as to seriously damage its credibility with
workers that have any community orientation. To suggest
that the training of community people to solve their own
problems is an "experimentation in learning capacity" is an
incredible slap in the face to those who have become
knowledgeable and competent through something other
than formalized academic training. The clear implication is
that academically unsophisticated people are either of
subnormal intelligence or incapable of acting in their own
self-interest or of understanding abstract ideas such as
justice. To couple that phrase with a reference to "available
manpower" was again a mistake, for a rereading of the
memo leaves no doubt that this manpower was to be a
surplus labor pool for the benefit of profit-making
attorneys.
What is inevitable is that this legal system must
change and paralegals in rapidly expanding numbers are
becoming aware of their role as agents in this change. The
paralegal's purpose is to have a clear impact on existing
legal institutions, and at this point in time that requires a
much larger area of concern than was mentioned in the NPI
memo. Tempered by their individual experiences with
client communities, paralegals are now completely unwilling to accept superficial changes designed to increase
lawyers' cost efficiency and the "productiveness" of
subservient labor.
The legal structure whose inequities and inefficiencies
have made paralegals, their roles and their positions
inevitable, is in need of some fundamental changes, and
paralegals intend to take an active part in this restructuring.
Once this fundamental orientation is understood, perhaps
paralegals, the NPI and the bar, can more easily engage in
productive dialogue on the terms under which credentialing
can be viewed as acceptable.
In the discussion of credentials and testing several
questions were enumerated. For credentialing, shall there
be general or specific subject area credentialing? May
someone be certified as a specialist without undergoing the
general exam? Who has the authority to issue these
credentials? Are any educational requirements to be
demanded? For testing, who creates, administers, and
judges the test? Are there to be any personal, training or
experience qualifications to be met before someone is
allowed to take the test? Should the exam be oral or
written? It was generally agreed that some form of
nonexclusory certification or credentialing could be helpful. A system based on a general examination and specialty

area exams was held to be the most practicable. In the
workshop I attended at the NPI's conference on credentialing, the sense of the group was that the generalist exam
should signify a greater knowledge of the full legal system
and that a person might be certified in a specialty area
without undergoing this generalist examination. A
generalist could, of course, take several specialty exams in
order to identify areas of expertise. Paralegals oppose any
restrictions on who may take the test and believe strongly
that they should have at least some input if not complete
control of the process of formulation and administration of
the test itself whatever that might be. A vote taken on the
question of whether the test could be given orally resulted
in an eight to seven vote in favor of only written exams.
I voted in the minority on this question for two
reasons. First, any written examination is static, formalized
and generally utilizes white, middle class English. Many
effective paralegal workers are neither white nor middle
class and would be penalized unjustly. Second, much
paralegal work requires oral skills and what is generally
termed "street knowledge"-how to hassle with landlords,
negotiate with welfare workers and communicate with
low-income people. I do not believe that any written test
can ever measure these skills.
In addition to these particular points, there are some
general areas of difficulty which need to be stated. The
strength, the legitimacy and the power of the paralegal
movement comes from its relation to the people. It now
appears that through a combination of academic requirements, tests designed to measure institutionally approved
verbal skills and an emphasis on "professionalism" and the
"almost lawyer" generalist, the dynamism of the paralegal
movement might be frozen into the position of being
merely a buffer between the legal establishment as it now
exists and the demands of the 140 million people who have
been denied services by that system. All proposed credentialing plans must be appraised in light of this danger and
the paralegal's commitment to return the law to the people.
Paralegals believe that the people working in the legal
field, particularly in the public sector, have shared values,
attitudes and beliefs concerning the provision of legal
services that are of a deeper and more general nature than
their concern with what their job title may be. The urge to
credential has some definite drawbacks. Regardless of the
success of the "career ladder" model in allowing individual
advancement through an imposed hierarchy of separate
function in the field of health care (most commonly used as
an analogy to our field) it seems to have neither allowed
unity among nondoctors nor caused any positive fundamental change in the method of health care delivery. It was
merely ensured that the primary delivery institutions can be
of larger, more "efficient" size, more fully systematized
and more easily controlled by external decision makers.
Specialization has meant that not only the patient but also
the workers, paramedic and professional alike, have become
tied to institutions too large and impersonal to meet the
human needs of those who interact with them. The effect
on the individual patient has been to make the ordeal of
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obtaining health care even more outrageously expensive and
mystifying. Within the work force layered credentialing has
had the effect of causing the energy of any one group to be
directed toward short range objectives and questions of
personal advancement or increased income. In fact, it may
appear that the attempt to formally differentiate paralegal
workers by certification is an action designed to lessen the
impact of any value oriented paralegal statement or
organization.
Credentialing would presumably exclude those
persons with the least formal education or certifiable skills
from the term paralegal, thus reducing our numbers and
tying us more closely to the aura of lawyers and the
existing power structure than with the largest number of
our co-workers and our clients. I submit the following
points as terms under which credentialing may truly benefit
paralegals.
Concerning generalist credentialing, credentialed paralegals should be guaranteed the ability to practice without
further supervision in certain areas of limited jurisdiction,
including not only those administrative areas now open to
laymen but areas which are now sometimes closed, such as

workmen's compensation, and areas within our expertise
that are now exclusively reserved for attorneys (such as
bankruptcies and domestic relations). We should be guaranteed the right to collect full statutory attorney's fees
where applicable. We should be given the right to supervise
the work of other paralegals. Access to the examination
should be made available through either education or work
experience, with absolutely no personal exclusions. In
conjunction with specialty area exams, these examinations
should not be used as an excuse to limit any rights
currently given to laymen. The certification should not be
used in an exclusory sense for the purpose of hiring. There
should be no prerequisites for taking an examination. Oral
exams may be used for areas where technical expertise is
not essential (advocacy, casefinding, interviewing, etc).
Judgment in these areas is to be by paralegals.
Several times in this comment I have said "we" or
"paralegals." I do not believe that my views are exactly
those of all paralegals, but I do believe that I have
articulated the feelings of a very large number. I rely on
both personal conversations and the discussion in the recent
conference.

OPEN FORUM
Affirmative Action Programs Defended
Increasingly during the past year, courts have been
entering consent decrees ordering that an increased proportion of all employees hired by private industry and
government agencies be minority group members. The
orders usually set target dates for reaching population
parity employment and require the employer to take all
necessary steps to recruit minority members at a significantly quickened rate until they make up a stated
percentage of the work force or in other words to adopt
affirmative action programs.
Numerous critics have described such actions as
amounting to the introduction of a "quota system" into
hiring practices. This note is a justification for such
affirmative action consent decrees.
The essential difference between quotas and goals or
timetables has been stated in the following way by the
United States Commission on Civil Rights. Under a "quota
system" a fixed number of percentage of minorities or
females is imposed upon the employer who has an absolute
obligation to meet that fixed number. No excuses are
accepted, nor can failure to meet the quota be justified.
However, neither the federal government nor the courts are
requiring the imposition of such quotas.
The courts and federal government are requiring,
however, that "goals and timetables" should be implemented. These, by contrast, are procedures by which the
employer determines goals and time schedules for correcting minority underutilization, and then makes every
good-faith effort to achieve the self-imposed goals. Contrary to what would be true in the case of quotas, failure to

meet goals and timetables is excused if the employer can
show that good-faith efforts have really been made.
However, an employer must demonstrate in detail why
good-faith efforts failed to produce the desired results.
After generations of systematic discrimination against
minorities and women, it is hardly surprising that unequal
employment patterns still persist. Although intentional
discriminatory practices are now indeed illegal, many
practices and selection procedures still exist that limit the
opportunities available to minorities and women.
Accordingly, if they are truly to get a fair trial in the
job market, there is a compelling need for an effective
program of affirmative action which will clearly and
unmistakably assure women and minorities that meaningful
equal employment opportunity-not mere tokenism-is
what they can reasonably expect. To achieve such assurance
employers must affirmatively demonstrate that past practices have been completely rejected by seeking out minorities and women and placing them in jobs for which
they are qualified but from which they have long been
excluded.
The unpleasant fact of the matter is that quotas have
been consistently applied in the past for the purpose of
excluding minority group members from many desirable
employment opportunities. Across a wide range of employments, blacks have long lived with a quota system which,
for all practical purposes, had been set at zero. One need
only take a look at some of the nation's law enforcement
agencies. The very small number of nonwhites on many
police forces is a reflection of the fact that, for many years,
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the quota allotted to nonwhites in the hiring of policemen
was not far from zero. This is why it is preferable to speak
of affirmative action. In requiring that police forces take
positive action to employ members of minority groups the
courts are not introducing a quota system. Rather the
courts are requiring that minimal steps be taken to
eliminate the consequences of past quotas.
The only way to communicate a convincing message
to minority groups that discriminatory practices are gone
forever is to take forceful affirmative steps which will
introduce them into employments from which they have
been systematically excluded by discrimination in the past.
There is a dynamic element involved in taking such steps
which should not go unnoticed. Minority group members
and women have, quite reasonably, been reluctant to
acquire the necessary education and skills for employment
where they have been unwelcome. As a result, they have
often indeed appeared to be "unqualified" for specialized
or skilled employments. Perhaps the most important effect
of affirmative action programs in the long run will be the
encouragement which it will provide to minority groups to
make the investment of time and effort in education and
the acquisition of skills which had previously seemed so
senseless in a world of rampant discrimination. But, in
order to persuade them to do this, we must unmistakably
and affirmatively demonstrate that the bad old days are
forever gone.
Rina Rosenberg, Civil Rights Compliance Officer
Wisconsin Council on Criminal Justice
122 West Washington Avenue
Madison, Wisconsin 53703

The Omaha Decision Revisited
The following is a letter to Richard 8. Collins who
commented on the Omaha decision in the Open Forum
column of the January issue on page 550.
Dear Mr. Collins:
Thank you for your letter of November 28.
Your interest in and concern for the Project's activities
is appreciated. Let me assure you that there was no
attempt in the lead article in the November issue of
the Clearinghouse Review to "mask" any unfortunate
side effects of the Omaha decision.
With the advantage of hindsight, it would have
been propitious if a demand for publication had taken
place at the time of the negotiations. However, HUD's
rule of voluntary publication post-dated the
promulgation of the Circulars. While the negotiations
were in progress, it was HUD's firm contention that its
Circulars were exempt from the APA's publication
requirements. The HUD Position was founded on
Attorney-General Opinion (see Attorney General's
Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, Vol. 1
(1947) 1, and had not been challenged in a then recent
Supreme Court decision in which the validity of a
HUD Circular was directly at issue [Thorpe v. Housing
Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969) 1. Thus, in the midst
of heated political battles on the subject of whether
the Circulars would be issued at all, you are quite

correct in assuming that no attention was paid to
publication.
Throughout the litigation, the conflict between
upholding these Circulars-which give long-overdue
rights to three million public housing tenants-and the
risk of even more government secrecy, was a
troublesome one on its own merits; but this conflict
was resolved by our clients' desire to uphold the
CirculArs even at the cost of a non-progressive decision
with respect to the APA.
I appreciate your writing, and hope you will
continue to communicate to us your observations and
concerns about the activities of this Project.
Sincerely yours,
Al Hirshen, Director
Housing Law Section
AH:dg

Parents Advisory Council
Involved in Title I Hearing
Hoping that our experience will be helpful to other
Legal Services attorneys and paraprofessionals, we have
forwarded to the Clearinghouse documents relating to a
Title I hearing held in Springfield, Massachusetts on
October 24, 1972. We attempted to deal directly with the
state department of education rather than only through the
federal government in the belief that this would be valuable
in delivering power to the Parents Advisory Councils (PAC).
Parent Involvement Guidelines of Massachusetts,
Clearinghouse No. 9650A (2 pp.). These were negotiated
over a period of time with the help of the Harvard Law and
Education Center, Legal Services attorneys, the League of
Women Voters and parents. The most significant guideline
is Guideline VI which provides a process of appealing local
decision through the Commission of Education.
In May 1972, a letter was sent by the PAC to the
local superintendent specifying complaints about the local
Title I Program and the way it had been run (Clearinghouse
No. 9650B (2 pp.) ). This document may be valuable in
that it is quite precise in defining the problems. A month
later, PAC requested the Commissioner of Education to
grant a hearing pursuant to Guideline VI (Clearinghouse
No. 9650C (1 p.) ). Despite the requirement of Guideline
VI that the hearing be held within 15 days, there was
substantial delay after this request was filed. An official in
the state department of education sought further
specifications as to the
request for
the appeal
(Clearinghouse No. 9650D (2 pp.) ), and PAC replied. In
July, the local federal project director responded to an
inquiry by state officials regarding PAC's charges
(Clearinghouse No. 9650E (2 pp.) ).
Finally, a conference was held on August 23, 1972,
to decide whether or not to allow an appeal (Clearinghouse
No. 9650F (56 pp.) ). In our opinion this procedure, like
the previous ones, was not required by the guidelines and
was simply a delaying tactic.
The state held a hearing on October 24, 1972, at
which the then acting Commissioner did not appear as

Vol. VI, No. 11, March 1973

671

HeinOnline -- 6 Clearinghouse Rev. 671 1972-1973

OPEN FORUM
required by the guidelines. The results were a finding that
the local education association had violated the state
guidelines and exhibited bad faith in its dealings with the
PAC and a requirement that the Springfield School
Department submit a satisfactory plan outlining how it
intends to involve the PAC in Title I Programs
(Clearinghouse No. 9650G (8 pp.) ).
We believe that this process has resulted in a stronger
PAC and has channeled the energies of a frustrated group of
people through the legal process.
William F. Malloy, Attorney
Western Massachusetts Legal Services, Inc.
11 Eastern Avenue
Springfield, Massachusetts 01109

Supplement to
Attorneys' Fees Packet Available
A compilation of cases on attorneys' fees in pro
bono matters has been updated by the author, an
attorney with the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights. The supplement is designed to be interfiled
with the original listing, Clearinghouse No. 7813. The
supplement carries Clearinghouse No. 7813C. The
supplement and the original listing are available from
the Clearinghouse free of charge to Legal Services
attorneys. Others will be charged $5 for the original
listing and $2 for the supplement.

LEGISLATIVE REPORT
Election Reform Model Statute
The National Municipal League, under a grant from
the Ford Foundation, is currently engaged in a study of the
administration of American elections. Although final
publication of the results of their project is not expected
until summer of 1973, they have produced a draft outline
of a model statute for election reform. The draft statute
provides for a state system of election administration and a
state system of voter registration, with emphasis upon
visibility and accountability by election officials and
administrators in both areas.
Responsibility for registration and voting are fixed in
a single officer of state government who would preside over
an administrative structure with authority clearly fixed at
both county and precinct levels. The League feels that such
a system will encourage efficient administration and
increased professionalism among election administrators
while opening up the system to full public scrutiny. Copies
of the draft are available from the Clearinghouse,
Clearinghouse No. 9603A (17 pp.).

Massachusetts Adopts New
Public Utilities Regulations
The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities has
adopted two new sets of regulations which deal with billing
and termination requirements and with security deposits.
The first regulations (MDPU No. 16696) establish a
prior hearing procedure to resolve billing disputes before
termination of service. They also provide that service
cannot be terminated in less than 48 days after a bill is
rendered, nor can it be terminated if the customer
questions his liability or the correctness of the bill.
Furthermore, the regulations specify that every other bill
must be based on an actual meter reading and require the
discontinuance of the practice of estimating billings of
several customers served from a single meter. The
regulations on billing and termination were appealed by 15
gas and electric companies to the Massachusetts Supreme

Judicial Court. A decision is pending. The regulations are
available from the Clearinghouse, Clearinghouse No. 9720
(6 pp.).
The Massachusetts Law Reform Institute and the
Massachusetts Welfare Rights Organization were allowed to
intervene as parties respondent in the appeal. The
Intervenors Brief (Clearinghouse No. 9721A (47 pp.) ), and
Reply Brief (Clearinghouse No. 9721B (9 pp.) ) is also
available from the Clearinghouse.
On September 19, 1972, the Department issued
regulations abolishing security deposits for residential
customers as a condition to furnishing gas and electric
service. Those regulations were appealed by the Boston
Edison Company. In November 1972, the Supreme Judicial
Court entered an order which prohibited the collection of
additional deposits by Boston Edison and stayed pending
final decision the Department's order that all deposits on
hand be refunded. Copies of the Deposit Regulations
(Clearinghouse No. 9722A (3 pp.) ) and MLRI's Motion to
Intervene (Clearinghouse No. 9723A (14 pp.) ), which was
denied, is also available from the Clearinghouse.
Legislative Advocacy Packet Available
In fall of 1971, a meeting was held in Philadelphia of
some 50 Legal Services lawyers experienced in the
legislative area, in conjunction with the National Society of
State Legislators' Annual Convention, to consider how
legislative advocacy can be used most effectively as a tool
for law reform. The Philadelphia meeting was called
because it was felt that Legal Services programs could
fruitfully devote more attention to legislative advocacy, and
because the quality of such legislative work could be
improved.
From this conference has emerged a collection of
articles discussing various aspects of legislative advocacy,
prepared mostly by those who attended the meeting. The
collection is divided into three main parts. Part I, Rules of
Clearinghouse Review
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the Road, relates to ABA and OEO guidelines regarding
policy on legislative advocacy and lobbying activities by
Legal Services lawyers. It also contains a memorandum
dealing with the limitations on lobbying and political
activity under the Internal Revenue Code. Part II, How to
Be an Effective Legislative Advocate, presents the thoughts
of three Legal Services attorneys who have broad
experience in the legislative area. They cover many of the
practical areas of legislative work, such as negotiations and
procedural problems. Part Ill, Substantive Legal Areas,
consists of memoranda from backup centers, detailing
specific matters in their respective areas of expertise where
legislative action might be appropriate.
The collection of articles should prove a useful tool
for Legal Services lawyers who are interested in law reform.
The package is available from the Clearinghouse,
Clearinghouse No. 9607 (99 pp.).

names, Permitil and Prolixin, by different pharmaceutical
companies.'
The following paragraph should appear at the end of
footnote 79:
One can without a great deal of effott suggest numerous
parallels between life in prison and in the military; therefore,
it should not come as any great surprise that compulsory
medical treatment is a further feature they have in common.
See Note, supra note 72, at 105 n. 34.
A member of the Armed Forces who refuses medical
treatment is subject to court martial if the Surgeon
General and review board of medical officers decide
that the treatment is necessary to enable such person
to perform his military duties. (Citing Johnson, Civil
Rights of Military Personnel Regarding Medical Care
and Experimental Procedures, 117 SCIENCE 212
(1953).)
See also Overholzer v. Treibly, 147 F.2d 705, 706 (D.C. Cir.
1945):
Civilians have the privilege of refusing medical
treatment even when it is to their best interests. A
serviceman does not have that privilege because the
military takes not only a disciplinary interest in him,
but also a paternalistic one.

8.

Correction

The last paragraph of column 1, p. 331 should

read:

The following corrections should be made to Prisoners'
Rights in Prison Medical Experimentation Programs, 6
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 319 (October 1972).
1.
The final citation in footnote 7 should read, '45
S. CAL. L. REV. 616 (1972).'
2.
The citation within parentheses in footnote 16
should read, 'Corrections, Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 3
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. II, at 192 (1971).'
The repeated citation in footnote 23 should read,
'Corrections, supra note 17, at 123, citing the Department
of Corrections' director, Raymond Procunier, in his
testimony before the House subcommittee in October,
1971.' Similarly, footnotes 24 and 26 should read,
'Corrections, where there are repeated citations.
3.
Footnote 46 should read, 'See note 38, supra,
cases cited.'
4.
The last sentence on p. 325, col. 2, should read,
'The Joseph v. Rowen court found that there had been an
invasion of the plaintiff's fourteenth amendment right ... '
5.
Footnote 52 should read, 'Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45, 46 (1957). See also Huey v. Barloga, 277
F. Supp. 864, 872 (N.D. III. 1967), where though it was not
advanced by plaintiffs .... '
6.
The first sentence following the short quotation
in footnote 53 should read, 'Judge Smith's dissent in U.S.
ex rel. Hyde v. McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864, 868 (2d Cir.
1970), contains a rare instance of judicial candor ... '
7.
In footnote 79, the docket number for Mackey
v. Procurier should read 'No. S-1983.'
The first sentence of the second paragraph in
footnote 79 should read, 'The Peek case is particularly
interesting in that the drug the convict refused to take was
Fluphenazine Hydrochloride, marketed under two brand

'Therefore, since the equal protection clause not only
provides case precedent with facts closely related to
involuntary medical treatment but also appears to have
survived recent personnel changes in our highest court, it
clearly stands out as the most promising basis for asserting a
persuasive constitutional claim.'
9.

The first full sentence in column 1, p. 333

should read:
'The outcome will hinge on weighing such factors as
the significance of determining whether a convict is
mentally disordered at all, as opposed to that of the
appropriateness of certain forms of intrusive treatment;
whether the "individual treatment" model to the extent it
distracts attention from socioeconomic causes of crime, is
basically flawed
in its conception as opposed to
constituting an essentially desirable contribution to the
rehabilitative ideal, which requires only that limitations be
placed on its more detrimental manifestations; and
finally. .. .'
10.
The sentence beginning at the bottom of
column 1, p. 333 should read:
'Perhaps the most appropriate function for attorneys
to perform is to pose such questions to be answered by
those in whose name they purport to act.'
It will be of great assistance to the Clearinghouse
if copies of documents sent to us from Legal Services
programs for our library (and, hence, for distribution
throughout the country) are in legible condition so
that copies can be reproduced on our Xerox machine.
Badly photostated copies and very faint carbon
copies (especially those on onion skin) will not
reproduce on our machine.
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I

POVERTY LAW DEVELOPMENTS

I

Copies of documents abstracted below are available from the National Clearinghouse, except those reprinted in full text in the CCH POVERTY
LAW REPORTER. All documents requested must be identified by use of the Clearinghouse Library number appearing at the beginning of each
abstract. Requests from attorneys practicing in OEO-funded Legal Services projects will be filled free of charge, not to exceed one copy of each
document per project. Other requests must be accompanied by a remittance of five cents per page to cover duplicating costs plus a postage and
handling charge of 75 cents for the first 30 pages and an additional 25 cents for each additional 30 pages or fraction thereof. All requests
should be addressed to the National Clearinghouse for Legal Services, Northwestern University School of Law, 710 North Lake Shore Drive,
Chicago, Illinois 60611.

ALIENS
Alien Contends Court Properly Allowed Withdrawal of
Guilty Plea Leading to Deportation
9525. California v. Giron, No. 1/Crim. 11029 (Cal. Ct.
App., filed Dec. 5, 1972). Respondent represented by
Armando M. Menocal III, Robert Gbnzales and Alex
Saldamando, San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance
Foundation, 2701 Folsom St., San Francisco, Cal. 94110,
(415) 648-7580. [Here reported: 9525A Respondent's
Opening Brief (13 pp.).]
Respondent, an alien who pleaded guilty to marijuana
possession, seeks to affirm a trial court's decision vacating
the judgment against him and permitting him to withdraw
his guilty plea. Respondent asserts that neither he nor the
court knew until after sentencing that his guilty plea
subjected him to automatic deportation. In light of his
ignorance when he offered his plea, respondent argues that
the trial court properly found his plea to be involuntary.
Citing United States v. Briscoe, 432 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir.
1970), the alien contends that the court may consider the
likelihood of deportation in determining the voluntariness
of a plea. The fact that his mistake related to matters
extrinsic to his case rather than to the case itself is,
respondent argues, inconsequential.
The alien asserts that a trial court should exercise its
broad discretion liberally in granting a motion to vacate a
judgment and permitting a defendant to withdraw a guilty
plea. Because the court concluded that an injustice had
been committed by an extrinsic fact which overruled the
free will of the respondent and deprived him of a trial on
the merits, the alien contends that the court did not abuse
its discretion.
AUTOMOBILES
Revocation of License Plates and Registration Without
Prior Hearing Alleged to Violate Due Process
9594. Brumfield v. Tofany, No. 71-3253 (N.Y. Ct. App.,
Dec. 1, 1972). Petitioner represented by C. Samuel
Beardsley and Richard V. Hunt, Onondaga Neighborhood
Legal Services, 633 South Warren St., Syracuse, N.Y.
13202, (315) 475-3127. [Here reported: 9594A Brief (14

the lapse of car insurance was the fault of the insured or the
insurer.
Appellant, due to an insurance agent's error in
forwarding her check, received a police department notice
that her license plates and registration had to be surrendered due to a lapse in her insurance. Appellant at all
times believed her car was insured, and prior to the date of
suspension said vehicle was in fact insured.
Appellant contends that the denial of a hearing prior
to suspending her registration and plates violates due
process. It is argued that the registration and plates are
property rights protected by due process. Further, appellant asserts that the state's interest in public safety is not
advanced by an unnecessary suspension of the registration
of an insured automobile, where the state has not accorded
fair procedures.
BANKRUPTCY
Ninth Circuit Upholds Exemption of Income Tax Refund
as Property Subject to Seizure by Trustee
5501. In re Cedor, No. 72-1483 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 1972).
Plaintiffs represented by Peter H. Reed, Ralph L. Jacobson
and Thomas R. Adams, Legal Aid Society of San Mateo
County, 6836 Mission St., Daly City, Cal. 94014, (415)
994-1065. [Here reported: 5501E Opinion (1 p.). Previously reported: 5501A Motion for Order to Return
Exempt Property (2 pp.); 5501B Points & Authorities in
Support of Motion (4 pp.), 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
156 (July 1971); 5501D Dist. Ct. Opinion (12 pp.), 6
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 82 (June 1972).]
The Ninth Circuit has affirmed a district court
opinion which determined that, to the extent a bankrupt
did not engage in the practice of overwithholding by
claiming fewer exemptions than he was entitled to, a tax
refund check is not property that passes to the trustee
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act. In addition, the
75% exemption of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection
Act (15 U.S.C. § 1671) is applicable to whatever portion of
the tax refund check that is attributable to overwithholding.

pp.).]

Divorced Husband's Obligation Under Divorce Decree to
Pay Debts Held Not Dischargeable in Bankruptcy

An appeal has been taken challenging a New York
traffic and vehicle law which allows an individual to be
deprived of his vehicle registration and license plates for not
being insured without a prior hearing to determine whether

9550. In re Laflin, No. BK 72-L-377 (D. Neb., December
1972). Creditor-wife represented by David L. Piester, Legal
Aid Society of Lincoln, Inc., 800 Anderson Bldg., 12th and
"0" Sts., Lincoln, Neb. 68508, (402) 435-2161. [Here
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reported: 9550A Applications for Determinations of Dischargeability in Bankruptcy (4 pp.); 9550B Bankrupt's
Answer (1 p.); 9550C Plaintiff's Points & Authorities (23
pp.); 9550D Findings of Fact & Order (4 pp.).]
The district court determined that a husband's
obligation to pay debts incurred during marriage and
imposed by a divorce decree are not discharged in bankruptcy. The court found the obligation nondischargeable as
alimony, maintenance and support of plaintiff and the
minor child of the marriage.
The debts were incurred jointly during marriage and
the wife would have been liable for payment upon
defendant husband's discharge in bankruptcy. The referee
found the obligation to be nondischargeable even though
the debts were not secured by property in the wife's
possession, since any payments she would make would
reduce the amount of maintenance and support monies
available to herself and the minor child. The wife's present
income was found inadequate to meet her needs.
CIVIL RIGHTS
Court Enjoins State Tax Exemption of Fraternal
Organization With Racially Discriminatory Membership
Selection
9560. Falkenstein v. Oregon Revenue Department, No.
71-816 (D. Ore., Nov. 20, 1972). [Here reported: 9560A
Order (6 pp.).]
The court has enjoined the state revenue department
from granting state property and corporate excise tax
exemptions as allowed under statute to the Benevolent and
Protective Order of Elks, an organization which practices
racial discrimination in its membership selection. The court
held that the state grants tax exemptions to encourage
private support of activities in which it has a vital interest
and to support services that would otherwise in all
likelihood be performed by the state. The court concluded
that public services provided by the Elks that would
otherwise require expenditures of state funds constituted a
degree of state involvement in discriminatory activity that
the fourteenth amendment prohibits.
The court held that unlike Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163 (1972), tax exemptions for fraternal organizations
provide a "symbiotic relationship" as there is benefit both
to the state and to the organization. In the instant case the
court reasoned that Oregon relieves fraternal organizations
from the burden of property and corporate excise taxes in
return for the public benefits from the benevolent and
charitable activities of these organizations.
CONSUMER
Supreme Court Vacates and Remands Appellate Court's
Dismissal of Consumer Action
5113. Givens v. W.T. Grant Co., No. 72-5256 (U.S. Sup.
Ct., Nov. 13, 1972). Petitioners represented by William H.
Clendenen, Jr., David M. Lesser, and Stuart Bear, New
Haven Legal Assistance Ass'n, Inc., 265 Church St., New

Haven, Conn. 06510, (203) 787-5861; Frank Cochran, 795
Grand Ave., New Haven, Conn. 06511, (203) 777-5428.
[Here reported: 5113R Petition for Certiorari (32 pp.);
5113S Order (1 p.). Previously reported: 5113A Complaint
(11 pp.), 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 157 (July 1971);
5113C Decision (8 pp.), 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 313
(October 1971).]
The Court has granted a petition for writ of certiorari
and has remanded petitioners' class action to the Second
Circuit, where the case had been dismissed for failure to
satisfy the jurisdictional amount. The Second Circuit had
held that the $10,000 federal jurisdictional requirement
had not been met in the action to enjoin a multimillion
dollar coupon credit plan because the consumers' claims to
compensatory damages alone had not met the threshold
amount.
In seeking certiorari, petitioners claimed that the
Second Circuit had erred in excluding recoverable costs of
litigation and attorney's fees from the amount simply
because the indigents' services were provided by a nonprofit
organization which would not hold them responsible for a
fee, that the court had erred by refusing to evaluate the
total detriment of the injunction to the defendant, and that
the court had erred in prohibiting aggregation of the
consumers' compensatory claims. Petitioners also argued
that the Second Circuit's decision undermined the principle
that inadequacy of a claim must be a legal certainty in
order to justify dismissal for want of the jurisdictional
amount. (See CCH POV. L. REP. 16,349.)
Allege Counterclaim in the Nature of Recoupment Not
Barred by Limitation Period of 15 U.S.C. §1640 (e)
9631. Kilgore v. Kennesaw Finance Co. of Douglasville,
No. 47586 (Ga. Ct. App., filed January 1973). Plaintiffs
represented by M. David Harrison, H. Winthrop Pettigrew,
John L. Cromartie, Jr., and Bettye H. Kehrer, Georgia
Indigents Legal Services, Inc., 15 Peachtree St., NE,
Atlanta, Ga. 30303, (404) 522-3553. [Here reported:
9631A Brief (83 pp.); 9631 B Supplemental Brief (10 pp.).]
The appellant credit purchaser is appealing from the
lower court's granting of a summary judgment to the
respondent finance company against the appellant's
counterclaim based on alleged truth-in-lending violations.
The court based its decision on the running of the one year
statutory period of limitation found in 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640 (e). The appellant argues that a claim contained in a
compulsory counterclaim asserted in a defensive manner by
way of recoupment is not barred by the statute as long as
the plaintiff's claim exists.
Appellant discusses the purposes of limitation periods
and the historical development of recoupment and set-off
arguing that the ancient doctrine of recoupment is implicit
in the doctrine of compulsory counterclaim as found in
Rule 13 (a) of the Federal and Georgia Rules of Civil
Procedure and that a claim in the nature of recoupment is
never barred by limitation periods as long as plaintiff's
claim exists. Moreover, appellant discusses similar limitation
periods in other federal statutes and demonstrates that the
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courts have consistently ruled that these limitation periods
do not run against defenses.
The major truth-in-lending violation alleged in this
controversy over the respondent's financing of the appellant's motor vehicle purchase is the respondent's failure to
include a $62.40 premium for credit life insurance in the
finance charge. The appellant contends that the court
below erred in granting summary judgment, since it is not
clear that the appellant would not be entitled to relief
should his alleged state of facts be proved. He argues that
such state of facts would require that the premium charge
remain in the finance charge, resulting in the violation of
rules prohibiting usurious interest rates and constituting
failure to disclose the required information on the actual
amount of the financing charge.
Massachusetts Supreme Court Ascribes to Bailee Burden of
Proof of Non-Negligence in Destruction of Bailed Goods
7923. Knowles v. Gilchrist Co., No. S-15,063 (Mass. Sup.
Jud. Ct., November 1972). Plaintiff represented by Paula
W. Gold and James J. Cotter III, Boston Legal Assistance
Project, 1486 Dorchester Ave., Dorchester, Mass. 02122,
(617) 436-6292. [Here reported: 7923C Opinion (16 pp.).]
Certain of the plaintiff's furniture was destroyed by
fire while in the possession of the defendant-bailee for
reupholstering. Judgment for the plaintiff-bailor was reversed by the appellate court on the basis of previous
Massachusetts decisions which held that the bailee had only
a weak burden of production of evidence as to cause of
loss, whereupon the burden of proof of negligence was
shifted to the bailor.
In accordance with what it saw to be the trend of law
in this area and because of the inequity of placing the
burden of proof of negligence on the bailor while property
was in the exclusive control and possession of the bailee,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has overruled
previous case law, shifting the burden of proof to the
bailee. Hereafter, as to property in the exclusive possession
of a bailee who has not been contractually released from his
duty of due care, once the bailor proves delivery of
property to the bailee in good condition and the failure to
redeliver upon timely demand, the bailee will have the
burden to prove that he has exercised due care to prevent
the property's loss or destruction.
Court Allows State to Intervene as Plaintiff in Class Action
Challenging Pennsylvania Vehicle Repossession Statute
9253. Gibbs v. Titelman, No. 72-2165 (E.D. Pa., Jan. 9,
1973). Plaintiffs represented by David A. Scholl, Jonathan
M. Stein and Laurence M. Lavin, Community Legal
Services, Inc., 313 South Juniper St., Philadelphia, Pa.
19107, (215) 735-6101 ; and James R. Adams, Office of the
Attorney General, Harrisburg, Pa. 17120, (717) 787-4099.
[Here reported: 9253G Opinion & Order (12 pp.). Also
available: 9253A Complaint (14 pp.); 9253D Memo in
Support of TRO (26 pp.); 9253E Opinion (11 pp.); 9253F
Plaintiffs' Memo in Opposition to Certification for
Interlocutory Appeal (11 pp.).]

In an action challenging the constitutionality of
Pennsylvania's motor vehicle repossession statute, the court
has permitted the state to intervene as a plaintiff in the
capacity of parens patriae, has allowed the plaintiffs to add
individually named plaintiffs and defendants, and has
determined that the suit be heard as a class action on the
part of both plaintiffs and defendants. The plaintiff class
includes all installment buyers whose motor vehicles have
been repossessed extrajudicially under the color of state law
without their voluntary consent at the time of repossession.
The defendant class encompasses all individuals or corporations who are licensed as installment sellers, sales finance
companies, or collector-repossessors, and who either have
ordered or carried out repossession of motor vehicles
without consent of the owners or who may do so in the
future under color of state law.
The court reasoned that a variety of factual situations
dealing with different types and stages of repossession made
it proper to bring in additional representatives of the classes
in order to ensure an adequate record. Responding to the
state's contention that the statute impaired the welfare of
the citizens by allowing deprivation of a property interest
without providing for notice and hearing, the court agreed
that the state had standing under the doctrine of parens
patriae and further noted that the state's access to
discoverable data necessary to identify all class members
would expedite the trial.
Erroneous Calculation of Annual Percentage Rate Held in
Violation of Truth-in-Lending
9459. Owens v. Modern Loan Co., No. 7298-A (W.D. Ky.,
Nov. 6, 1972). Plaintiff represented by Kurt Berggren,
Thomas P. McCarthy and Martin R. Glenn, Legal Aid
Society of Louisville, 422 West Liberty St., Louisville, Ky.
40202, (502) 584-1254. [Here reported: 9459A Complaint
(3 pp.); 9459B Amended Complaint (3 pp.); 9459C Order
(1 p.); 9459D Memorandum Opinion (6 pp.); 9459E Order
(1 p.).]
The federal district court has granted partial summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiff. His complaint for money
damages under the Truth-in-Lending Act against an automobile dealer and finance company alleged, in part,
understatement of the annual interest percentage rate by
more than the statutory limit of one-quarter percent. The
court first concluded that the annual percentage rate had
been understated because the loan company had calculated
from a principal amount erroneously augmented with
certain nonfinance charges, including insurance and filing
fees. The court then held that the loan company's lack of
scienter and wrongful intent did not constitute a defense,
since it was an error of law and not within the class of
clerical errors exonerated by the Act.
Summary judgment was not granted against the
defendant automobile dealer, whose liability was held to
depend on certain questions of fact. If the dealer had been
compensated for referring the plaintiff to the defendant
loan company for financing, the dealer might be liable as an
"extender of credit" under Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R.
Clearinghouse Review
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§226.2 (f); if the dealer had knowledge of the terms of the
plaintiff's financing, he might be liable for nondisclosure
under Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §226.6 (d).
The court declined to award attorneys' fees since the
plaintiff was represented by Legal Services attorneys. The
court concluded that the Act's intent was only to recompense prevailing plaintiffs for actual expenses in retaining
counsel, of which there were none in this case.
Damages Awarded to Class in Truth-in-Lending Suit:
Attorney's Fees Awarded LSP
9682. Settle v. Mallicott Auto Sales, Inc., No. 71-238 (D.
Ore., Nov. 1, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by Robert J.
Altman, Legal Aid Service, 2005 SE Hawthorne Blvd.,
Portland, Ore. 97214, (503) 234-8461. Of counsel, Eric S.
Busch. [Here reported: 9682A Amended Complaint (3
pp.); 9682B Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel
Answers to Interrogatories (2 pp.); 9682C Statement in
Support of Attorney Fees (3 pp.); 9682D Judgment (1
p.).]
This suit was a civil class action for damages brought
on behalf of the named plaintiff and all others similarly
situated for violation of the Truth-in-Lending Act. The
complaint alleged that the defendant, a seller of used cars,
had consistently failed to disclose the annual percentage
rate in credit sales of used cars in which a finance charge
was imposed. The trial court awarded damages of $100, the
minimum under the statute, to each of the 96 class
members, for a total judgment in favor of plaintiffs in the
amount of $9,600. The court also awarded the Legal Aid
Service the sum of $1,250 as reasonable attorneys fees.
The case is of significance because it is the first
truth-in-lending case brought in the District of Oregon and,
one of the first in the United States to proceed to a final
judgment for damages.
Class Action Seeks to End Finance Company Avoidance of
Challenges to Wage Assignments Law
9210. Albert v. Household Finance Corp., No. 72 Civ.
4651 (S.D. N.Y.). Plaintiff represented by Philip G. Schrag,
435 West 116th St., New York, N.Y. 10027, (212)
280-2622; Lisa L. Barrett and Steven M. Tullberg, Monroe
County Legal Assistance Corp., Mid-Hudson Valley Legal
Services Project, 31 South Main St., Liberty, N.Y. 12754,
(914) 292-6800. [Here reported: 9210B Memo in Support
of Motion for Determination as a Class Action (12 pp.).]
Plaintiff seeks a determination of class status in this
action to enjoin defendant from enforcing wage assignments that it has obtained over a period of approximately
four years under New York's Personal Property Law which
allows up to 10% of a worker's monthly income to be
subject to assignment and does not provide for a prior
hearing.
Plaintiff contends that the fact that the statute could
be determined unconstitutional and therefore inapplicable
does not make a class action unnecessary. First, plaintiff is
seeking as ancillary relief an order requiring refund of
money unlawfully seized, and denial of class status would

prevent the entry of such an order. Second, plaintiff
contends that finance companies in New York have made a
practice of avoiding constitutional test case litigation by
systematically dissolving the wage assignment of the
challenging litigant and thereby mooting the case.
Plaintiff alleges that all the other requirements for a
class have been met and that a class action in a federal court
is the best method of avoiding the systematic mooting of
state court constitutional challenges.
Truth-in- Lending Statute of Limitations Interpreted
9632. Eady v. General Finance Corp. of Augusta, No. 1726
(S.D. Ga., Sept. 25, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by Fred
Raskin, Georgia Indigents Legal Services, Inc., 501 Greene
St., Augusta, Ga. 30902, and John L. Cromartie, Georgia
Indigents Legal Services, Inc., 15 Peachtree St., NE,
Atlanta, Ga. 30303, (404) 522-3553. [Here reported:
9632A Complaint (2 pp.); 9632B Plaintiff's Brief (5 pp.);
9632C Defendant's Brief (2 pp.); 9632D Order (3 pp.).]
A federal district court has held that federal law
controls statute of limitation questions concerning truth-inlending violations. The violations alleged in the instant case
occurred on June 11, 1971. The complaint was lodged with
the clerk on June 6, 1972, and an order granting leave to
proceed in forma pauperis was signed June 7, 1972, and
mailed to the clerk who filed the complaint on June 12,
1972. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss
based on the one year limitation in Section 1640 (e) stating
that filing occurs when the complaint is deposited with the
clerk and that the fact that the court considers the
application to file in forma pauperis after the statute runs
does not affect the filing status of the case.
Incarceration for Inability to Pay Consumer Deficiency
Judgment Alleged to Constitute Imprisonment for Debt
9436. Heatley v. Tulsa County District Court (Okla. Sup.
Ct., filed Nov. 2, 1972). Petitioner represented by Ben G.
Price and Betty R. Outhier, Tulsa County Legal Aid
Society, Inc., 2521 East 1st St., Tulsa, Okla. 74104, (918)
936-1966. [Here reported: 9436A Petition for Writ of
Prohibition (5 pp.); 9436C Brief Supporting Application to
Assume Original Jurisdiction (16 pp).]
Petitioner, who is without funds to pay on a default
deficiency judgment issued against him, has initiated this
action for a writ of prohibition. Found guilty of and facing
probable imprisonment for indirect contempt for failure to
make payment, plaintiff asks the state supreme court to
command the lower court to refrain from further
proceedings to sentence plaintiff for indirect contempt.
Arguing that incarceration under this contempt order
constitutes imprisonment for debt, plaintiff contends that
such a sentence violates both state and Federal Constitutions. Plaintiff alleges that under state law a debtor can
be imprisoned only for willful refusal to pay a judgment
when he is financially able to do so. Plaintiff bases his
federal argument on the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. Applying the holding in Illinois v. Williams, 399 U.S.
325 (1971), that statutes authorizing imprisonment for
677
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failure to pay fines violate the equal protection clause when
the failure to pay results from financial inability, plaintiff
argues that the statute under which he can be imprisoned
for contempt is similarly unconstitutional in that the court
made no finding that he was financially able to comply
with the judgment order.
Plaintiff also argues that his imprisonment constitutes
involuntary servitude in violation of the thirteenth amendment in that although the debtor owes nothing to the state,
the state benefits from jailing the debtor either through his
labor or through his serving as an example. Finally, plaintiff
contends that the writ of prohibition should issue because
the creditor has not sought the sentencing of plaintiff for
contempt but rather has used the continuous threat of
imprisonment to force plaintiff to pay the debt. This
postponement of sentencing constitutes an abuse of the
judicial process and unwarranted harassment.
For want of another remedy, plaintiff asks the state
supreme court to assert original jurisdiction under its
supervisory power over the other courts in the state.
Plaintiff Consumers Attack Retail Store's Coupon Credit
Scheme
8372. Ives v. W.T. Grant Co., No. 15,125 (D. Conn., filed
November 1972). Plaintiffs represented by Stuart Bear,
William H. Clendenen, Jr., and David M. Lesser, 265 Church
St., New Haven, Conn. 06510, (203) 787-5861; Frank
Cochran, 795 Grand Ave., New Haven, Conn. 06511, (203)
777-5428. [Here reported: 8372B Memo in Support of
Motion for Class Certification (5 pp.); 8372C Memo in
Support of Motion for Discovery Order (7 pp.); 8372D
Memo in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (25 pp.); 6_372E
Defendant's Memo in Support of Motion to Dismiss (13
pp.). Also available: 8372A Complaint (24 pp.).]
Plaintiffs, the class of all persons in Connecticut who
have signed defendant retail store's installment contracts
for coupon credit book purchase, have brought an action
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages in an
effort to enjoin the allegedly illegal credit scheme. Plaintiffs
argue that defendants have violated state and federal
statutory and constitutional regulation of consumer disclosures, the use of punitive attorney's fees clauses, credit
card liability, unfair and deceptive practices, mail fraud,
unconscionable acts, usury, illegal loans, and illegal security
agreements. Defendant has refused to answer a number of
interrogatories, alleging that they are unrelated to the
action and that compliance would impose an undue burden
upon them. Defendant, in a motion to dismiss, has argued
that Connecticut statutes designed to protect consumer
goods do not apply to coupon books, that no controversy
concerning the illegal issuance of credit cards exists, that
private rights of action do not exist under federal statutes
relied upon by plaintiffs, and that the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over claims arising under state law.
Plaintiffs argue that the defendant did not make the
specific and detailed objections to the questioned interrogatories, as required by FED. R. CIV. P. 33, and that the
interrogatories are relevant to the subject matter under

FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (b). In response to defendant's motion
to dismiss, plaintiffs argue, first, that the Connecticut
statutes apply to a security agreement entered into to
assure installment payments to a retail seller of consumer
goods. Second, plaintiffs allege that a Connecticut statute
which authorizes defendant to impose the burden of its
attorney's fees upon the class amounts to state action
encouraging the imposition of a financial charge as a
condition of access to the courts, in violation of the due
process clause, and the infliction of unequal litigation
burdens upon the debtor class, in violation of the equal
protection clause. Third, plaintiffs argue that the court has
jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. §1643 to hear the claim for
declaratory and injunctive relief on the issue of liability and
notice of liability for lost or stolen coupons. Fourth,
plaintiffs allege that under the doctrine of implication, a
consumer has a private right of action to sue for unfair and
deceptive acts and practices under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §45, and for mail fraud under
39 U.S.C. §3005. Finally, plaintiffs assert that the district
court has jurisdiction over the state claims under the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Plaintiffs argue both that
the federal claims are substantial and that state and federal
claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.
Nevada Supreme Court Upholds Damages in Attachment
Case
9448. Nevada Credit Rating Bureau Inc. v. Williams, No.
917136 (Nev. Sup. Ct., Nov. 17, 1972). Respondent
represented by Daniel R. Walsh, Carson City, Nev. [Here
reported: 9448A Opinion (11 pp.).]
The Nevada Supreme Court has upheld an award of
compensatory and punitive damages against a credit bureau
and its agent for abuse of process in authorizing an
attachment of the respondent's property far in excess of
that required and with the intent of pressuring payment of
an alleged debt.
The respondent had become indebted to the agentappellant and agreed to repay him by doing excavating
work. However, the appellant offered no work for the
respondent to perform, and contacted a credit bureau
about collecting the amount owed him by the respondent.
The credit bureau accepted the alleged debt on assignment,
authorized attachment of respondent's equipment, and
brought suit on the alleged debt. The trial court found for
the respondent, holding that there was no account stated
but merely an agreement whereby the respondent would
repay the appellant by performing work for him. The
respondent then brought an action for wrongful attachment
and malicious prosecution. The trial court found in the
respondent's favor, holding that the tort of abuse of process
was satisfied by the ulterior purpose of attempting to force
payment of the claim rather than obtaining security for the
debt and by the willful act of attaching all of the
respondent's equipment and refusing to release any of it.
The supreme court agreed that an attachment of
property valued at over $30,000 to secure an alleged debt
of less than $5,000 was a willful disregard of the responClearinghouse Review
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dent's right to use his property. Compensatory damages
were based on the value of the rental the respondent would
have received from his equipment, deducted by the
estimated time the equipment would be idle due to weather
and lack of demand, the estimated breakdown time, and
the estimated time repairs would be made unnecessary due
to the fact that the equipment was idle. Damages were
further allowed for the costs due to vandalism and exposure
to the elements during the attachment. The court held that
the punitive damage award was proper where evidence
existed showing that the appellant's wrongful conduct was
willful, intentional, and done in reckless disregard of its
possible results.
Minnesota Consumer Class Action Ordered
6691. Rathbun v. W.T. Grant Co., No. 380957 (Minn. Dist.
Ct., Ramsey County, Nov. 27, 1972). Plaintiffs represented
by Mark Reinhardt and Roger Haydock, Legal Assistance of
Ramsey County, Inc., 20 West Sixth St., St. Paul, Minn.
55102, (612) 227-7858. [Here reported: 6691A Complaint
(5 pp.); 6691B Amended Complaint (5 pp.); 6691C Class
Action Memo and Sample Supporting Affidavit (22 pp.);
6691D Outline of Reply to Defendant's Memo on Class
Action Motion (9 pp.); 6691E Plaintiffs' Supplemental
Memo on Class Action (3 pp.); 6691 F Reply to Defendant's
Memo Opposing Class Action (3 pp.); 6691G Order and
Memorandum (5 pp.); 6691H Memo on Summary Judgment (18 pp.); 6691-1 Plaintiffs' Proposed Notice to Class
(3 pp.); 6691J Objections to Defendant's Proposed Notice
(5 pp.); 6691K Order (5 pp.).]
In an action by retail customers alleging that the
defendant retail store's coupon book plan is usurious under
Minnesota statute, the court has granted consumer class
status, has rejected defendant's proposed notice which
would have required class members to make an affirmative
response in order to be included in the class, and has
ordered plaintiffs' proposed notice with the typical "optout" provision to be sent to the 5,500 class members at
plaintiffs' expense. The plaintiff class consists of retail
customers who have participated in the defendant's coupon
book plans since the date that the interest charged
exceeded Minnesota's legal maximum of eight percent. In
the plan, the customer agrees to pay back the total value of
the coupon book plus an interest charge in a series of
monthly installments. If the customer already has an
outstanding coupon plan balance, the interest commences
when the contract is executed; if the customer owes no
outstanding balance, the interest commences on the date
the first coupon is used. Most members of the class have
finished paying the monthly installments, but have not yet
exchanged all of their coupons.
Plaintiffs contend that the defendant's coupon plan is
equivalent to a loan of money, that the plan involves a
forbearance of a debt, and that the agreements for the
extension of credit are entered into separately from the
actual sale of goods and are therefore not time-price sales
within the exemption provision of the usury statute.
Plaintiffs seek to have the plan declared unlawful and to
recover finance charges paid under the plan. Plaintiffs had

opposed the defendant's proposed "opt-in" class notice as
contrary to the applicable Minnesota statutory provisions
modeled after Federal Rule 23. Plaintiffs had also claimed
that defendant's proposed notice would have made unreasonable requirements of potential class members and would
have tended to intimidate them by adding counterclaims to
all notices even though the counterclaim would not have
been applicable to most of the proposed members. The
court implicitly rejected plaintiffs' proposal that the defendant, because of its superior financial position, absorb the
mailing costs.
Seek to Prevent
Pawnbrokers

Unconscionable

Trade

Practices by

9513. Roanhorse v. Eoff, No. 14,529 (N.M. Dist. Ct.,
McKinley County, Dec. 20, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by
Paul Biderman, Richard B. Collins, Marion Davidson, and
Alan R. Taradash, P.O. Box 206, Window Rock, Ariz.
86515, (602) 871-4151; Richard Hughes and Richard
Fahey, P.O. Box 967, Shiprock, N.M. 87420, (505)
368-4377; James Wechsler, P.O. Box 116, Crownpoint,
N.M. 87313, (505) 786-5277. [Here reported: 9513A
Complaint (24 pp.); 9513B Amendments to Complaint (10
pp.); 9513C Brief in Support of Class Action (11 pp.);
9513D Order (2 pp.).]
Plaintiffs in this class action seek individual relief
against defendant pawnbrokers under the truth-in-lending
law, the Uniform Commercial Code, and the New Mexico
Indian Trader Act, which sets interest rates and a holding
period. An additional claim, brought on behalf of all
persons similarly situated to plaintiffs and against all
pawnbrokers in the judicial district, seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief pursuant to the state unfair practices law.
Plaintiffs seek to compel all pawnbrokers to cease resales
without notice or an accounting for surplus and use of
pawn tickets lacking truth-in-lending law disclosures, or
face contempt citations. The court has ordered that the
claim on behalf of the plaintiff class be maintained as a
class v. class action, that it be severed from the individual
claims, and that counsel for both sides come up with a
workable set of guidelines drawn from applicable laws and
regulations, to be entered in the form of a consent decree.
The court also, on its own motion, extended the defendant
class to include all pawnbrokers in the state.
Secured Party Seeking Deficiency Has Burden of Proof of
Complaince with UCC
9636. Tauber v. Johnson, No. 55633 (111.Ct. App., Nov.
22, 1972). Appellants represented by Ron Fritsch, Legal
Aid Bureau, 64 East Jackson Blvd., Chicago, III. 60604,
(312) 922-5625. [Here reported: 9636A Brief (24 pp.);
9636B Opinion (7 pp.).]
The court has held that a retail installment seller who
seeks to recover a deficiency has the burden of proving
compliance with Section 9-504 (3) of the Uniform Commercial Code concerning disposition after repossession. The
court further held that no deficiency may be had in the
absence of proof that proper notice was sent and that the
subsequent sale was commercially reasonable.
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Defendants, purchasers who had entered into a retail
installment contract for a used car, had fallen behind in
their payments when they returned the car to plaintiff's
place of business for repairs. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff
allegedly mailed a notice of resale to defendants. The car
was sold, and judgment by confession was subsequently
entered against defendants for the amount still owed.
Defendants successfully argued that plaintiff has the
burden of proving compliance with UCC requirements and
that absent such proof, the deficiency could not be had. It
was also argued that the entire retail installment contract
was illegal and unenforceable because an excessive time
price differential was charged. The court held, however,
that absent a showing of legislative intent to void a
contract, the amount still owed, less the amount on resale
and denying recovery of any interest, would be the proper
measure of recovery.
Trade School May Recover Only Actual Damages Proved in
Suit Against Student on Installment Contract
9635. Vogue Models, Inc. v. Reina, 6 II1. App. 3d 206, 285
NE.2d 258 (1972). Defendant represented by Ron Fritsch,
Legal Aid Bureau, 64 East Jackson Blvd., Chicago, II.
60604, (312) 922-5625. [Here reported: 9635A Brief (20
pp.); 9635B Opinion (3 pp.).]
The Illinois Court of Appeals has held that certain
trade schools may recover only actual damages proved in
actions against students under installment contracts.
Defendant appealed from a judgment entered against
her on a retail installment contract for charm and modeling
instruction from the plaintiff. The defendant never attended any classes and made no payments to the plaintiff
and judgment was confessed in favor of the plaintiff for the
entire cash price of the contract plus attorney's fees. In this
appeal, the defendant did not contest her liability on the
contract, but instead argued that the amount of da.nages
awarded was excessive since the seller should not be
allowed to recover a judgment on the contract without
offering specific proof of damages. The court noted that
there is an exception to the general rule of proving actual
damages where one party to the contract is a school, based
upon the premise that the failure of a student to complete a
term would have no substantial effect on the operating
expense of a school which offered extensive facilities to its
students. However, the court reversed the judgment of the
trial court and held this exception to the general rule of
damages to be inapplicable here since the plaintiff school
did not have the necessary level of services traditionally
associated with a school to be within the exception. The
court held Vogue Models to be a "service" rather than a
"school." The case was remanded for a hearing in which the
plaintiff will be required to present evidence as to the
actual damages sustained.
Prejudgment Attachment by Trustee Process Without
Notice Held Unconstitutional
8999. Schneider v. Margossian, No. 72-1421-G (D. Mass.,
Sept. 22, 1972). [Here reported: 8999A Declaratory

Judgment and Injunction (2 pp.); 8999B Memorandum of
Decision (9 pp.).]
A Massachusetts three-judge federal district court,
basing its decision on Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
and Fuentes v. Shevin, has permanently enjoined enforcement of statutes permitting prejudgment attachment of
civil defendants' property by way of trustee process. The
petitioner's bank accounts had been so attached and could
be released before judgment only upon his posting of a
satisfactory bond. The court held that such attachment
without prior notice and hearing violates the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court did not
decree, however, the precise kind of hearing required in
order to pass constitutional muster.
National Bank
Neighborhood

Denied

Permission to Leave Changing

9627. In re South Shore National Bank of Chicago
(Comptroller of the Currency, Dec. 5, 1972). Protestant
South Shore Commission represented by Kenneth K.
Howell, Gordon C. Waldron, and Eric Kemmler, Senior Law
Student, Legal Aid Society of Chicago, 64 East Jackson
Blvd., Chicago, Ill. 60604, (312) 922-5625. [Here reported:
9627A Post-Hearing Brief on Behalf of Protestant South
Shore Commission (24 pp.); 9627B Opinion of the
Comptroller of the Currency (2 pp.).]
A recent order of the Comptroller of the Currency
has denied the South Shore National Bank of Chicago
permission to relocate. The bank is located in a racially
changing neighborhood that had also declined economically. The owners of the bank applied to the Comptroller of
the Currency to relocate the bank in the central financial
district of Chicago. A number of community organizations
objected to the relocation, arguing that the loss of the
community's third largest institution would be disasterous
to the community. In a departure from previous decisions,
the Comptroller of the Currency considered the needs of
the existing community and denied permission to relocate.
The denial was also based on the failure of the bank to
demonstrate that the proposed area was in need of
additional banking services.
Consent Decree Vacates Past Default Judgment and
Prescribes Procedures to Eliminate Sewer Service
4346. United States v. Brand Jewelers, No. 70 Civ. 179
(SD. N.Y., Nov. 20, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by David
Paget and David M. Brodsky, Assistant United States
Attorneys, United States Courthouse, Foley Sq., New
York, N.Y. 10007. [Here reported: 4346B Consent Decree
(22 pp.). Previously reported: 4346A Oponion (23 pp.), 4
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 379 (December 1970).]
In an action directed at the long-standing, systematic
practice of "sewer service" in collection suits by the
defendant retailer, the United States has secured a consent
decree which affords retail customers of the defendant the
opportunity to vacate past default judgments and which
also prescribes certain procedures which are designed to
eliminate the possibility of bad service in the future. Even
Clearinghouse Review
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though no federal statute authorized such a suit, the court
had upheld the government's standing to sue on the basis of
its inherent power to protect against large-scale burdens on
interstate commerce and to end widespread deprivation of
property without due process of law.
Under terms of the decree, the defendant will furnish
the names of all persons from whom it obtained default
judgments during the period of 1969-1971. Those consumers, over 15,000 in number, will be advised by letter
from the United States Attorney's Office that the default
judgments can be vacated by signing the short form
attached to the letter. The form, when returned, will
constitute a general denial of any claim for money owing.
Pending subsequent court decisions or settlements, consumers returning the form will not have to make further
payments to the company and will have existing garnishments suspended. The defendant has consented to detailed
procedures and record-keeping requirements for the prevention and detection of sewer service, has agreed not to
recover the attorney's fees when it does obtain judgments
on these consumers, and has promised to pay the
government $5,000 for the costs of the investigation.

Merchant Enters Into Consent Decree Agreeing to Adopt
Trade Practices Conforming to the Federal Trade
Commission and Truth-in-Lending Acts
9410. McFall v. Helton Enterprises of Jackson, Inc., No.
72J-120 (C) (S.D. Miss., Nov. 30, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by John L. Maxey II, Barry H. Powell, and Bryan B.
Harper, Jr., Community Legal Services, P.O. Box 22571,
Jackson, Miss. 39205, (601) 355-0671. [Here reported:
9410A Amended Complaint (9 pp.); 9410B Final Judgment
(5 pp.).]
In what may be the first successful action brought by
a consumer under the Federal Trade Commission Act, a
retail merchant has entered into a consent decree to cease
using allegedly deceptive trade practices and to adopt new
procedures that conform to the Federal Trade Commission
Act and the Truth-in-Lending Act.
Under the agreement, the defendant merchant
stipulates that whenever it communicates with a potential
customer in the course of soliciting business it will identify
itself as a merchant engaged in the sale of goods. If the
retailer offers a customer a free gift, it agrees to inform the
customer that he is entitled to receive the gift immediately
after entering the store and need not listen to a sales
presentation before receiving the gift The merchant further
agrees not to use documents which purport to be testimonial certificates but which contain words creating a
contract for purchase. To conform to the Truth-in-Lending
Act, the defendant consents to amend its retail sales
contract by adding a space for the customer's signature if
he does not desire the insurance coverage for which the
contract provides and by appending a notice that the
contract is negotiable and can be assigned at the seller's
option. Finally, the defendant agrees not to misrepresent
the value of any gift offered to a potential customer.

Representing the class of persons who will be
customers or potential customers of the defendant, plaintiffs alleged that upon going to the defendant's store to
receive a free gift defendants had offered them, plaintiffs
were subjected to blandishments, high pressure sales tactics,
and fake games and contests to persuade them to purchase
unwanted merchandise at unconscionable prices. Plaintiffs
argued that defendants used deceptive tactics in obtaining
plaintiffs' obligation to purchase, failed to inform plaintiffs
that the credit agreements did not require the customer to
purchase insurance from the defendant, and misled the
plaintiffs into believing that the defendants would handle
the financing.
CRIMINAL
Suspended Sentence Held Insufficient Basis for Habeas
Corpus Jurisdiction
9122. Walker v. Dillard, No. 72-C-22-R (W.D. Va., Dec. 6,
1972). Petitioner represented by David G. Karro, The Legal
Aid Society of Roanoke Valley, 702 Shenandoah Ave., NW,
Roanoke, Va. 24016. [Here reported: 9122G Opinion (9
pp.).]
Following her conviction in the Roanoke Municipal
Court for the misdemeanor of "use of profane, threatening
or indecent language over telephone," the petitioner was
sentenced to serve 30 days in jail, which sentence was
suspended for six months, and required to pay a $25 fine
and costs. Her petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the
Supreme Court of Virginia was denied and the instant
habeas corpus petition to the federal district court was filed
alleging denial of her constitutional right to trial by jury
and conviction under a vague and overbroad statute, in
violation of the first, fifth and fourteenth amendments.
Her petition was dismissed on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction. The seminal case of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963), stated that the jurisdictional prerequisite is not the
judgment of a state court, but detention simpliciter. This
requirement of detention has been construed expansively,
as in Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968), where
habeas corpus jurisdiction was found as to a petitioner
whose sentence had expired, since the petition had been
filed before the expiration. Nevertheless, although the
instant petition was filed before the expiration of the
petitioner's suspended sentence, this situation was distinguished from Carafas on the rationale that here there had at
no time been actual detention.
Equal Protection and Due Process Allegedly Violated by
Nonattorney Police Judge
9150. Allen v. Blackburn, No. 9186 (Ky. Cir. Ct., Floyd
County, filed Oct. 5, 1972). Plaintiff represented by Cassie
J. Allen and John M. Rosenberg, Appalachian Research and
Defense Fund, 661 University Rd., Prestonburg, Ky.
41653, (606) 886-3876. [Here reported: 9150A Amended
Complaint (4 pp.); 9150B Memorandum (15 pp.).]
Plaintiff, charged with intoxicated driving, and
subject to imprisonment or the automatic revocation of his
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license, seeks to enjoin defendant, a police judge, from
proceeding with any criminal trial on the ground that
defendant is not a licensed attorney.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant's inability to analyze
and determine factual and legal issues denies him a fair trial.
He asserts that due process requires police judges, who are
authorized to render judgments, set bail, and issue warrants,
be licensed and qualified attorneys.
Plaintiff further maintains that as a citizen of a fourth
class city, his right to equal protection is violated by a
Kentucky law which only requires that citizens of first or
second class Kentucky cities be brought to trial before
police judges who are licensed attorneys.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Court Waives Requirement of Service of
Publication in Divorce Cases

Process by

9548. Gaines v. Gaines, No. D-0425-72 (D.C. Super. Ct.,
Nov. 9, 1972). Plaintiff represented by Martin J. Snider and
Donald R. Rogers, Lawcor Project, The American
University, Washington College of Law, Washington, D.C.
20016, (202) 686-2630. [Here reported: 9548A Plaintiffs'
Memorandum of Points & Authorities (25 pp.); 548B
Order (3 pp.).]
The superior court issued an order permitting service
of process in actions for divorce by posting a copy of the
order of publication at the courthouse for three successive
weeks together with service by mail to defendant and/or
closest living relative, if known. The requirement of service
by newspaper publication was waived.
Petitioners are indigent plaintiffs who are proceeding
in forma pauperis in actions for divorce. Efforts to locate
and serve process on defendants were unsuccessful. Plaintiffs contended successfully that the expense of publication
would create an undue hardship. Also they argued that
their inability to pay the cost of the service by publication
would foreclose them from further proceedings in their
divorce actions in denial of fifth and fourteenth
amendment rights.
DRIVERS' LICENSES
Posting of Security Bond Alleged Not to Revive a Claim
Discharged in Bankruptcy
9595. Blue v. Loxton, No. 44106 (Minn. Sup. Ct., filed
January 1973). Defendants represented by Bernard P.
Becker and Stephen D. Swanson, Legal Aid Society, Inc.,
501 Park Ave., Minneapolis, Minn. 55415, (612) 332-8984.
[Here reported: 9595A Appellants' Brief (74 pp.).]
This appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court by
defendants, involved in an automobile accident, raises the
issue of the effect of a motor vehicle safety responsibility
act bond on a revival after a discharge in bankruptcy.
As a result of the accident, plaintiff brought suit and
recovered a judgment in the amount of $945. When served
with the summons and complaint, defendants thereupon
filed petitions in bankruptcy in federal district court. On
the petitions plaintiff was scheduled as an unsecured

creditor and his claim against defendants was listed as a tort
claim. Defendants were discharged in bankruptcy seven
months later. On the same day as their discharge, defendants executed a motor vehicle safety responsibility
bond in the sum of $500, and three months later executed
another bond for $445. Both bonds were posted pursuant
to the requirements of the Minnesota Safety Responsibility
Act.
Defendants amended their answer to affirmatively
allege their discharges in bankruptcy, contending that the
discharges constituted a complete defense to plaintiff's
claim. Defendants' motion for summary judgment was
denied.
On appeal defendants contend that the posting of
motor vehicle safety responsibility bonds subsequent to
their discharges in bankruptcy did not revive the claim of
plaintiff discharged in bankruptcy. They further contend
that their discharges in bankruptcy constitute a complete
defense to plaintiff's claim and that their motion for
summary judgment should have been granted.
In addition, defendants contend that to interpret
compliance with the provisions of the Minnesota Safety
Responsibility Act requiring the deposit of security in order
to avoid driver's license suspension as a revival of an
unliquidated tort claim discharged in bankruptcy wrongfully denies to them rights guaranteed by the Federal
Bankruptcy Act. Further, enforcement of the state safety
act creates an irreconcilable conflict between the state law
and the fundamental purpose of the Bankruptcy Act, to
give bankrupts a fresh start in life, and therefore violates
the supremacy clause of the Constitution.
EDUCATION
District Court Upholds Constitutionality of Academic High
School
6583. Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School District,
No. C-71-1875 LHB (N.D. Cal., Dec. 19, 1972). Plaintiffs
represented by Suzanne Martinez and Kenneth Hecht,
Youth Law Center, 795 Turk St., San Francisco, Cal.
94102, (415) 474-5865. [Here reported: 6583D Memo
Opinion and Order (15 pp.). Previously reported: 6583A
Complaint (14 pp.), 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 469
(December 1971); 6583B Amended Complaint (29 pp.);
6583C Plaintiffs' Memo in Support of Preliminary
Injunction and Partial Summary Judgment (72 pp.), 6
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 162 (July 1972).]
A federal district court has granted the defendants'
motion for a summary judgment and dismissed a complaint
challenging the maintenance of a special academic high
school in San Francisco.
The plaintiffs had alleged that maintenance of the
school was unconstitutional because its admission
standards, although neutral on their face and based on past
academic performance, effectively discriminated on a racial
and economic basis, and also because the school's policy of
admitting equal numbers of males and females discriminated against females in that males with academic records
inferior to those of excluded females were admitted. The
Clearinghouse Review
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plaintiffs also contended that the operation of the academic
high school without reference to the racial mix was
unlawful per se because its curriculum was different from
that of other area high schools and because it caused
intellectual and emotional harm to excluded students.
Finally the plaintiffs contended that the defendants had
unconstitutionally favored the school in the allocation of
educational resources.
The court found that even if these allegations were
true, the actions were within the discretion of the school
district
Title I Parents Advisory Council Entitled to List of Program
Participants
9554. Lopez v. Luginbill, No. 9508 (D. N.M., filed Dec.
12, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by Richard C. Bosson,
Legal Aid Society of Albuquerque, Inc., 1015 Tijeras, NW,
Albuquerque, N.M. 87101, (505) 243-5461. [Here reported: 9554A Complaint (11 pp.); 9554B Memorandum
(10 pp.); 9554C Memorandum Opinion (3 pp.); 9554D
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (10 pp.); 9554E Memorandum on Standing (9 pp.);
9554F Memorandum on Ripeness (6 pp.); 9554G Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (5 pp.); 9554H Judgment
(2 pp.); 95541 Memorandum in Response to Defendant's
Motion for Stay of Injunction Pending Appeal (11 pp.).]
The court held that the plaintiff members of the
Roswell Independent School District Title I Parents Advisory Council were entitled to have the names of all those
parents whose children are participating in Title I programs
within their district, except those parents who specifically
request that their names remain confidential. The court
enjoined the defendant state and local school officials from
refusing to make these names available to the plaintiffs.
The court ruled that the defendants, so long as they
operated a program funded with federal Title I money,
were obligated to follow pertinent federal statutes and
regulations lawfully promulgated thereunder. Therefore,
the defendants were held to be bound by HEW's interpretation of its own regulation governing effective parental
involvement which required the release of the names.
The defendants have moved for a stay of injunction
pending appeal.
Aliens Challenge
Tuition Rates

Residency Requirements

for In-State

9507. Wong v. California State University Board of
Trustees, No. 652-035 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco
County, filed Dec. 21, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by Jack
Seidman, San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance
Foundation, 250 Columbus Ave., San Francisco, Cal.
94133, (415) 362-5630. Of counsel, Eric Wong. [Here
reported: 9507A Complaint (5 pp.); 9507B Memo of Points
and Authorities (7 pp.).]
Plaintiffs in this class action, aliens who have
obtained permanent resident status and who have resided in
California for at least one year prior to registering at
California State University or at a state college, seek

declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of
a statutory provision which requires them to reside in the
state for at least one year subsequent to obtaining
permanent resident alien status before they are entitled to
lower resident tuition rates, regardless of their residence
prior to obtaining this status.
Plaintiffs allege that the statute violates equal
protection because of the discriminatory treatment of
aliens and that the manner in which it is implemented by
the board of trustees constitutes an abuse of discretion. It is
argued that aliens are entitled to equal protection and that
such a classification based on alienage is inherently suspect
and must be justified by a compelling state interest, and
requires close judicial scrutiny.
Students Urge Supreme Court to Deny Certiorari to
Suspension Decision
9497. Hayakawa v. Wong, No. 72-699 (U.S. Sup. Ct., filed
Dec. 6, 1972). Respondents represented by Armando M.
Menocal III and Michael S. Sorgen, San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, 2701 Folsom St., San
Francisco, Cal. 94110, (415) 648-7580. [Here reported:
9497A Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari (9
pp.).]
Respondents, college students, urge the Supreme
Court to deny certiorari to review a district court holding
that suspicion of disorderly conduct does not alone justify
expuslion from a public institution of higher education.
The sole evidence relied upon by petitioning school officials
in a college disciplinary hearing was a police report listing
names of students arrested at a prohibited assembly.
Respondents contend that the police report is admissible
but is not the substantial evidence which fairness requires
because it does not indicate the conduct of any of the
particular students involved.
Petitioners contend that disorderly conduct can be
adduced by evidence of mere "presence," as opposed to
"participation," at a prohibited assembly on campus.
Religious Exemption From Compulsory Inoculation Does
Not Require Membership in Organized Church
9661. Maier v. Besser (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Onondaga County,
Dec. 29, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by Richard A.
Ellison, Syracuse University College of Law-Law Clinic,
125 Stadium PI., Syracuse, N.Y. 13210, (315) 472-7344.
[Here reported: 9661A Complaint (4 pp.); 9661B Decision
(7 pp.).]
The court held that if the plaintiff father, suing on
behalf of his children, could prove at trial that he had a
genuine and sincere religious belief which he actively
practiced and followed and which was substantially similar
to the Christian Scientist faith as he argued, he would
qualify for an exemption from an otherwise compulsory
program for inoculation of school children under the New
York statute which provides for exemptions for children
whose parents are bona fide members of a recognized
religious organization whose teachings are contrary to the
inoculation practices provided.for by the statute. The court
683
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granted a preliminary injunction pending the outcome of
the trial enjoining the defendant school principal from
keeping the plaintiff's children out of school because of
their refusal to be inoculated.
The court chose to interpret the challenged statute as
being constitutional rather than accept the plaintiff's view
that the provision violated the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment and the establishment and free
exercise clauses of the first amendment by providing
religious exemptions for only those children whose parents
belonged to organized churches.
Exclusion of "Exceptional Children" From Public Schools
Challenged
9642. Wilcox v. Carter, No. 73-41-Civ.-J-T (M.D. Fla., filed
Jan. 12, 1973). Plaintiffs represented by Alan A. Alop, Paul
C. Doyle and Steven M. Goldberg, Duval County Legal Aid
Ass'n, 205 East Church St., Jacksonville, Fla. 32202, (904)
356-8375. [Here reported: 9642A Complaint (8 pp.).]
The named plaintiff, a mentally retarded child, brings
this class action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
against a school board which excludes from public school
those children whom the board terms "exceptional." The
class of "exceptional children" includes the mentally
retarded, the speech impaired, the deaf and hard of hearing,
the blind and partially sighted, the crippled and other
health impaired and the emotionally disturbed and those
with specific learning disabilities. Plaintiffs allege that
denial of access to public supported education violates
equal protection and that the procedure of exclusion
without hearing, written notice and provision for
alternative education violates due process.
Students Lose Challenge to Constitutionality of College
Regulations
9608. Young Socialists for Jenness & Pulley v. Brady, No.
C-72-267 SC (N.D. Cal.). Plaintiffs represented by Christopher N. May, Michael S. Sorgen, and Armando M.
Menocal Ill, San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance
Foundation, 2701 Folsom St., San Francisco, Cal. 94110,
(415) 648-7580. [Here reported: 9608A Complaint (19
pp.); 9608B Memo in Support of Motion for TRO (10 pp.);
9608C Order (2 pp.); 9608D Memo in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment (18 pp.).]
The defendant, the City College of San Francisco, has
won a summary judgment in this class action challenging
the constitutionality of certain of the college's regulations.
Plaintiffs are four students at the college who were
disciplined for having posted a banner advertising their
political party during college-wide elections for student
council held in January 1972. Seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief, plaintiffs challenged four sets of regulations and a statutory provision, including a regulation
authorizing summary expulsion prior to notice and a
hearing; a regulation requiring prior approval by school
officials of all posters and other election materials to be
posted; a regulation defining general categories of conduct
for which students may be disciplined; and Section 10602

of the California Education Code setting forth good cause
for suspension or expulsion from school.
Plaintiffs did not obtain a temporary restraining order
in this case and were denied their motion for summary
judgment. Attorneys for the plaintiffs anticipate an appeal
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
EMPLOYMENT
Lower Court Denial of Preliminary Injunction Against Job
Lottery Reversed
6747. Bowman v. Los Angeles County Civil Service
Commission, No. 2 Civ. 39888 (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 21,
1972). Plaintiffs represented by Philip L. Goar, Community
Legal Assistance Center, 1709 West 8th St., Los Angeles,
Cal. 90017, (213) 483-1491. [Here reported: 6747H Order
(16 pp.). Previously reported: 6747A Complaint (9 pp,);
6747B Points and Authorities (14 pp.), 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 753 (April 1972). Also available: 6747C
Petition for Writ of Supersedeas (18 pp.); 6747D Petition
for Temporary Stay Pending Determination of Writ (6 pp.);
6747E Stay Order (2 pp.); 6747F Writ (2 pp.); 6747G Brief
(32 pp.).]
The California Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's denial of a preliminary injunction against the
conducting of a lottery by the defendant Civil Service
Commission to choose which of the plaintiff-applicants for
county firemen jobs would be examined. Under the
defendant's lottery scheme, the names of five hundred of
the approximately 2,400 yearly applicants would be drawn
from a drum. Only those drawn would be allowed to take
the examination and be eligible for hiring.
The court held that the trial court had abused its
discretion in denying the preliminary injunction, since there
was a reasonable probability that the lottery was illegal, and
unless the lottery was enjoined it would be extremely
difficult to afford plaintiffs meaningful relief if they were
ultimately successful.
The lottery had been stayed by the court of appeal
pending its decision.
Use of Arrest Records as Bar to Employment Challenged on
*Ground of Racial Discrimination
9496. Chandler v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No.
72-2472 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 26, 1972). Plaintiff represented by Bruce E. Endy, Andrew S. Price, Harold I.
Goodman, Jonathan M. Stein, and Laurence M. Lavin,
Community Legal Services, Inc., 313 South Juniper St.,
Philadelphia, Pa. 19107, (215) 735-6101. [Here reported:
9496A Complaint (17 pp.); 9496B Memo in Support of
Motion for Preliminary Injunction (14 pp.); 9496C
Interrogatories (10 pp.); 9496D Interrogatories (12 pp.).]
Plaintiff brings a class civil rights action representing
all black persons whose employment opportunities at
Goodyear Tire and/or Amstar Corporation have been, or
will in the future be, adversely affected by the fact that
they have one or more arrests, but no convictions. This
action challenges racial discrimination in employment by
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the two named defendant employers as a result of their
reliance on and utilization of criminal arrest records as a bar
to employment. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief, as well as money damages to remedy the defendants'
unlawful and unconstitutional employment practices.
Plaintiff avers that the defendants use arrest record
information to deny black job applicants employment or to
discontinue employment solely because of the fact of an
applicant's arrest record, although he has no convictions.
Plaintiff further avers that the defendants entered into a
conspiracy to exchange information concerning plaintiff's
arrest record. Plaintiff contends that the employment
practices of the defendants are neither related to the
business needs of the defendants nor are they reasonably
calculated to predict whether an applicant will be successful
on the job. They constitute an artificial, arbitrary and
unnecessary barrier to employment and operate to discriminate against the plaintiff class on the basis of racial
classification in violation of the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Plaintiff asks that a declaratory judgment issue
declaring the acts of the defendants to be unlawful and
unconstitutional. Plaintiff also asks that the court preliminarily and permanently enjoin each of the defendants from
continuing their discriminatory practices of utilizing any
arrest record which did not result in conviction as a factor
in determining any condition of employment, including
hiring, promotion, and termination. Plaintiff further seeks
an injunction ordering defendants to reinstate him in his
former employment, and to reinstate all members of the
class whose employment was adversely affected. Finally,
plaintiff seeks punitive and compensatory money damages.
Attack Railroad Policy of Not Hiring Anyone With a
Criminal Record
9322. Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., No. 72 C 702
(3) (E.D. Mo., filed Nov. 7, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by
Walter Heiser, Phillip F. Fishman, and Francis Kennedy,
Legal Aid Society of the City and County of St. Louis,
4030 Chouteau Ave., St. Louis, Mo. 63110, (314)
652-9581. [Here reported: 9322A Complaint (10 pp.).]
The named plaintiff in this class action is a black
resident of Missouri who was denied employment with the
defendant company because of its policy of not hiring any
person who has been convicted of a criminal offense other
than a minor traffic violation. At the time of his application
for employment with the defendant, plaintiff disclosed that
he had been arrested and convicted in 1967 for failure to
report for military induction after he had been denied
conscientious objector status. The plaintiff asserts that this
policy of denying employment to members of his class is a
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, because a disproportionately greater percentage of
blacks are arrested and convicted of a criminal offense than
are whites.
Previously, the plaintiff filed a formal charge of
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, which determined that there was reasonable
cause to believe that the defendant was in violation of Title
VII. After conciliation efforts proved unsuccessful, the
plaintiff brought this action. In addition to the disputed
hiring policy, the plaintiff also asserts that the defendant
continues to maintain a racially segregated work-force and
racially segregated job classifications, limiting and denying
employment opportunities of blacks in its general office,
and totally excluding them from certain job classifications.
The plaintiff seeks relief through a request for a court order
requiring the defendant to take all necessary steps to rectify
the continuing effect of its racially discriminatory acts and
practices, and providing for hiring the plaintiff and the
members of the class he represents with back pay, or
payment of lost wages.
Consent Decree Gains Affirmative Action Program in Grand
Rapids Fire Department
9657. Martinez v. Grand Rapids Civil Service Board, No.
G-178-72 (W.D. Mich., Jan. 22, 1973). Plaintiffs represented by H. Rhett Pinsky, Robert Relph, and Stephen F.
Idema, Grand Rapids & Kent County Legal Aid Society,
1208 McKay Tower, Grand Rapids, Mich. 49502, (616)
451-2504. [Here reported: 9657A Complaint (9 pp.);
9657B Preliminary Brief (13 pp.); 9657C Answer (10 pp.);
9657D Order for Preliminary Injunction (2 pp.); 9657E
Consent Decree (5 pp.).]
This action, which was filed on behalf of one black
and one Latin, sought to challenge hiring practices of the
Grand Rapids Fire Department, as administered by the Civil
Service Board. The hiring practices had the effect of placing
only two minority firemen on a team of 228 in a city with
a minority population of approximately 15%. The consent
decree contains agreement on some far-reaching prohibitions against discriminatory recruiting, testing, and hiring,
and an aggressive affirmative action program. The tests used
are to be validated within six months, if necessary by court
order, and no tests will be given prior to validation.
Whenever hiring is done a specified percentage of minorities
will be hired. Arrest records cannot be considered and
felony convictions can bar employment only under very
specific circumstances. Applicants are given an opportunity
to rebut unfavorable past employment records. Rejected
applicants have a right to a due process hearing and the
court requires progress reports on the implementation of its
order.
The affirmative action program must be established
within two months and must include pretest tutoring and
maximum use of communications media likely to reach
minorities, and promotional material must refer to the
court's order requiring minority hiring. The program must
be designed by consultation with community agencies and
groups which have direct contact with the minority
community.
Municipal Employment Extended to Aliens
9522. Mohamed v. Parks, No. 72-3578-T (D. Mass., Dec.
11, 1972). Plaintiff represented by Gene R. Shreve, Boston
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Legal Assistance Project, 474 Blue Hill Ave., Roxbury,
Mass. 02121, (617) 442-0211. Of counsel, Robert James,
same address. [Here reported: 9522A Plaintiff's Memo in
Support of Application for Preliminary Injunction (16 pp.);
9522B Agreed Statement of Facts (5 pp.); 9522C Order (2
pp.).]
The district court issued a preliminary injunction
ordering defendant city officials to pass upon plaintiff's
application for employment without consideration of
municipal statutory provisions prohibiting the employment
of aliens. The Boston City Council subsequently repealed
provisions of the Revised Boston City Ordinances of 1961
which excluded plaintiff and others from city employment
solely on the grounds of alienage.
Plaintiff argued that the challenged ordinances
subjected him to an injurious and suspect classification in
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. He also contended that the ordinances contravened the immigration and naturalization scheme established by Congress and is thus in violation of the supremacy
clause of the Constitution as well as the 42 U.S.C. §1981
right to "make and enforce contracts" and have "full and
equal benefit of the laws."

denied a specific employment promotional opportunity,
allegedly due to defendant's discriminatory practices.
Plaintiffs allege that defendant maintains various
discriminatory practices, including administration and use
of the Federal Service Entrance Exam which plaintiffs
contend is culturally and racially discriminatory and serves
systematically to exclude qualified blacks from obtaining
managerial, administrative, supervisory, and professional
level positions within defendant's organization; failure to
provide developmental and other training programs to black
employees as they are provided to white employees; and
assignment of black employees to noncareer, dead-end job
classifications. The asserted effect of these practices is to
deny plaintiffs equal employment opportunities because of
plaintiffs' race.
Two of the five named plaintiffs pursued appropriate
administrative remedies and received adverse decisions.
Consequently plaintiffs charge that they have no adequate
remedy at law and seek injunctive relief. Specifically
plaintiffs seek to enjoin defendant from engaging in the
alleged discriminatory practices, an award of back pay to
members of the class, and such further relief as necessary,
including promotions.

Dismissal of Employees by State-Regulated Company
Because of Long Hair Preliminarily Enjoined

Discrimination in New York Sanitation Department Alleged

9312 Boelts v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 76174
(Iowa Dist. Ct., Polk County, November 1972). Plaintiffs
represented by Robert C. Oberbillig, Legal Aid Society of
Polk County, 507 Shops Bldg., 8th & Walnut, Des Moines,
Iowa 50309, (515) 282-8375. [Here reported: 9321A
Ruling on Motion for Preliminary Injunction (7 pp.).]
A preliminary injunction has been issued to prevent
defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) from refusing
the plaintiffs further employment because their hair and
sideburns exceeded (by one-quarter inch) the companydesignated maximum lengths. The court first held that the
right to govern one's personal appearance is guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Although
the defendant is a private corporation, the court concluded
from the extensiveness of regulation by the Iowa Commerce Commission and from UPS's holding of "a partial
monopoly granted by the State" that the defendant's
actions are subject to the fourteenth amendment as "state
action."
Job Discrimination Charged Against Civil Service for Lack
of Promotional Opportunity
9592. Gunter v. Laird, No. C-73-50 (E.D. Pa., filed Jan. 8,
1973). Plaintiffs represented by Michael Cox and Edwin D.
Wolf, Employment Discrimination Referral Project, One
North 13th St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19107. [Here reported:
9592A Complaint (14 pp.).]
This class action suit for racial discrimination in
employment, brought primarily under the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and back
pay. Plaintiffs are black persons, employed by defendant
Army Electronics Command in Philadelphia, who have been

9672 Luna v. Bronstein (S.D. N.Y., filed Jan. 4, 1973).
Plaintiffs represented by Cesar A. Perales, Herbert Teitelbaum and Kenneth Kimerling, Puerto Rican Legal Defense
& Education Fund, Inc., 815 Second Ave., New York, N.Y.
10017, (212) 687-6644; Jack Greenberg, Jeffry A. Mintz
and Deborah Greenberg, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 10
Columbus Circle, Suite 2030, New York, N.Y. 10019,
(212) 586-8397; and Elizabeth B. DuBois, 30 East 39th St.,
New York, N.Y. 10016, (212) 986-5380. [Here reported:
9672A Complaint (20 pp.).]
Plaintiffs sue individually and in behalf of all other
Puerto Ricans and other Hispanic persons who are being
discriminated against with respect to obtaining positions as
sanitation men in the New York City Department of
Sanitation. Plaintiffs charge that certain requirements for
appointment as sanitation men, including a written examination, as well as a 5 feet 4 inch height minimum, are not
job related and have a discriminatory impact on Puerto
Ricans and other Hispanic persons. Plaintiffs further charge
that these requirements discourage Puerto Ricans and other
Hispanic persons from applying for the position of sanitation man. As a result, less than two percent of the New
York City sanitation men are of Puerto Rican or other
Hispanic extraction contrasted with a city-wide population
consisting of 16% Puerto Rican and other Hispanic persons.
Plaintiffs request that the defendants be enjoined
from promulgating and using examinations or other criteria
for appointment to the Sanitation Department which are
not job related and which have a discriminatory impact
upon Puerto Ricans and other Hispanic persons. In addition, plaintiffs request that defendants be required to take
affirmative steps to increase the number of Puerto Ricans

686

Clearinghouse Review

HeinOnline -- 6 Clearinghouse Rev. 686 1972-1973

and other Hispanic persons employed by the New York
City Department of Sanitation.
ENVIRONMENT
Parties to Highway Relocation Suit Agree to Form
Committee to Study Problem of Replacement Housing
8554. West Oakland Planning Committee v. Volpe, No.
C-72-1323-RFP (N.D. Cal., Sept. 27, 1972). Plaintiffs
represented by Stephen P. Berzon, Carolyn E. Jones, and
Miriam Morse, Legal Aid Society of Alameda County, 2357
San Pablo Ave., Oakland, Cal. 94612, (415) 465-4376.
[Here reported: 8554C Stipulation for Continuance of
Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (4 pp.).]
The parties in this highway relocation suit have
entered into a letter of understanding, agreeing to cooperate in the formation of a housing advisory committee
which will formulate recommendations concerning the
number of replacement housing units and how such units
could best be implemented. Plaintiffs, citizens' groups, are
seeking to enjoin federal and state highway authorities from
further acquisition, displacement, and construction activity
on a portion of the Grove-Shafter Freeway in west
Oakland, California, until defendants comply with federal
relocation, environment and hearing requirements.
Among the terms of the agreement are provisions that
the state defendants will not commence negotiations on
any previously unnegotiated parcels and that negotiations
already commenced will be suspended pending relocation
housing studies; that relocation assistance services will not
be unilaterally offered but will be provided only on request
of occupants within the project's right of way; that aside
from parcels on which demolition contracts have previously
been let there will be no demolition on any improvement
within the corridor unless required for public health or
safety; and that the state will not evict any tenant
otherwise in compliance with his legal duties as a tenant.
The agreement is to remain in effect indefinitely or
until one of the parties cancels it. The purpose of the
agreement is to give the parties sufficient time in which to
assemble and study the facts pertaining to settlement of the
issues raised in the suit. The parties anticipate that if such a
settlement can be reached, the lawsuit will be dismissed and
the freeway project may proceed.

FOOD PROGRAMS
School Lunch Program Ordered Extended to All Needy
Children
9392. Justice v. Mount Vernon Board of Education, No.
72 Civ. 2339 (S.D. N.Y., Nov. 9, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by Mark A. Chertok, Dana H. Freyer, and Norman
B. Lichtenstein, Legal Aid Society of Westchester County,
Roosevelt Sq., Mount Vernon, N.Y. 10550, (914)
668-4045. [Here reported: 9392A Preliminary Statement
(77 pp.); 9392B Opinion (37 pp.); 9392C Verified
Complaint (23 pp.).]

The federal district court has held that defendant
Mount Vernon School Board must begin providing free
lunches to plaintiffs, under the National School Lunch Act.
According to federal criteria and standards
promulgated by defendant, plaintiffs are eligible for, and
should be receiving, free mid-day meals. Defendant provided such assistance at only four of its 14 schools,
although needy children are found in all of its schools.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendant is obligated to provide free
lunches on a priority basis to its neediest children. The
choice of the four schools was based on physical facilities
for serving food, with no regard to the relative need of the
students. The district's neediest children are not situated at
these schools.
The court ordered defendant to comply with the
National School Lunch Program, citing the legislative
history and purposes of the Act and concluding that
defendant was bound by its terms. The court found
defendant's arguments based on the respective physical
facilities of its schools totally unpersuasive and
unsupportable, and ordered compliance district-wide.
For those few students to whom lunches were
previously provided, defendant employed a system of
monthly tickets which served to identify recipients as
needy. Under this court order defendant must provide
alternative payment systems which do not discriminatingly
identify assistance recipients from the general student
population.
The court ordered a further hearing to determine the
appropriate decrees, but admonished defendant that the
extension of a school lunch program to all needy children
shall begin "promptly and go forward speedily," noting
that "the era of deliberateness in such matters seems to
have passed." (See CCH POV. L. REP. 16,410.)
HEALTH
Access to Nursing Homes Sought as First Amendment
Right
9505. Citizens for Better Care v. Alden Care Enterprises,
No. 214876R (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County, filed Nov. 21,
1972). Plaintiffs represented by Jeanne F. Franklin and
Sally W. Stabler, Michigan Legal Services Assistance Program, Wayne State Law School, Detroit, Mich. 48202,
(313) 577-4822. [Here reported: 9505A Complaint (9 pp.);
9505B Brief for Plaintiffs (37 pp.); 9505C Brief in Support
of Summary Judgment (9 pp.).]
In this class action for declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief, a public interest group, organized by the
City of Detroit Health Department to represent the
interests of patients and their families concerning the
quality of care in nursing homes, claims that the defendant
corporation, the owner and operator of eight nursing homes
in the Detroit area and the recipient of substantial federal
and state subsidies through the Medicaid program, has
violated plaintiffs' first amendment rights to discuss information with the patients about statutory benefits, to
organize and act collectively, and to petition for redress of
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grievances. Plaintiffs claim that the nursing home's refusal
to let the plaintiffs speak with the patients in their room
and in privacy unless their family has put in a written
request deprives the plaintiffs of the only means of
exercising their first amendment rights to communicate
with the patients. Plaintiffs maintain that many patients do
not have any family and meeting in person is the only
effective means of reaching nursing home patients who do
not have bedside phones and who often cannot read or
write because of old age and illness.
Because the nursing home facilities are operated in
part from the federal and state Medicaid programs and
subject to strict federal and state regulations, plaintiffs
allege that the actions of the defendant constitute state
action and that the defendant's deprivation of the plaintiffs' first amendment rights is illegal state action under the
fourteenth amendment.
Finally plaintiffs maintain that in a competition of
interests, the plaintiffs' and patients' first and fourteenth
amendment rights to organize, associate, and disseminate
information regarding statutory rights and to petition for
redress of grievances outweigh the defendants' assertion of
the right of private ownership to keep persons off their
premises. Where an area has a sufficiently public character
and the activity is related to that public use, private
ownership rights cannot prevail over constitutionally protected activity where there is no other way for a person to
exercise his constitutional or statutory rights.

benefits immediately to persons who had lost eligibility
solely because of the increase in social security benefits.
Respondent state officials had refused to comply, despite
an HEW interpretative memorandum specifically extending
continued Medi-Cal benefits to the categorically needy.
Petitioners alleged that as a result of respondents'
refusal to comply with the federal mandate, they are forced
to choose between necessities and medical care.
Although petitioners received increased quarterly
allotments due to the overall increase in social security
benefits, such additional monies, according to California
policy, rendered them ineligible for Medi-Cal benefits. The
operational effect of transferring petitioners to the Medically Needy Only Program was to require each of them to
pay a certain amount of their own medical expenses before
the state would assume the remainder. This initial medical
payment requirement consumed a substantial portion of
petitioners' fixed incomes, leaving them with money
sufficient to purchase necessities such as food, clothing, and
shelter, or medical care-but not both.
By the terms of the writ, California must restore
benefits to petitioners by January 19, 1973. The state
decided not to appeal and assistance will be reinstated as
ordered. Pursuant to the writ, the California Department of
Health Services issued a letter to all counties ordering
compliance. This letter provides that county departments
must identify these individuals and restore Medi-Cal benefits with no liability retroactively to the effective day of
discontinuance of cash grant status.

State Ordered to Reinstate Medi-Cal Benefits
9407. Dils v. Geduldig, No. C-44371 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los
Angeles County, Dec. 27, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by
Peter Coppelman, Phil Neumark, Elaine Climpson, and
Ruben Lopez, National Senior Citizens Law Center, 942
Market St., San Francisco, Cal. 94102, (415) 989-3966;
Patricia Butler and L. Michael Messina, National Health &
Environmental Law Program, 2477 Law Bldg., 405 Hilgard
Ave., Los Angeles, Cal. 90024, (213) 825-7601. [Here
reported: 9407A Petition for Writ of Mandate (13 pp.);
9407B Points and Authorities (8 pp.); 9407C Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (12 pp.); 9407D Judgment
Granting Peremptory Writ of Mandate (3 pp.); 9407E
Peremptory Writ of Mandate (3 pp.); 9407F Letter (2
pp.).]
In this class action, petitioners, California social
security recipients, successfully sought a writ of mandamus
to compel respondent state health and welfare officials to
comply with federal law concerning eligibility for
California's state Medicaid program, Medi-Cal.
Because of an increase in social security benefits,
approximately 10,000 social security recipients were declared by California to be ineligible for Medi-Cal benefits
and were transferred to the Medically Needy Only Program.
Medi-Cal provides comprehensive health care without
liability whereas the Medically Needy Only Program
provides substantially less assistance.
As of October 30, 1972, congressional legislation
required all states, including California, to restore Medicaid

Citizens Seek
Treatment

Improvement

in

Hosptial Standard

of

9321. Copes v. The Ira Davenport Memorial Hospital, No.
1972-564 (W.D. N.Y., filed Oct. 26, 1972). Plaintiffs
represented by John F. Soja, Monroe County Legal
Assistance Corp., 106 Tremont St., Rochester, N.Y. 14608,
(716) 454-6500. Of counsel, John J. Kelly, same address.
[Here reported: 9321A Complaint (50 pp.).]
This class action has been brought by residents of the
territorial area served by the defendant hospital, against the
hospital and the New York Health Department and its
commissioner, for relief from allegedly inadequate and
substandard medical care. Factual allegations include that
the hospital is understaffed, with inadequate facilities and
personnel, and fails to keep a staff physician on the
premises 24 hours daily.
Six counts of the plaintiffs' complaint allege that the
in-patient and emergency treatment provided by the hospital are in violation of the common law standards of
accepted medical practice in the community and ordinary
due care, the hospital's own rules and regulations, the New
York hospital licensing statute, and federal standards for
hospitals participating in Medicare and Medicaid. Four
counts allege that the defendant commissioner and Department of Health are in dereliction of their duty to enforce
the requisite state and federal standards of hosptial care and
treatment and that their non-uniform enforcement of these
standards discriminates against plaintiffs' right to adequate
Clearinghouse Review

HeinOnline -- 6 Clearinghouse Rev. 688 1972-1973

hospital care, in denial of equal protection. The final three
counts allege that the hospital has failed to provide a
reasonable amount of services to those unable to pay, in
violation of its duty under the Hill-Burton Act.
Hearing Requested
Benefits

Before

Termination

of

Medicare

9552. Fuller v. Richardson, No. 72-972M (D. Md., filed
Dec. 15, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by Thomas J. Miller
and Dennis M. Sweeney, Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., 341 North
Calvert St., Baltimore, Md. 21202, (301) 539-5340. [Here
reported: 9552A Amended Complaint (14 pp.).]
Plaintiff contends in this class action that the
Secretary of HEW may not terminate Medicare benefits
without first giving adequate notice and a full and fair
hearing on all issues of dispute, as required by the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. He seeks an order
declaring invalid and enjoining the termination procedure.
Plaintiff contends that he relied on certifications
made by his attending physician and by the Utilization
Review Committee that he was covered under the Hospital
Insurance Benefits Program. He argues that the decision of
the Utilization Review Committee as to the type of care
rendered is a final decision and should not be overruled.
Texas Statutes Prohibiting Nonmedical Associations From
Rendering Health Care Challenged
9521. Garcia v. Texas Board of Medical Examiners, No. SA
72CA375 (W.D. Tex., filed Dec. 13, 1972). Plaintiffs
represented by Mario Obledo, Alan Exelrod and Michael
Mendelson, Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, 145 Ninth St., San Francisco, Cal. 94103, (415)
626-6196. [Here reported: 9521A Complaint (10 pp.).]
This class action seeks injunctive and declaratory
relief on behalf of all persons who desire to incorporate the
San Antonio Community Health Maintenance Association
(SACHMA) and similar organization and who are precluded
from doing so by Texas law. This action is also brought on
behalf of corporations similarly situated to SACHMA that
wish to hire members of the medical profession but are
precluded by Texas law. Finally, this action is brought on
behalf of individuals medically indigent and middle income
who wish to join nonprofit health and medical care
corporations whose boards of directors and incorporators
are not members of the medical profession.
Plaintiffs contend that their rights to freedom of
association under the first amendment and due process and
equal protection under the fourteenth amendment have
been violated. They seek to have the court declare
unconstitutional a series of interlocking Texas statutes
which allegedly arbitrarily and irrationally prevent nonmedical personnel from associating in order to provide
essential health services to the community. Plaintiffs assert
that the special interest laws at issue in this suit effectively
deny to the medically indigent services vitally necessary to
their health. The immediate effect of these laws, they
contend, is to deny to a group of citizens the right to form
a nonprofit corporation for delivery of health services to

the poor and further to deny to a group of lay persons the
right to hire doctors licensed by the medical profession.
Plaintiffs contend that the challenged Texas statutes
reach beyond the borders of the state as they preclude
laymen from applying for and/or receiving funds under 42
U.S.C. §246, since Texas law requires that if the purpose of
one organization is to deliver health or medical care, then
its board of directors must be doctor controlled. It is
contended that the Texas laws make the right of an
individual to benefit from federal statutes subservient to
the Texas medical profession's principles of doctor control
and doctor economic self-interest.
On August 2, 1972, SACHMA was formed for the
purpose of obtaining medical services, providing a hospitalization program, and rendering health care to all sectors,
with special emphasis on the medically indigent of Bexar
County, Texas. It intended to have on staff salaried
personnel, Texas-state-licensed members of the medical
profession to administer health and medical care services.
Its initial incorporators consisted of three individuals who
in no way are related to the medical profession. In October
1972, plaintiff SACHMA was informed that it would not
receive a corporate charter because none of the proposed
incorporators are licensed to practice medicine in Texas,
and the proposed corporation was deemed organized for
the practice of medicine for which a license is required.
Plaintiffs ask that a three-judge district court be
convened to hear this action. They further seek to have the
court issue a declaratory judgment holding various provisions of the Texas health code violative of the first and
fourteenth amendments, and enjoin their enforcement
insofar as they deny plaintiffs the rights of association, due
process, and equal protection of the law. Finally they ask
that the Texas Secretary of State be mandatorily enjoined
to issue the corporate charter to SACHMA.
Resist Motion to Dismiss in Suit to Enforce HEW Medicaid
Fee Guidelines
9447. Yanez v. Jones, No. NC 38-72 (D. Utah, filed Jan.
10, 1973). Plaintiffs represented by Jerry L. Bean, L.G.
Bingham, Paul D. Vernieu, David J. Knowlton and William
F. Daines, Weber County Legal Aid Services, 453 24th St.,
Ogden, Utah 84401, (801) 394-9431. Of counsel, Patricia
A. Butler, National Legal Program on Health Problems of
the Poor, 405 Hilgard Ave., Los Angeles, Cal. 90024, (213)
825-7601. [Here reported: 9447A Complaint (7 pp.);
9447B Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction (6 pp.); 9447C Brief in Support of Class Action
(20 pp.); 9447D Supplemental Memorandum of Points &
Authorities (14 pp.); 9447E Memorandum of Points &
Authorities (9 pp.); 9447F Memorandum in Response to
Motion to Dismiss (6 pp.).]
Plaintiffs in this class action are welfare recipients
who seek damages and an injunction compelling defendant
welfare officials and individual doctors to comply with
federal law which prohibits states from permitting physicians to charge Medicaid recipients amounts above the fee
level prescribed in the state Medicaid plan. Plaintiffs also
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seek to recover the excess amounts paid to the named
physicians as damages and demand disclosure relating to all
funds improperly collected and the identity of all persons
from whom such sums were received.
Plaintiffs' position is that although there is no
requirement that particular health-care providers agree to
treat Medicaid recipients, federal regulations do require of
those who assume the burden that the established fee
structures shall constitute payment in full. Since health
providers agree and certify to the Utah Division of Family
Services that they will make no further claim for payment
of the services, the plaintiffs assert that the state must
enforce these contracts. Additionally, plaintiffs believe that
they are being charged the unlawful amounts which exceed
the state fee level solely because of their status as welfare
recipients in violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss
arguing: that HEW has jurisdiction over the matter; that the
health providers are not proper defendants; that the
Medicaid recipients have no standing; that aggregation of
claims to reach the jurisdictional amount is not allowable;
and that the personal liberty-property right distinction is a
barrier to such actions. In response to the defendants'
argument that HEW's rejection of the state agency's plan is
the only remedy, the plaintiffs assert that the United States
Supreme Court has rejected this postion and held that
welfare litigants may not be barred from federal courts
merely because HEW may consider the issue raised in the
complaint. The plaintiffs counter the contention that only
welfare administrators are proper defendants for the reason
that the federal regulation refers to the state agency, by
arguing that precedent overrules this point and also that the
health providers are agents of the state. The plaintiffs also
reject the contention that they lack standing to sue as third
party beneficiaries, arguing that previous decisons support
the idea that there is a cause of action and that poor people
have standing to sue health service providers. In response to
the defendants' arguments that the Court lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction, and that the personal liberty-property
right distinction is a barrier, the plaintiffs argue exceptions
to the general rule that individual claims should not be
aggregated to obtain jurisdiction, and that the United States
Supreme Court has expressly rejected the distinction
between personal liberty and property rights.

of themselves and all other residents of a 277-unit, Section
221 (d) (3) apartment building. Plaintiffs seek to have the
court delcare that defendants' approval of a requested
rental increase without giving plaintiff class prior notice of
the request and a full and fair hearing denies them their
rights under the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
Section 221 (d) (3) of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C.
§17151 (d) (3), portions of the Administrative Procedure
Act, and certain leases and regulatory agreements. The
apartment building in which plaintiffs are tenants was
financed and constructed under the program of insurance
for mortgages on housing for low and moderate income
persons established by Section 221 (d) (3) of the National
Housing Act.
In July 1972, the defendant owner and manager
applied to HUD for permission to increase rents. Plaintiffs
were at no time afforded notice of this application or given
any opportunity to present their objections to its approval
and to rebut the presentations made by the defendant
owner and manager. Subsequently the requested rental
increase was approved. Plaintiffs contend that had they
received timely notice of the request they could have
presented information relevant under the applicable rules
and regulations to the approval of a rent increase. They
assert that this information would or might have resulted in
a denial of the rent increase or a reduction in its amount.
Plaintiffs further seek judicial review of the
administrative decision authorizing the rental increase.
They assert that the agency action was arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, taken without giving due consideration to the purpose of the Section 221 (d) (3) project,
and without conformity with the economic stabilization
regulation for HUD programs. Plaintiffs also contend that
the defendants failed to make a concerted effort to assure
that they were each provided with all possible rental
assistance.
Plaintiffs ask that the approved rental increase be
declared unlawful. They seek to invalidate specific computation errors and ask that the defendants be enjoined from
granting any application for a rent increase without first
making every concerted effort to assure that members of
the plaintiff class are provided all possible rental assistance
prior to or contemporaneous with such increase. They
further ask that restitution be granted in the amount of the
increment unlawfully approved.

HOUSING

Allege Tenants in Federally Subsidized Housing Have Right
to Notice and Hearing Prior to Rent Increases

Tenants Challenge
Increases

HUD

Methods

of Approving Rent

9404. Harlib v. Romney, No. 72 C 2550 (D. Ill.,
filed
1972). Intervening plaintiffs represented by John H.
Schlegel, Seymour J. Mansfield and C. Daniel Hershenson,
Legal Aid Society of Chicago, 64 East Jackson Blvd.,
Chicago, III. 60604, (312) 922-5625. [Here reported:
9404A Intervening Complaint (27 pp.).]
Intervening plaintiffs bring this class action for
declaratory and injunctive relief and restitution on behalf

9357. Paulsen v. Coachlight Apartments Co., No.
6354-72CA (W.D. Mich., filed January 1973). Plaintiffs
represented by Robertamarie Kiley and Carl Kaplan,
Greater Lansing Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., Box 1071, Lansing,
Mich. 48933, (517) 489-4576. On the brief, Robert L.
Reed, Michigan Legal Services Assistance Program, Wayne
State University Law School, Detroit, Mich. 48202, (313)
577-4822. [Here reported: 9357A Complaint (10 pp.);
9357B Memo of Points & Authorities in Support of Motion
for a Preliminary Injunction (8 pp.); 9357C Supp. Memo in
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Support of Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (24 pp.);
9357D Supp. Memo in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (31 pp.).]
Plaintiffs, tenants in a housing unit subsidized under
Section 236 of the National Housing Act, bring this class
action against their landlord, the Secretary of HUD and the
local director of HUD and FHA alleging that FHA
authorization of rent increases in federally subsidized
housing based solely on information derived from landlords' applications is invalid. They allege such procedure
violates the National Housing Act and regulations promulgated thereunder, the Administrative Procedure Act and
their fifth amendment right to due process.
Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief as well
as court costs and restitution of rent payments made since
the increase. In particular, plaintiffs assert that minimal due
process requires that prior to any rent increase they must
be furnished with notice of the application for such
increase and the facts supporting such application.
Plaintiffs further assert that due process requires that
they be allowed to produce evidence, examine and crossexamine witnesses at an informal administrative hearing
concerning the proposed increase, that a record be made of
the proceedings, and that the FHA furnish them with a
written decision including reasons for its approval of any
rent increases.
Challenge Retaliatory Eviction for Report of Rent Freeze
Violation
9611. Robbins v. Dunn, No. G-72-800 (N.D. Cal., May 4,
1972). Defendant represented by Harvey M. Freed,
Armando M. Menocal and Michael H. Marcus, San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, 2701
Folsom St., San Francisco, Cal. 94110, (415) 648-7580.
[Here reported: 9611A Complaint (3 pp.); 9611B Answer
(4 pp.); 961 1C Cross Complaint (2 pp.); 9611 D Request for
IRS Interpretive Ruling & Complaint Regarding Economic
Stabilization Program Violation (7 pp.); 9611 E Petition for
Removal (3 pp.); 9611F Request for Leave to File In
Forma Pauperis (3 pp.); 961 1G Order (1 p.).]
9612. Bischoff v. Imhoff, No. C-72-799 (N.D. Cal., May 4,
1972). Plaintiffs represented by the foregoing attorneys.
[Here reported: 9612A Complaint (8 pp.); 9612B Memo in
Support of TRO (8 pp.); 9612C Petition for Removal (3
pp.); 9612D Request for Leave to File In Forma Pauperis
(3 pp.); 9612E Order (1 p.).]
Both of these actions involve retaliatory eviction for
complaints by lessees of rent freeze violations.
In Robbins v. Dunn, plaintiff-owner commenced
eviction proceedings against defendant renter. In her answer
defendant asserted violations by plaintiff of the Economic
Stabilization Program and cross-claimed for damages for the
resulting emotional distress and anxiety suffered. Defendant is a 76-year-old woman in poor health, dependent
upon social security benefits. For purposes of economic
stabilization, defendant's apartment had a base rent of $80
per month, which plaintiff raised to $125 per month.
Plaintiff commenced this action when defendant asserted

that she had a right to continue her rent at $80 per month
and refused to pay the increase. Concurrent with the filing
of the answer, defendant sought an interpretive ruling from
IRS seeking a determination that the rent increase was, in
fact, a violation of the program, stressing the need for
protection from retaliatory evictions. Such ruling is still
pending. Meanwhile defendant has successfully petitioned
for removal to federal district court and obtained an order
waiving all prepayment costs and the necessity for posting
bond.
Bischoff v. Imhoff is an action commenced by
plaintiff lessees against defendant lessor seeking to enjoin
defendant from filing and prosecuting an eviction action
pending administrative action on plaintiff's contention that
the eviction threatened by defendants is violative of the
Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971. In
addition, plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction against
such an eviction, and damages both under the Act and for
emotional distress under California law.
Plaintiffs suffer from physical ailments and are
dependent upon social security for their subsistence.
Defendant attempted to raise the rent, which plaintiffs
resisted. Defendant asserts that he wishes to occupy
plaintiffs' apartment himself and for that reason brought
eviction proceedings. Plaintiffs believe his action is
retaliatory and seek protection from the court.
As in the above case, plaintiffs seek an interpretive
ruling from IRS and have removed the action to federal
court, with permission to proceed in forma pauperis.
Tenant Seeks Damages for Intentional Infliction of Mental
Distress From Slum Landlord
9490. Soria v. Fieberling, No. 32102 (Cal. Ct. App., filed
Nov. 29, 1972). Appellant represented by Rosalyn M.
Chapman, Western Center on Law and Poverty, P.O. Box
24795, Los Angeles, Cal. 90024, (213) 825-5706; Allan D.
Heskin, National Housing & Economic Development Law
Project, 2313 Warring St., Berkeley, Cal. 94704, (415)
642-2826; and Richard McAdams, Legal Aid Society of
Santa Cruz County, 109 East Lake Ave., Watsonville, Cal.
95076, (408) 688-6535. [Here reported: Appellant's Brief
(61 pp.).]
Appellant, a former tenant, seeks damages for
intentional infliction of emotional distress suffered from
her landlord's allegedly deliberate renting of defective
premises at excessive rent. Appellant and her family are
welfare recipients and contend they moved into the
landlord's property and were forced to remain there
because of economic compulsions.
Appealing from the sustaining of a general demurrer,
appellant contends that the landlord rented a seriously
defective cottage and refused to repair it with full knowledge that such conduct would proximately cause her to
suffer severe emotional distress. Appellant alleges that the
demurrer to this cause of action should have been overruled, since California permits recovery for this tort, since
California courts have applied the doctrine of intentional
infliction of emotional distress in landlord-tenant relations,
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and since the landlord's conduct in refusing to repair
violations of state housing law was outrageous. Other causes
of action also relied on include implied covenant of quiet
enjoyment, implied warranty of habitability, rescission of
an illegal contract, wanton and reckless conduct, nuisance
and retaliatory eviction.
Order Requiring Due Process Protections for
Housing Tenants Affirmed on Appeal

Public

7295. Brown v. Milwaukee Housing Authority, No.
72-1259 (7th Cir., Dec. 8, 1972). Appellees represented by
Patricia D. McMahon, Freedom Through Equality, Inc., 152
West Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, Wis. 53203, (414)
271-7772. [Here reported: 7295G Decision (10 pp.).
Previously reported: 7295A Complaint (9 pp.); 7295B
Answer (6 pp.); 7295C Plaintiffs' Brief re Motion for
Judgment on Pleadings (18 pp.); 7295D Defendants' Brief
re Motion to Dismiss (9 pp.); 7295E Decision (7 pp.);
7295F Judgment (1 p.), 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 166
(July 1972).]
The court has affirmed the district court order
requiring the defendant public housing authority to provide
plaintiff public housing tenants with written statements
outlining the reasons for a proposed termination and an
impartial pretermination hearing replete with due process
protections. The class of all tenants in federally-assisted
low-rent public housing projects owned and operated by
the defendant had brought an action for declaratory and
injunctive relief. The district court held that the authority's
failure to provide notice and a prior hearing violated both
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and
HUD regulations promulgated pursuant to the United
States Housing Act of 1937.
The court of appeal held that the eviction procedure
violated the HUD regulation but did not decide the due
process of law issue. The court found, first, that the
regulation promoted the Housing Act's policy of assuring
adequate housing for low-income families and operated to
protect HUD's financial contribution to the project.
Second, the court found that promulgation of the regulation in compliance with notice provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act was specifically excepted by statute.
Finally, the court held that a state judicial action for
unlawful detainer does not comply with the grievance
procedure mandated by the regulation.
Eviction Proceeding and Denial of Access to Leased
Housing Program Alleged to Violate Due Process and HUD
Circulars
9495. Caliri v. Donato, No. 34000 (Mass. Super. Ct,
Middlesex County, filed Aug. 30, 1972). Petitioners represented by Donald K. Stern and Donald L. Becker, Boston
College Legal Assistance Bureau, 21 Lexington St,
Waltham, Mass. 02154, (617) 8934793. [Here reported:
9495A Amended Complaint (10 pp.); 9495B Memo of Law
(6 pp.).]
Petitioners, tenants in the Leased Housing Program
seek injunctive and declaratory relief to enjoin eviction

proceedings and to compel the defendant Newton Housing
Authority to accord them a grievance hearing and notice of
good cause prior to eviction as provided in HUD circulars.
Petitioners allege that their leased housing
arrangement was improperly terminated and that the
eviction proceedings are therefore void, and also that the
Newton Housing Authority improperly justified the eviction and denial of access to leased housing programs on the
basis of anonymously received correspondence which
impugned petitioners' character. Petitioners argue that they
have a right to a grievance hearing before an impartial
individual, the right not to be evicted solely on the basis of
police records or other social reasons, and the right to be
told promptly in writing of the reasons for their eviction.
Petitioners have now received a letter from the authority
asking them to select a date for "a hearing before an
impartial officer."
Notice and Hearing Required in Foreclosure Under Deed of
Trust
9358. Great Western Savings & Loan Association v.
Jackson, No. 676 242 (San Francisco Mun. Ct., Oct. 16,
1972). Defendant represented by James Pachl, 721 Webster
St., San Francisco, Cal. 94117, (415) 567-2804. [Here
reported: 9358A Answer (2 pp.); 9358B Stipulated Facts
(5 pp.); 9358C Defendant's Memo (9 pp.); 9358D Informal
Opinion (2 pp.); Judgment 9358E (1 p.).]
In a case marked by the lack of a formal written
opinion, the San Francisco Municipal Court sustained the
defendant's contention that the plaintiff's claim of title in
defendant's property and subsequent sale under a deed of
trust did not meet the requirements of procedural due
process. Although defendant assumed full responsibility for
payment under the deed of trust, she believed that she had
been given an oral moratorium on her obligations to the
plaintiff by using the moneys that would constitute
payments on the deed of trust to make necessary repairs on
the property. Although the plaintiff complied with all of
the applicable requirements of the California Civil Code in
regaining control of the property, the defendant was not
advised that it was necessary for her to record a request for
notice of any default or of the trustee's sale in order to
receive information on the status of her title. Consequently,
the defendant was not sent notice of the recordation of
default and had no hearing prior to the exercise of the
power of sale by the plaintiff. The informal opinion of the
court sustained the defendant's claim that both federal and
state decisions make such a procedure invalid, holding that
a person cannot be deprived of any property interest
without prior notice and judicial hearing on the merits of
the creditor's alleged claim against the debtor.
Partial Agreement in Indianapolis Workable Program Case
7847. Near East Side Community Organization v. Indianapolis (Ind. Metro. Dev. Comm'n, Marion County, filed
Oct. 18, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by Nelson A. Soltman, Julius E. Smith, and Solomon L. Lowenstein, Jr.,
Legal Services Organization of Indianapolis, Inc., 1955
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Central Ave., Indianapolis, Ind. 46202, (317) 926-2374. Of
counsel, Richard T. LeGates and Alvin Hirshen, National
Housing & Economic Development Law Project, Earl
Warren Legal Institute, 2313 Warring St., Berkeley, Cal.
94704, (415) 642-2826. [Here reported: 7847C Letter
From HUD to NESCO (4 pp.); 7847D Letter From HUD to
Indianapolis Department of Metropolitan Development (8
pp.); 7847E Memo Agreement (4 pp.); 7847F Agreement
Contract (21 pp.). Previously reported: 7847A Administrative Complaint to the City (76 pp.); 7847B
Administrative Complaint to HUD (25 pp.), 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 168 (July 1972).]
The parties in this case have agreed to resolve some of
their disagreements. In particular, the parties have agreed to
the establishment of a Project Area Committee (PAC) to
work in cooperation with local residents, to identify their
changing attitudes, desires and priorities and transmit them
to the Department of Metropolitan Development (DMD),
to provide them with information about its activities, and
to serve as the decision-making body for the area. The PAC
has authority to hire, direct, and fire its staff and
employees.
The parties further agreed that the DMD would
permit the PAC maximum feasible authority, would collaborate with the PAC in developing proposals for the area
and would submit all programs to PAC for review and
evaluation. The DMD also agreed to maintain all dwellings
owned by it in a habitable condition and to submit copies
of all NDP applications for the area to the plaintiff more
than 45 days before official action if possible.
This agreement supplements an earlier one whereby
the DMD and the plaintiff assured the plaintiff's participation in the Workable Program by providing it with
technical assistance upon request and with copies of all
drafts of the Workable Program and all relevant correspondence between the DMD and HUD. Negotiations on all
unresolved issues are continuing.
Tenants Allege Mismanagement of Section 236 Housing
9437. Perez v. Lancaster Garden Court, Inc., (U.S. Dep't of
Hs'g & Urban Dev., filed 1972). Complainants represented
by James Kearney, Alan N. Linder, and J. Richard Gray,
Tri-County Legal Services, 53 North Duke St., Lancaster,
Pa. 17602, (717) 397-4237. [Here reported: 9437A
Complaint (15 pp.).]
Low-income residents of a Section 236 apartment
complex have filed a complaint requesting the Secretary of
HUD to terminate the management contract between the
owner-mortgagor of the project and its resident manager.
The plaintiffs contend that since the apartments had been
financed under Section 236 of the National Housing Act
the owners are required to provide for socially-oriented
management and related human services needed in low and
moderate income projects.
The complaint charges the current manager with
racial prejudice, abusive rent collection tactics, arbitrary
eviction of tenants, failure to repair, lack of proper social
orientation and a disrespectful attitude towards all low-

income tenants. Since this conduct violates HUD standards,
as outlined in provisions of supplementary agreements and
management plans, and constitutes serious mismanagement,
complainants request an investigation and urge the Secretary to declare the mortgagee in default as a result of the
bank's failure to properly supervise the mortgagor, to
require the owner-mortgagor to provide the project with
proper management satisfactory to the tenants, and to bar
retaliatory management action against the complainants.
Statute Requiring City to Transport and Store Evictees'
Goods Held Constitutional
9694. Property Owners Association of Baltimore, Inc. v.
Butler, No. 1972A/466/A-52753 (Md. Cir. Ct., Dec. 14,
1972). Defendants represented by Thomas Miller and H.
Maxwell Hersch, Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., 341 North Calvert
St., Baltimore, Md. 21 202, (301) 539-5340. [Here
reported: 9694A Memorandum and Order (4 pp.).]
The Circuit Court of the City of Baltimore has upheld
the constitutionality of a 1972 Maryland statute which
required that the City of Baltimore provide transportation
and necessary storage facilities for furniture and goods put
into the street as a result of evictions. (This law was passed
through efforts by legal aid bureau representatives.) Plaintiff property owners sought to have the statute declared
unconstitutional under a provision of the Maryland Constitution which strips the legislature of power to pass local
laws on any subject covered by previously-granted express
powers of the city. The court concluded that Baltimore had
no express, as opposed to implied, power to pass such a
law; that even if the city did have power to pass such a law,
express within the meaning of the constitutional provision,
any conflict between the city's power and the local law was
clearly de minimis and not of constitutional dimension;
that the state legislature properly exercised its residual
sovereign power, in light of the strong presumption in favor
of constitutionality; that the intervention of a community
organization was appropriate; and that the complaint be
dismissed with costs to the property owners.
The landlords association sought to have this law
declared unconstitutional because it provided for significant
delay in regard to evicting a tenant and placing his goods on
the street. Since there are limited vehicles available from
the City of Baltimore, it was not possible to evict a tenant
with the same speed as had been possible in the past, where
a tenant's goods were simply placed on the street without
any requirement that a vehicle be provided to transport
these goods to adequate storage facilities.
Low-Income Persons Seek to Intervene in Proceedings
Contesting Municipality's Refusal to Allow Low-Cost
Housing Construction
9494. Waltham Housing Authority v. Waltham Zoning
Board of Appeals, No. 1972-6 (Mass. Dep't of Community
Affairs, Housing App. Committee). Intervenors, Waltham
Tenants Organization, represented by Donald K. Stern and
Donald L. Becker, Boston College Legal Assistance Bureau,
21 Lexington St., Waltham, Mass. 02154, (617) 893-4793.
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[Here reported: 9494A Brief in Support of Application for
Intervention (17 pp.).]
Low-income residents, individually and as members
of an unincorporated tenants association, seek to intervene
in state administrative proceedings contesting a local zoning
board's refusal to issue a permit for the construction of
low-cost housing to a municipal housing authority.
Arguing that they have been forced to endure
substandard living conditions because of a lack of decent
low-cost housing, applicants contend that they have a
personal stake in the outcome of this controversy, thus
meeting the test for standing set forth in Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962). Applicants assert that the concept of
standing is expanding to include all affected persons and
groups and find specifically that potential residents have
standing to challenge administrative decisions regarding
public housing citing Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. III. 1967). Referring to the
language in the Massachusetts statute empowering the
housing authority to provide housing for low-income
persons, applicants insist that their interest in having
additional housing is within the zone of interests protected
by the statute and thus that they have standing under the
test of Association of Data Processing Service, Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1969).
Applicants observe that those with property abutting
the site of the proposed low-cost housing project have
already been admitted as intervenors and contend that their
interest in obtaining decent and safe housing is at least as
great as the purely economic interest of the abuttors.
Finally, the applicants argue that they should be
permitted to intervene because they can make a positive
contribution in the conduct of the proceedings. Willing to
testify that they were on the housing authority's waiting
lists for years, applicants assert that they are in a unique
position to speak of the critical demand for low-cost
housing and to show that defendant's decision was inconsistent with local needs. Because the housing authority has
no duty to represent the interests of low-income persons,
applicants fear that if they do not intervene, their personal
hardships will not be aired during the proceedings.
HUD

Stipulation

Agrees

to

Reinstate

Philadelphia

Neighborhood Renewal Program
8350. Pugh v. HUD, No. 72-1173 (E.D. Pa., October
1972). Plaintiffs represented by George D. Gould and
Jonathan M. Stein, Community Legal Services, 313 South
Juniper St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19107, (215) 735-6101. [Here
reported: 8350C Stipulation (4 pp.). Previously reported:
8350A Complaint (35 pp.); 9350B Memorandum in
Support of TRO (7 pp.), 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 356
(October 1972).]
By stipulation, defendant HUD reinstated the
Philadelphia Neighborhood Renewal Program and the
parties agreed to further procedures to alleviate problems
created by the temporary termination of the program.
The program provides grants up to $3,500 to lowincome homeowners to correct or prevent health and

building code violations in their dwellings. The program had
been dropped after the publication of a news article
questioning its administration. Plaintiffs filed a class action
seeking to enjoin the termination of the program.
By the terms of the stipulation HUD agreed to
reinstate the program and to provide immediate benefits to
the homeowners whose applications had been previously
approved, but who did not receive their grants prior to the
date of termination. In addition, HUD recognized that an
unknown number of applicants have financially altered
their position prior to the termination in reliance upon the
possibility of a grant. Under this stipulation the parties
agreed to procedures to locate such persons who detrimentally relied and provide them the opportunity to
process their applications in light of present circumstances.
Zoning Authority's Zoning Amendment
Challenged as a Violation of Equal Protection

Practice

9545. Southwest Florida Self-Help Housing v. Whisnant,
No. 72-1631-Civ-PF (S.D. Fla., filed Dec. 7, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by Joseph C. Segor, Migrant Services
Foundation, 395 NW 1st St., Miami, Fla. 33128, (305)
374-6193. Of counsel, Neil W. McMillan, Florida Rural
Legal Services, P.O. Box 1109, Immokalee, Fla, 33934.
[Here reported: 9545A First Amended Complaint (13
pp.).]
Plaintiff, a housing organization serving low-income
minority racial and ethnic group members, seeks injunctive
and declaratory relief against defendant county commissioners for allegedly forcing plaintiffs to live in substandard
housing or segregated neighborhoods because of their
failure to act, concerted actions and conspiracy. Plaintiff
contends that the commissioners' approval of an amendatory zoning ordinance increasing minimum floor area
requirements violates the supremacy clause of the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §2701 in that defendants violated the
policy of self-help expressed in the Economic Opportunity
Act and illegally prevented plaintiff from effectuating that
policy by unlawfully interfering with its efforts to carry on
its activities in accordance with the terms of its grant from
the Office of Economic Opportunity.
Moreover, plaintiffs contend the amendatory zoning
ordinance is contrary to and in violation of the Constitution and Florida state law as "spot zoning" since
defendants' actions are unreasonable, arbitrary, and
contrary to public health, safety, welfare, and community
morals.
Plaintiff seeks to enjoin defendants from enforcing
the amendatory zoning ordinance or taking any other
action which will discriminate against or otherwise interfere
with the pursuit of standard housing and an integrated
community, and from acting pursuant to state enabling
legislation until it is revised to establish standards insuring
that the power delegated by the statute is used lawfully.
Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the ordinance and
the state enabling legislation are unconstitutionally vague,
and an order that 1) defendants produce an affirmative plan
for residential integration; 2) that it be delivered to the
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court within a reasonable time; 3) that defendants permit
and encourage participation of plaintiff and its counsel in
the development and completion of the plans; and 4) that
defendants reconstitute the Area Planning Commission to
reasonably conform to the social, ethnic, and economic
composition of the population in the area or, in the
alternative, enjoin the further operation of the planning
commission. Finally, plaintiff seeks $5,000 each for three
individually-named plaintiffs.

order deprived the tenant of due process of law by
requiring her to pay all rents at issue to the landlord before
allowing the tenant an opportunity to present evidence of
affirmative defenses which would either entitle her to pay
the rent into court or qualify her for abatement of the rent.
The appellate court ruled that the lower court could,
however, require payment of all rents at issue into court as
a condition of granting such pre-trial motions.
United States Supreme Court Asked to Grant Right of
Equal Access for Indigent Civil Appellants

IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Decision Prohibiting AFDC Recipient From Proceeding for
Divorce In Forma Pauperis Appealed
9626. Kirk v. Kirk, No. M. 1034-71 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App.
Div., Dec. 5, 1972). Appellant represented by C. Samuel
Beardsley and Richard V. Hunt, Onondaga Neighborhood
Legal Services, 633 South Warren St., Syracuse, N.Y.
13202, (315) 475-3127. [Here reported: 9626A Brief (14
pp.).]
Plaintiff, an AFDC recipient, challenges a lower court
decision holding that because of her receipt of AFDC
funds, bringing her above the poor person statute
requirements, she may not proceed in forma pauperis in her
action for divorce.
Plaintiff contends that her inability to pay costs and
expenses has been demonstrated and that the money
received for support is needed to provide for the necessities
of life. It is argued that due process requires the state to
defray costs in such a case, and that as a recipient of public
assistance, with no available property to draw upon,
plaintiff should be deemed to be indigent per se for
purposes of the poor persons statute.
Payment of Alleged Rent Arrears to Landlord as Condition
for Proceeding In Forma Pauperis Reversed
9573. Margarito v. Ortiz, No. L&T 24800/72 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., App. Term, Nov. 9, 1972). Appellants represented by
John C. Gray and Allen R. Bentley, Brooklyn Legal
Services Corporation B, 152 Court St., Brooklyn, N.Y.
11201,
(212) 855-8003. [Here reported: 9573A
Appellant's Brief (15 pp.); 9573B Order and Opinion (2
pp.).]
In this suit for alleged nonpayment of rent, the court
has modified a lower court order which would have
required the tenant to pay the rent at issue to the landlord
prior to the trial, and ordered the tenant-appellant to
deposit all past due rent into court pending a final
determination of the case. The tenant, a welfare recipient
withholding rent because of defective and hazardous
building conditions, had moved to proceed as a poor person
and had requested a jury trial without payment of jury fees.
The lower court had ruled that all arrears of rent had to be
paid to the landlord before it would grant the tenant's
motions.
The tenant-appellant's brief argued that the lower
court had no authority to place such a condition on
granting leave to proceed as a poor person and that the

9462. Johnson v. Dade County Board of Public Instruction
(U.S. Sup. Ct., filed October term 1972). Petitioner
represented by Bruce S. Rogow and Daniel S. Pearson, 25
West Flagler St., Miami, Fla. 33130, (305) 377-8155;
William D. Townsend and Sally Weintraub, Legal Services
of Greater Miami, 17430 South Dixie Highway, Perrine,
Fla. 33157, (305) 379-0822. [Here reported: 9462A
Petition for Certiorari (14 pp.); 9462B Appendix (12 pp.).]
Petitioner initially filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
for declaratory relief and a permanent injunction seeking to
enjoin the Dade County School Board from suspending him
for a 40-day period without providing for a hearing
consonant with the principles of due process. The district
court denied relief after a hearing and also denied the
petitioner's application for leave to appeal in forma
pauperis. The district court stated that any appeal by the
petitioner would be frivolous and that the Legal Services
agency representing the petitioner should be able to finance
the cost of an appeal as a tax-supported government
organization. Thereafter, petitioner sought leave from the
Fifth Circuit to appeal in forma pauperis and was summarily denied by a single judge of the Fifth Circuit, and
later by a three-judge panel. Both orders by the court of
appeals failed to provide any reasons for the denial of the
application.
The petition for certiorari relies on Coppedge v.
United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962), which granted indigent
criminal appellants equal access to the courts, in reaching
the conclusion that the disparate treatment of in forma
pauperis civil appeals violates the Constitution. The petition
asserts that analysis of the Fifth Circuit statistics for 1972
revealed that the court does not, in form or substance,
screen the paid civil cases for frivolity with the same strict
standard that it applies to the in forma pauperis cases,
thereby creating a classification based solely upon wealth
which is suspect under both the equal protection and due
process clauses. The petitioner also asserts that the denial of
his in forma pauperis appeal because his counsel is a
federally funded Legal Services office is a violation of
congressional intent to give Legal Services attorneys the
same rights and privileges as the private bar.
Indigent Litigant Seeks Right to Free Transcript for Civil
Appeal
3746. Almarez v. Carpenter, No. 72-1828 (10th Cir., filed
Dec. 27, 1972). Appellants represented by Donald Juneau
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and Jonathon B. Chase, Colorado Rural Legal Services,
1375 Delaware St., Denver, Colo. 80204, (303) 573-1641.
[Here reported: 3746D Appellants' Brief (29 pp.). Previously reported: 3746A Plaintiffs' Brief (33 pp.), 4
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 221 (August-September 1970);
3746B Colorado Supreme Court Opinion (11 pp.), 4
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 554 (March 1971); 3746C
Appellants' Brief (35 pp.), 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 608
(February 1972).]
Indigent appellants have filed an appeal urging a
reversal of the federal district court's denial of a motion for
a new trial and seeking an order directing the district court
to issue an injunction against the defendant state trial judge
in the original action to furnish the appellants with a
transcript of the state trial free of charge. Appellants
originally sought a free transcript in order to appeal from
an adverse civil judgment in a state court in which they had
been allowed to appear in forma pauperis. After the
judgment the trial judge found that the applicable state
statute did not authorize a trial transcript without cost. The
appellants then brought a Section 1983 action in the
federal district court arguing that the state statute was in
violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment, insofar as it did not provide for
a trial transcript without cost for indigent litigants. The
district court certified questions of state law to the
Colorado Supreme Court who determined that there was no
right to a free transcript and that the state constitution was
not violated because there were alternative methods of
making a trial court record available to the indigent litigant.
The district court then entered a judgment against the
appellants which was later reversed and remanded by the
Tenth Circuit. The appellants now appeal the dismissal of
their action by the district court on remand.
On appeal they reassert their previous due process
and equal protection arguments in light of recent decisions
supporting an indigent's right to a free transcript. They
especially stress Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971),
which recognizes the right of an indigent misdemeanant to
a free trial transcript. Additionally, they cite federal and
state decisions which have read Boddie v. Connecticut to be
an adequate basis for allowing indigents to participate more
fully in the judicial process.
Finally, the appellants argue that when indigent civil
litigants make out a prima facie case for a government paid
full transcript the burden shifts to the government to show
a full transcript unnecessary or an alternative record
adequate. They claim that the lower courts had erroneously
placed the burden on the poor person contrary to Mayer v.
Chicago which specifically placed the burden on the state.
Supreme Court Upholds
Bankruptcy

Filing Fees for Discharge in

6537. United States v. Kras, No. 71-749 (U.S. Sup. Ct.,
Jan. 10, 1973). Appellee represented by Kalman Finkel,
The Legal Aid Society, 267 West 17th St., New York, N.Y.
10011, (212) 691-8320. On the brief, John E. Kirklin and
Leon Polsky, same address. [Here reported: 6537C Opinion

(32 pp.). Previously reported: 6537A Memo in Support of
Petition in Bankruptcy (24 pp.); 6537B District Court
Opinion (21 pp.), 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 464
(December 1971).]
Declining to extend the scope of Boddie v.
Connecticut, the Supreme Court has held that the required
payment of the $50 filing fee as a condition to a discharge
in bankruptcy does not violate the rights of due process and
equal protection of those unable to pay the fees. In
reversing the district court holding that a discharge in
bankruptcy is a fundamental right that can be denied only
upon the showing of a compelling state interest, the Court
in effect held that some persons are too poor even to go
bankrupt.
The Court distinguished Boddie by drawing a
distinction between the right to a divorce, held to be a
fundamental right in Boddie, and the right to a discharge in
bankruptcy, which the Court held not to be a fundamental
right. The Court further found that while the state's
exclusive control over the establishment and dissolution of
marriage requires access to the courts regardless of indigency since no alternative means of resolving the dispute
and dissolving the marital relationship exists, access to the
courts is not the only conceivable relief available to
bankrupts. Suggesting that other means of settling with
creditors and thus escaping the cloud of debt can be
pursued, the Court found no constitutional right to a
discharge in bankruptcy.
In holding that the filing fee requirement does not
deny indigents equal protection, the Court applied the
rational justification test rather than the compelling governmental interest test to support the different treatment
afforded to indigents as opposed to those able to pay a
filing fee. The Court found such a rational basis to exist in
the need and congressional purpose for making bankruptcy
proceedings self-sustaining, with the payment of referees by
those who use the system rather than by general tax
revenues. (See CCH POV. L. REP. 16,567.)
INSURANCE
Suit Challenges Longer Statute of Limitations on Accident
Claims for Insurance Companies
9609. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fales, No. 1 Civ.
30913 (Cal. Sup. Ct., filed Apr. 28, 1972). Defendant
represented by Harvey M. Freed and Armando M. Menocal
III, San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, 2701 Folsom St., San Francisco, Cal. 94110, (415)
648-7580. [Here reported: 9609A Defendant's Opening
Brief (26 pp.); 9609B Points and Authorities in Opposition
to Motion to Dismiss (7 pp.); 9609C Petition for Hearing
(31 pp.).]
The California Supreme Court has heard arguments in
this case challenging the the constitutionality of a section
of the state insurance code which gives insurance companies
three years from the date on which they become subrogated to an insurance claim in which to file suit. Uninsured
motorists have only one year in which to file suit on a
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personal injury claim. Thus, an insurer may legally delay
action until more than one year after the accident so that
counter suit by the insured motorist is foreclosed.
In this case, plaintiff insurance company filed suit
after the defendant could no longer counterclaim and
obtained a judgment against defendant in the superior court
for over $5,000. Defendant appealed and, after filing his
opening brief challenging the constitutionality of Insurance
Code Section 11580.2, the insurance company filed an
accord and satisfaction with the court of appeal, accompanied by a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that it was moot. Defendant accepted the satisfaction of
the judgment but opposed the motion to dismiss and, after
it was granted by the court of appeal, filed a petition for
hearing in the California Supreme Court.
Before the supreme court, defendant argued that
there is sufficient continuing public interest in resolving the
constitutional issues to overcome mootness. Additionally,
defendant presented attorneys' declarations to the effect
that insurance companies throughout the state have tried to
avoid a judicial determination of the statute's
constitutionality by dismissing an action whenever the
constitutionality of Insurance Code Section 11580.2 is
attacked.
JUVENILE
Supreme Court Upholds Right of Illegitimate Children to
Support Payments
9655. Gomez v. Perez, No. 71-575 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Jan. 17,
1973). [Here reported: 9655A Opinion (4 pp.).]
The Supreme Court has held that a Texas statute
which provides a judicially enforceable right of support
from a natural father to legitimate children and denies that
right to illegitimate children is a denial of equal protection.
Under Texas common law and statutes, the natural
father has a continuing obligation to support his legitimate
children. In this case, although appellant had shown that
appellee was the natural father of her child and that the
child was in need of the support, the trial and appellate
courts agreed that Texas common law and statutes imposed
no legal obligation of support on the child's father.
In reversing and remanding the decision of the state
court, the Supreme Court relied on two previous decisions,
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), and Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), which
established the principle that a state may not discriminate
against illegitimate children by denying them substantial
benefits accorded to children generally. (See CCH POV. L.
REP. 16,584.)
Seek Substantial Evidence Standard and Individualized
Treatment Before Court May Order Removal of Minor
From Parental Home
9440. In re Ivan R.M., No. 21129 (Cal. Ct. App., filed
November 1972). Appellant represented by Ernest L.
Aubry and Paul F. Cohen, Western Center on Law &
Poverty, 1709 West Eighth St., Los Angeles, Cal. 90017,

(213) 483-1491. [Here reported: 9440A Appellant's Brief
(40 pp.); 9440C Appellant's Reply Brief (44 pp.).]
Appellant, a minor, appeals from the judgment of the
juvenile court, committing him to the California Youth
Authority, detaining him after adjudication pending disposition, and detaining him after disposition pending appeal.
The court of appeal temporarily stayed the order of
commitment and detention pending appeal and the minor
was released to his parents.
The appellant was originally charged with and
convicted of maliciously destroying another's personal
property and of disturbing the peace, both charges arising
out of the overturning of an automobile. Appellant does
not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining the
court's finding that he was involved in the acts in question,
but argues that no statutory basis exists for the three orders
of commitment appealed from. Appellant asserts that the
United States Constitution and state statutes require
substantial evidence of misconduct and necessity to support
the removal of a minor from the parental home after a
criminal conviction. Appellant argues that this standard of
substantial evidence and necessity was not met in this case
because: the nature of the charged offense cannot in itself
constitute the basis for detention since each juvenile must
be treated as an individual; the court's order here ignored
this right to individualized treatment by failing to consider
the appellant's minor role in the disturbances and his
exemplary record; the interim order detaining the minor
after the adjudication hearing was void since the court
heard no evidence and made no finding of fact concerning
the propriety of detention; and there was no evidence at
the disposition hearing showing the necessity of removing
the appellant from the custody of his parents.
Commitment of Juvenile Upheld: No Manifest Abuse of
Discretion
9428. Randall v. Washington, No. 1363-1 (Wash. Ct. App.).
Petitioner represented by Larry V. Lund, Seattle-King
County Public Defender, 1511 East Alder, Seattle, Wash.
98122. [Here reported: 9428A Brief (33 pp.); 9428B
Opinion (6 pp.).]
The Washington Court of Appeals has affirmed a
lower court decision committing a 15-year-old juvenile to
the Washington Division of Institutions, rejecting petitioner's arguments that because of the nature of juvenile
cases, especially those involving commitment and a resulting curtailment of liberty, the scope of review should be
broad and a standard less than manifest abuse of discretion
should warrant reversal.
The appellate court concentrated on petitioner's
alternative contention that even under a strict standard of
review, the facts and circumstances of this case indicated a
manifest abuse of discretion by the trial judge. The court
held that the trial judge had adequately considered the
social reports on petitioner within the meaning of the
statute despite the fact that the judge stated at the hearing
that he had not looked the reports over carefully. Although
there was conflicting evidence presented, the court found
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that the trial judge's conclusions were supported by
substantial evidence and thus could not be overturned.
Petitioner alleged that the trial court had not
considered her welfare in ordering commitment but the
court dismissed this argument on the ground that, although
the court had not explicitly disclosed how petitioner's
welfare would be served by commitment, a presumption
attaches that the trial judge has made the child's interests
paramount. Finally, the court rejected petitioner's contention that the trial judge's failure to give explicit reasons for
ordering commitment Is a denial of due process and abuse
of discretion, since there is no statutory or constitutional
requirement for such findings.

rate, practical and understandable to those to whom
directed. Materials should scrupulously avoid naming individual attorneys. The court does not approve the use of
community education programs to foster political reforms
allegedly designed to make the legal system more responsive
to the needs of the poor. The court finally stated that these
guidelines should be supplemented by study of the opinions
of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the ABA as
applied to individual problems.

LEGAL SERVICES

9366. California v. Knapp, No. 2 Crim. 22418 (Cal. Ct.
App., filed Nov. 9, 1972). Appellant represented by
Richard S. Buckley, John J. Gibbons, Richard Burton and
Laurance S. Smith, Office of the Public Defender, 1601
Eastlake Ave., Los Angeles, Cal. 90033, (213) 233-2171.
[Here reported: 9366A Appellant's Brief (62 pp.).]
After the appellant was convicted for "molesting a
child under age 18," he was additionally adjudicated a
mentally disordered sex offender (MDSO) under the (civil)
California MDSO Act and committed to a state mental
hospital. One year later, the superintendent of the state
hospital certified to the court that the appellant was still a
MDSO, had not recovered, and should be recommitted to
the state department of corrections. Appellant's motion for
a jury trial was denied, he was found to remain an MDSO,
and he was recommitted to the department of mental
hygiene for an indeterminate period. From this
recommitment proceeding he has appealed.
The appellant first alleges unconstitutional
discrimination against an arbitrary class of persons-the
MDSO. Unlike other mentally ill persons, the MDSO can be
confined in penal institutions and does not have the option
of submitting to voluntary treatment as an alternative to
commitment. Unlike other convicted criminals, the MDSO
has no opportunity for probation or parole and may be
confined beyond the maximum term for the underlying
crime. The appellant alleges the nonexistence of any
rational reason for so discriminating against the MDSOwho, under statute, need not actually have committed any
crime to be so classified so long as the threat of crime
exists-as opposed to other mental patients, other misdemeanants, and even felons, in violation of the fourteenth
amendment equal protection.
The appellant next alleges that his confinement for
the status of being a MDSO, without appropriate treatment,
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the eighth and fourteenth amendments. He alleges that his
sexual deviation is curable with appropriate therapy; that in
harmony with established medical practice the appropriate
therapy is intensive, individual psychotherapy; and that his
confinement in a loosely supervised ward with a group of
other homosexuals, receiving "treatment" only from "ward
teams" whose formal education consisted solely of a high
school diploma, and without the possibility of submitting

Community Education Programs Conducted by Legal
Services Held to be Proper Within the Canons of Ethics
9578. In re Professional Ethics, No. 12356 (Mont. Sup.
Ct., Nov. 28, 1972). Petitioners represented by Barney
Reagan, and Gary G. Doran, Montana Legal Services, 601
Power Block, Helena, Mont. 59601. Amicus curiae, Henry
Loble, Helena, Mont. [Here reported: 9578A Opinion (7
pp.).]
The Montana Supreme Court has held that
community education programs conducted by Legal
Services offices do not constitute unprofessional conduct so
long as they are dignified in tone, do not promote or
advertise individual attorneys and do not in and of
themselves stir up or promote litigation either in individual
cases or to promote a cause. The matter was before the
court as a result of an application for guidance and counsel,
brought by the director of the Montana Legal Services
Association, on matters concerning the Canons of Professional Ethics. The court granted a hearing under its power
to regulate the practice of law in Montana.
OEO rules and regulations require that all Legal
Services programs engage in "community education." Petitioners asked for guidance from the court that they might
accomplish the required community education without
violating Canon 27 (advertising, direct or indirect) and
Canon 28 (stirring up litigation, directly or through agents).
The court stated that the indigent need education as
to their legal rights to ensure equal protection of the law.
The court further stated that the purpose of the community education program ought to be confined to making
the poor aware of their legal rights and the availability of
legal services without regard to their ability to pay, so as to
bring them under the equal protection of the law.
The court set forth the following guides to aid the
Montana Legal Services Association in conducting its
education program. It may advertise the existence, location,
telephone numbers and services of its offices. Any recognized advertising medium may be used to reach desired
recipients. Materials used should relate to general legal
problems and not attempt to advise specific persons
concerning individual legal problems in the absence of any
attorney-client relationship. Materials used should be accu-

MENTAL HEALTH
Challenge Constitutionality of the California Mentally
Disordered Sex Offender Act
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to voluntary, private treatment are not conducive to his
recovery.
The MDSO Act specifies that whenever the
superintendent of the state hospital concludes that an
MDSO is still dangerous but not amenable to further
treatment, the criminal court may either impose sentence
or recertify the MDSO to the superior court. As construed
by the superior court, the appellant-MDSO was not entitled
to argue in defense that he was actually still amenable to
treatment. The appellant alleges that his construction by
the superior court was correct and that the Act as
construed is unconstitutional as denying him due process
and constituting an unconstitutional delegation of power to
the superintendent of the state hospital, since his decision
as to the MDSO's further amenability to treatment is
effectively nonreviewable.
North Carolina Summary Commitment Statutes
Treatment Accorded Alleged Unconstitutional

and

9314. Hayes v. Knight, No. C-305-D-72 (M.D. N.C., filed
November 1972). Plaintiffs represented by William Webb
and Paul Raby, Legal Aid Society of Durham County, 353
West Main St., Durham, N.C. 27701, (919) 688-6396.
[Here reported: 9314A Complaint (10 pp.); 9314B Brief in
Support of Motions for Class Action, Three-Judge Court,
and Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (84 pp.).]
Plaintiffs, representatives of the class of patients
involuntarily confined to mental hospitals under North
Carolina statutes, bring this action seeking to have the
statutes declared unconstitutional for failure to afford
commitment procedures consistent with due process and
equal protection of the laws, and requesting a declaratory
judgment delineating and enforcing constitutionally required minimum standards of treatment for patients involuntarily confined to mental hospitals. Defendants are
hospital and state mental health officials and clerks of the
local courts responsible for the enforcement of the statutes.
Plaintiffs comprehensively attack the statutes' failure
to provide adequate notice of the proceedings, right to
counsel and appointed counsel for indigents, adequate
discovery procedures, adequate confrontation of witnesses,
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the need for commitment, exclusion of hearsay evidence, exclusion of selfincriminatory statements, a verbatim record with free
transcripts to indigents, disinterested psychiatric evaluations, judicial hearings within reasonable time periods,
and periodic review of commitment. Plaintiffs argue that,
because the statutes fail to require proof that there is no
less drastic alternative to hospitalization, there is cruel and
unusual punishment. Second, plaintiffs allege that the
constant surveillance, the absence of notification that
actions may be self-incriminatory, the use of mind-dulling
drugs before judicial commitment, and involuntary submission to examination without fundamental procedural
protections are all denials of the right to privacy guaranteed
by the ninth amendment. Plaintiffs argue that the statutory
provisions which lack standards and provision of fair notice
are void for vagueness and overbreadth. Finally, plaintiffs

allege that they have a constitutionally protected right to
treatment and that the hospital has denied that right by
failing to provide a humane psychological and physical
environment with a sufficient number of qualified staff and
individualized treatment plans.
Voting Rights of Voluntarily Committed Mental Patient
Secured
9374. Letti v. Trembley, No. 34150 (Mass. Super. Ct., filed
Oct. 6, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by Barbara J. Rouse
and Donald K. Stern, Boston College Legal Assistance
Bureau, 21 Lexington St., Waltham, Mass. 02154, (617)
893-4793. [Here reported: 9374A Complaint (9 pp.);
9374B Plaintiff's Brief (16 pp.).]
The plaintiff in this class action is a voluntarily
committed mental patient who sought to have the court
declare invalid and enjoin defendant's refusal to register and
enroll plaintiff and his class as qualified and eligible voters
in state and federal elections. The defendant board of
registrars of voters contended that the mental hospital was
the guardian of all persons confined therein, regardless of
voluntary or involuntary status, and that any person under
such guardianship is not eligible to vote. In response, the
plaintiff asserted that the refusal of the defendants to
register and enroll the plaintiff as an eligible voter was both
a denial of due process and an invidious discrimination
against mental patients as a class in violation of the equal
protection clause.
The court retained jurisdiction of the case and
remanded it to the board of registrars of voters, which
accepted the named plaintiff as an eligible voter and
proceeded to register him. However, the court would not
enter judgment as to the named plaintiff or the class, so the
case was dismissed as moot.
Attack Missouri Criminal Commitment Statute
9509. Missouri v. Kite, No. 58077 (Mo. Sup. Ct., filed Dec.
11, 1972). Appellant represented by Richard Boardman,
The Legal Aid Society of the City and County of St Louis,
4030 Chouteau Ave., St. Louis, Mo. 63110, (314)
652-9581. [Here reported: 9509A Brief (16 pp.).]
The appellant alleges that the respondent Missouri
state officials violated his rights to equal protection and due
process under the fourteenth amendment by committing
him to a state hospital without a hearing after he was
adjudged innocent of arson by reason of a mental disease or
defect excluding responsibility for the act. The appellant
urges that the Missouri statute under which he was
committed is an unconstitutional deprivation of his due
process rights in that it provides for commitment upon such
acquittal on criminal charges without a hearing and a
finding of fact as to his present mental condition at the
time of the commitment. He argues that at such required
hearing the court would be foreclosed from inquiring into
his mental condition at the time of the alleged criminal act
by the previous judgment of acquittal.
The appellant also alleges that the statutory provision
under which commitment took place violates his right to
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while for civil commitment a person has to be adjudged
mentally ill and in need of custody, care or treatment at the
time of the commitment proceedings.

contacted in the belief that such person committed the
investigated crime, the removal shall be made only with
probable cause, and if the crime is a misdemeanor committed out of the police department's view, only pursuant
to an arrest warrant. The court ordered that a printed card
in compliance with this decree be delivered to all members
of the police department.

MIGRANTS

Seek Remedy Against Alleged Police Brutality and Lack of
Effective Internal Police Discipline

equal protection since it imposes an unreasonable and
arbitrary distinction between civil and criminal cases. Those
who are acquitted of criminal charges on the basis of
mental defect or disease are automatically committed,

Michigan Supreme Court Holds Migrants Unconstitutionally
Excluded From Workmen's Compensation Coverage
6561. Guiterrez v. Glaser Crandell Co., No. 53541 (Mich.
Sup. Ct., Dec. 21, 1972). Amicus curiae represented by
Alan W. Houseman, Michigan Legal Services Assistance
Program, Wayne State University Law School, Detroit,
Mich. 48202, (313) 577-4822. [Here reported: 6561D
Opinion (18 pp.). Also available: 6561B Amicus Brief (49
pp.).]
In three separate opinions the Michigan Supreme
Court has held that the state's exclusion of seasonal
farmworkers from workmen's compensation coverage is
constitutionally impermissible. The majority opinion based
its decision on the premise that singling out agricultural
employers as exceptions to the workmen's compensation
scheme was discriminatory, while another opinion founded
its rationale on a denial of equal protection between
agricultural workers paid on a piecework basis (not
covered) and those paid hourly wages (covered). Both
found these distinctions impermissible, discriminatory and
without rational basis.
POLICE
Consent Required Prior to Removal of a Person for Police
Investigation
3415. Alexander v. Rizzo, No. 70-992 (E.D. Pa., Dec. 18,
1972). Plaintiffs represented by David L. Hill, Community
Legal Services, Inc., 1528 North Broad St., Philadelphia, Pa.
19121, (215) 235-8617. [Here reported: 3415H Final
Decree (4 pp.). Previously reported: 3415A Complaint (24
pp.); 2415B Memo in Support of Discovery (4 pp.), 4
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 105 (June 1970).]
A federal district court has decreed that the
defendants, the Philadelphia Police Department, shall not
remove a person from where he is initially contacted for
investigative purposes unless the removal is either voluntarily and knowingly consented to by the person or is
accompanied by probable cause to believe that such person
committed the investigated crime. Where a person has
voluntarily and knowingly consented, the removal shall be
made only during hours reasonable under the circumstances
and after the person has been informed of the place to
which he is being taken, the nature of the investigated
crime, the right to choose not to be removed, and that he
may leave the place he is being held at any time. Where a
person is removed from the place where he is initially

9503. Calvin v. Conlisk, No. 72 C 3230 (N.D. Ill., filed
Dec. 22, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by Robert C.
Howard, Marshall Patner, and Alexander Polikoff, 109
North Dearborn St., Chicago, II1. 60602, (312) 641-5570;
Robert W. Bennett, 357 East Chicago Ave., Chicago, Ill.
60611, (312) 649-8430; Kermit C. Coleman, 19 South
LaSalle St., Chicago, III. 60603, (312) 263-2267; Clare E.
Benford, 118 West Randolph St., Chicago, II1. 60601, (312)
236-5277; Martha Jenkins, 231 South LaSalle St., Chicago,
11. 60604, (312) 236-4500; Lawrence E. Kennon, 2600
South Michigan Ave., Chicago, III. 60616, (312) 326-1440.
[Here reported: 9053A Complaint (64 pp.).]
The individual plaintiffs in this class action have
allegedly been subjected to abusive and arbitrary police
misconduct, particularly the excessive use of physical force,
which has deprived them of their constitutional rights. This
civil action, seeks damages for the injuries sustained by the
named plaintiffs and declaratory and injunctive relief to
redress the alleged deprivations of constitutional rights of
the class by police misconduct.
In addition to the individual police officers who
allegedly abused the individual plaintiffs, the defendants
include the superintendent of police, the police board and
the City of Chicago. These defendants, it is alleged, have
the duty to prevent such misconduct and to discipline
police officers who engage in it. The plaintiffs maintain that
these defendants have failed to fulfill this duty, and have
instead followed a course of conduct that condones, and in
effect encourages, such abusive misconduct. The plaintiffs
assert that this course of conduct is particularly evident in
the operation of a police discipline system by defendants
which does not make thorough investigations of such
abusive misconduct and does not take appropriate
disciplinary action against police officers who engage in it.
The plaintiffs ask for equitable relief to assure the
effective functioning of the police discipline system and to
protect plaintiffs and other persons against future occurrences of unconstitutional misconduct by policemen.
Specifically, in addition to damages for the named plaintiffs, the complaint requests the following relief: an order
compelling the defendants to take all appropriate steps
within their power to prevent police officers from engaging
in unconstitutional misconduct and to discipline appropriately all officers who engage in such misconduct; to
adopt and implement an effective police discipline system
for the receipt, investigation and disposition of complaints
of unconstitutional misconduct by policemen; to provide
the opportunity for each complainant to be fully informed
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concerning the procedures of the police discipline system in
the handling of his complaint; and public access to
information concerning the procedures and performance of
the police discipline system.
Police Department Ordered to Hire Minority Applicants
9103. Shield Club v. Cleveland, No. C72-1088 (N.D. Ohio,
Dec. 21, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by Edward R. Stege,
Jr., and Isabelle Katz Pinzler, Legal Aid Society of
Cleveland, 2108 Payne Ave., Cleveland, Ohio 44114, (216)
861-6242; Jack Greenberg, William Robinson and Jeffry A.
Mintz, 10 Columbus Circle, New York, N.Y. 10019; James
Hardiman and Edward Becker, 1375 Hayden Ave., East
Cleveland, Ohio 44112; Russell Adrine and Leodis Harris,
Superior Bldg., Cleveland, Ohio 44112; Almeta Johnson,
Citizens Bldg., Cleveland, Ohio. [Here reported: 9103B
Memorandum & Order (8 pp.). Previously reported: 9103A
Complaint (10 pp.), 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 577
(January 1973).]
A federal district court has concluded that the City of
Cleveland and other public defendants failed to overcome
the prima facie showing that tests used by the police
department for determining the employment of new
policemen have a racially discriminatory impact. The court
granted injunctive relief primarily to obtain the appointment of qualified black and Hispanic testees who, but for
the possible discriminatory impact of the examination on
their test scores, would have merited appointment. The
court concluded that the appointments will be accomplished best by insuring that a minimum percentage of
those black and Hispanic testees who passed the examination are appointed. The court stated that with allowance
of plus or minus one percent, the minimum number of
appointments should be fixed at a percentage (fraction),
the numerator of which is the total number of blacks and
Hispanics who passed the examination and the denominator
of which is the total number of all persons who passed the
examination. The result here is 18%, which is intended, to
apply to black and Hispanic appointments, both male and
female.
This class action sought injunctive and declaratory
relief on behalf of all black and Hispanic persons who had
applied for but were denied employment as patrolmen or
women in the Cleveland Police Department, or who as
present officers were subject to racially discriminatory
practices in assignments, promotions, discipline and general
treatment by their superior and fellow officers.
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants discriminated on
the basis of race, color, and national origin against
applicants for employment with the Cleveland Police
Department and against black and Hispanic police persons
within the police department. Plaintiffs alleged that the
means used by the police department for recruitment of
new applicants, the written examination, medical and
psychological examination, polygraph test, and background
investigation which were required for securing employment
with the department, were discriminatory. Plaintiffs further
alleged that a disproportionately high numberof black and

Hispanic officers traditionally were assigned to particular
patrol duties and that promotions within the department
were made on a discriminatory basis.
The court has ordered that the blacks and Hispanics
who passed the test be appointed from names certified by
the Civil Service Commission and properly screened in the
order in which they appeared on the eligibility list, and in
sufficient numbers that at least 18% (plus or minus one
percent) of the 188 police persons appointed are black or
Hispanic. The court further ordered that once the 188 new
police are appointed, the defendant Civil Service Commission and the safety director are enjoined from making
any further use of the eligibility list until an appropriate job
validation study has been conducted and it is found that
the tests are job related. The court retained jurisdiction to
determine whether in light of the validation study the
eligibility list may again be used. In the alternative the Civil
Service Commission may determine that it should cancel
the eligibility list, once the 188 police are hired from the
list. The Commission may then proceed to establish a new
eligibility list, employing tests and procedures that conform
to the fourteenth amendment and other applicable law.
Petition to Perpetuate Evidence Granted in Police Brutality
Case: Counsel Fees to Defend Dismissed Appeal Awarded
9643. Souza v. Sharkey, No. 72-1184 (1st Cir., July 21,
1972). Plaintiff represented by Gary Yesser, John M.
Roney, Cary J. Coen and Kenneth F. Maclver, Rhode
Island Legal Services, Inc., 56 Pine St., Providence, R.I.
02903, (401) 274-2652. [Here reported: 9643A Petition to
Perpetuate Evidence (3 pp.); 9643B Order (2 pp.); 9643C
Memorandum to Dismiss Appeal (8 pp.); 9643D Order (1
p.); 9643E Memorandum in Opposition (5 pp.); 9643F
Order (1 p.).]
The First Circuit has upheld a district court's ruling
allowing a petition to perpetuate evidence under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 27 in regard to a police brutality complaint lodged
by an inmate in the adult correctional institutions (ACI) in

Early Screening Packet Available
National Welfare Rights Organization, assisted
by the Health Law Project and the National Health
Law Program, has prepared a packet of materials on
the struggle for good screening programs. Besides all
the basic materials such as the law and guidelines, this
packet contains a good analysis of the forces affecting
the health system and a plan of action for welfare
rights and other local consumer groups.
The packet is available from either the Health
Law Project, 133 South 36th St., Philadelphia, Pa.
19104, or from the National Health Law Program,
2477 Law Bldg., 405 Hilgard Ave., Los Angeles, Cal.
90024. Although the packet itself is free, a $1
donation to cover postage and handling costs is
urgently requested.
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Rhode Island. The plaintiff alleged that he was the victim
of numerous assaults while in the custody of the Cranston,
Rhode Island Police Department that resulted in his
immediate placement in the hospital of the ACI when he
was subsequently incarcerated. The plaintiff moved under
Rule 27 to perpetuate evidence of his physical condition
and requested that the district court order the admission of
a physician and photographer to the ACI. Over the
objection of counsel for the prison officials, the court
granted the petition to perpetuate evidence. The defendant
did not move either the district or appellate court for a stay
of the court's decision and the plaintiff was examined and
photographed. When the defendants subsequently appealed,
the plaintiff asserted that the appeal was not timely filed
and that the case was moot. The court of appeals dismissed
the case as moot and awarded the Legal Services project
$250 counsel fees to defend the dismissed appeal.
PR ISONS
Class Action Alleges Inhumane Conditions at State Prison
9446. Farnsworth v. Frost, No. MC 32-72 (D. Utah, filed
Nov. 24, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by Weber County
Legal Aid Services, 453 24th St., Ogden, Utah 84401, (801)
394-9431. Of counsel, Stanley A. Bass, NAACP Legal
Defense & Education Fund, 10 Columbus Circle, New
York, N.Y. 10019. [Here reported: 9446A Complaint (15
pp.).]
Plaintiffs in this class action allege that they and all
other inmates of the Weber County Jail are subject to cruel
and unusual conditions which amount to a deprivation of
their constitutional rights under color of state law. The
defendants are sued individually and in their respective
capacities as officials of Weber County and the State of
Utah who are responsible for the administration of the jail
and the care and custody of its inmates, or who have the
power to alleviate conditions there but have not exercised
that power.
The complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief,
and asserts that the conditions alleged deprive the plaintiffs
and their class of the right to be treated with decency and
dignity under the ninth and fourteenth amendments, the
right of privacy under the fourth, ninth, and fourteenth
amendments, and the right of freedom of religion guaranteed by the first amendment. The jail was constructed
over 75 years ago and designed to house not more than 50
prisoners, resulting in overcrowding which denies the
inmates privacy and freedom of movement. There are also
numerous specifications of unsanitary conditions, such as
lack of clean bedding and clean clothes, lack of personal
hygiene supplies, unwholesome food served under unhygienic conditions, and uncovered toilets. There are no lights
in the individual cells and the only artificial lighting is
provided by a few light bulbs in some of the halls, rendering
reading at night impossible. Inmates are assigned to
particular cells at random without the benefit of an
effective classification system, and accused and convicted
prisoners are often combined. The complaint also alleges

that there is inadequate guard control and supervision,
often resulting in the administration of unauthorized
disciplinary measures to prisoners.
Other allegations of inhumane treatment include: the
denial of access to physicians when inmates are sick and a
general lack of provision for the treatment of special
medical problems; that inmates of the jail who are not
trustees receive no physical exercise indoors or outside
since there is no area for recreation; that there is no library
where an inmate can obtain law books or other reading
material; that there is a lack of communication since all
letters sent out of the prison are censored by jail authorities, and that visitation privileges are grossly
inadequate and arbitrary.
The plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 that the alleged conditions are in violation of
their constitutional rights and also an injunction requiring
the defendants to provide an affirmative remedy for all the
deprivations resulting from the unlawful operation of the
facility.
Temporary Restraining Order Against Use of Mace on
Prisoners Denied
8419. Aikens v. Lash, No. 72-S-129 (N.D. Ind., filed Aug.
10, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by Harold R. Berk, Legal
Services Organization of Indianapolis, Inc., 15 East Washington St., Indianapolis, Ind. 46204, (317) 639-4151. [Here
reported: 8419D Memo in Support of Motion for TRO (4
pp.); 8419E Supp. Memo in Support of Motion for TRO (4
pp.); 8419F Second Supp. Memo in Support of Motion for
TRO (2 pp.); 8419H Memo in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration of Application for TRO (8 pp.); 8419-1
Supp. Memo in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of
Application for TRO (6 pp.). Also available: 8419A
Complaint (29 pp.); 8419G Amendments to Complaint (4
pp.).]
Plaintiffs, prisoners at the Indiana State Prison, have
brought this suit to enjoin the alleged prison practice of
spraying Mace at prisoners in locked detention cells as a
form of punishment. This practice coupled with the denial
of medical care for a time ranging from several hours to
several days is challenged as constituting cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. Plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order against the
use of liquid or gaseous chemical irritants has been denied,
pending motion for rehearing.
State Statute Prohibiting Assertion of Workmen's
Compensation Claim by Convicted Felon Held
Unconstitutional
9658. Delorme v. Pierce Freightlines Co., No. 72-644 (D.
Ore., Jan. 18, 1973). Plaintiffs represented by Laird
Kirkpatrick, Charles Williamson and Allen G. Drescher,
Multnomah Bar Association, Inc., 732 SW Third Ave.,
Portland, Ore. 97204, (503) 224-4086. [Here reported:
9658A Complaint (6 pp.); 9658B Plaintiff's Brief (18 pp.);
9658C Defendant's Brief (6 pp.); 9658D Plaintiff's Reply
Brief (5 pp.); 9658E Opinion and Order (5 pp.).]
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A three-judge court has ruled an Oregon statute
unconstitutional insofar as it prevents a person convicted of
a felony from prosecuting his workmen's compensation
claim either before state administrative agencies or the
courts. Plaintiff, a convicted felon in the Oregon State
Penitentiary, brought this class action for declaratory
judgment and an injunction against enforcement of
Oregon's "civil death" statute, ORS 137.240, which provides that the conviction of a felony suspends all the civil
and political rights of the person so convicted. The court
declared the statute unconstitutional, as applied in this
case, on the grounds of denial of equal protection, and
ordered the workmen's compensation board to direct the
hearing officer to accept jurisdiction over the plaintiff's
claim.
In 1968, during the course of his employment with
defendant trucking company, plaintiff suffered a severe and
permanently disabling back injury while lifting some
freight. Plaintiff ultimately received an award from the
workmen's compensation board for permanent partial
disability, in addition to an earlier, smaller award. In 1971,
after plaintiff had been notified of his final award, he was
convicted of a felony and sentenced to a ten-year prison
term. Shortly after his conviction, plaintiff requested a
hearing upon the adequacy of his workmen's compensation
award which was denied on the ground that plaintiff lacked
legal capacity under ORS 137.240.
Plaintiff alleged that ORS 137.240 irrationally
discriminated against him and denied him equal protection
in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Plaintiff also
alleged that ORS 137.240, in denying any right to a hearing
or review of the adequacy of a workmen's compensation
award, deprived plaintiffs of property without due process
of law. In addition, plaintiff contended that ORS 137.240
violated the first and fourteenth amendments in that it
denied him the right to petition for redress of grievances.
Finally, plaintiff alleged that ORS 137.240, in depriving
him of all civil rights, constituted cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments.
The court stated that the defendants had failed to
show that the goals of preventing pointless litigation and
rehabilitating prisoners were rationally related to the action
taken by the state, that the means used to accomplish the
state's purposes were impermissibly broad and that the
state statute violated equal protection.
Prisoners Challenge Michigan Parole Release Procedures
9506. Scherwin v. Michigan Department of Corrections
(E.D. Mich., filed 1972). Plaintiffs represented by Alan W.
Houseman, Michigan Legal Services Assistance Program,
Wayne State University Law School, Detroit, Mich. 48202,
(313) 577-4822; William H. Goodman, 3200 Cadillac
Tower, Detroit, Mich. 48226. Of counsel, Alvin J.
Bronstein and Barbara Millstein, The National Prison
Project, 1414 Sixteenth St., NW, Washington, D.C. 20036,
(202) 234-9345. [Here reported: 9506A Amended
Complaint (12 pp.).]

Plaintiff, an inmate in the State Prison of Southern
Michigan, brings this class action for declaratory and
injunctive relief representing all inmates residing in Michigan who are or will be subject to the jurisdiction of the
parole board and who have been, are, or will be brought
before the parole board for a parole release proceeding.
Plaintiff seeks to have the court declare invalid and enjoin
practices of the defendant which are in violation of due
process as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
Plaintiff asserts that the interviews or meetings held by the
defendant parole board were not in accord with the
requirements of procedural due process and that he was not
accorded a due process hearing to determine whether he
would be granted parole. He also asserts that the decisionmaking processes of the parole board violate the mandates
of the Michigan Administrative Procedure Act
Plaintiff became eligible for parole consideration in
February 1972, and again in August 1972. On both
occasions he was not granted parole. In February 1972,
plaintiff attended a hearing or interview. He was not
informed prior to or at the interview held with the parole
board as to what matters would be considered by the board
in order to afford him an opportunity to prepare a
presentation for the board's consideration, nor was he given
access to the board's file on him. The plaintiff was afforded
no opportunity to present evidence on his behalf at the
interview or at any meeting with the parole board. In
August 1972, plaintiff was not present during any
consideration of his parole.
Plaintiff alleges that at no time was he offered an
opportunity to be represented in any manner when his
parole was considered by the parole board, to obtain
records or transcripts of the board meetings or to challenge,
cross-examine, or interpret any evidence used in the
decision to deny parole. He was never advised as to what
rules, standards or criteria would be used in determining his
eligibility for parole, nor was he informed of which
members of the parole board participated in the decision or
reviewed his file prior to or after the decision. Plaintiff
finally alleges that he never received any oral or written
statements from the parole board detailing the factual basis
supporting the decision, the rules, standards or criteria used
in making the decision, nor the specific recommendations
necessary to meet the standard or criteria for release.
Plaintiff contends that there is no organized way in
which information is excluded, included or organized in the
prisoner's file, or tested for relevancy, accuracy, bias or
prejudice. Plaintiff further contends that the operation and
decision-making by the board give a presumption in favor
of evidence negative to the prisoner, and the final decisions
are based on unpublished standards or criteria. There is no
right to appeal from the decision of the parole board.
Prisoner Alleges Transfer
Violates Eighth Amendment

to

Out-of-State

Institution

7216. Heald v. Robbins, No. 13-23 (D. Me., filed July 28,
1972). Plaintiff represented by Thomas P. Kapantais and
Charles R. Peck, Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Inc., P.O. Box
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1207, Presque Isle, Me. 04769, (207) 764-4349; Stanley A.
Bass, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 10 Columbus Circle,
New York, N.Y. 10019; Herman Schwartz, 732 Prudential
Bldg., Buffalo, N.Y. and Neville Woodruff, Pine Tree Legal
Assistance, Inc., 565 Congress St., Portland, Me. 04101,
(207) 772-3711. [Here reported: 7216D Brief (26 pp.).
Previously reported: 7216A Complaint (6 pp.), 6
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 57 (May 1972).]
Plaintiff, a prison inmate, is suing state and federal
officials alleging that he was transferred without his consent
and without a hearing or other procedural safeguards from
the Maine State Prison to the United States Penitentiary at
Marion, Illinois in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
Defendants do not deny that they have allowed such
nonconsensual transfers from state to federal prisons, but
contend that the practice does not involve the deprivation
of any constitutional rights.
A significant portion of plaintiff's thorough brief
documents the history of such transfers and finds that the
right to be secure against forced removal from the state is
well established in Anglo-American law and tradition and
that transfer as a method of treating convicted criminals is a
practice long since abandoned in the western world. On the
basis of these findings, plaintiff contends that his removal
from Maine while serving a Maine sentence is cruel and
unusual punishment.
Plaintiff also makes the following arguments: that
because of the adverse effects transfer may have on a
prisoner, he has a due process right to be heard prior to any
transfer; that a nonconsensual interstate transfer violates
the right of access to counsel and to courts since it puts a
great distance between the prisoner and his attorney and
the courts where his case may be pending; and that his
transfer was in violation of federal law which authorizes
federal-state contracts only when proper and adequate
treatment facilities are available.
Prisoners Challenge Prison Regulation Prohibiting
Confidential Communication With Social Scientists
9419. Louie v. Carlson (D. Ill., filed 1972). Plaintiffs
represented by Eddie D. Cox, Anthony Anastasia, and
George Sing Louie, Prisoners' Law Commune, P.O. Box
1000, Marion, II. 62959, (618) 993-8183; Larry E. Stead,
Egyptian Jaycees Legal Rights & Assistance Committee,
same address; Edward A. Mea, National Federal Prisoners'
Legal Reform Institute, P.O. Box 1000, Leavenworth, Kan.
66048. [Here reported: 9419A Complaint (10 pp.).]
Petitioners bring this class action against the Director
of the United States Bureau of Prisons and the Warden of
the United States Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of all prisoners
confined in the United States Penitentiary in Marion,
Illinois against a policy prohibiting confidential
correspondence and visits with social scientists.
Petitioners allege that at various times from 1971
through 1972 they expressed the desire to defendants to
carry on correspondence by means of sealed, confidential
and uncensored letters. Uncensored correspondence was

desired because the subject matter concerned possible legal
action against the defendants, personal grievances, and
support for congressional legislation. Requests to mail such
sealed letters were denied. Petitioners contend that the
policy prohibiting uncensored communication deprives
them of "access to the courts" in violation of their rights
under the due process clause of the fifth amendment, and
in violation of freedom of speech and the right to petition
for redress of grievances. Petitioners assert that the problem
is particularly acute where charges of cruel and unusual
punishment or arbitrary conduct on the part of defendants
are involved.
Petitioners further contend that the policy of opening
and reading correspondence between prisoners and social
scientists is inconsistent with rights to effective expert
assistance under the sixth amendment. Finally, petitioners
assert that defendants' policy violates the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the eighth amendment.
Petitioners seek an order declaring defendants' policy
with respect to social scientists' correspondence to be
unconstitutional, and ask that its continued enforcement be
enjoined. Petitioners further seek an order permitting
members of their class to write to professional scientists in
sealed, confidential letters and that they be permitted to
receive unread letters from social scientists subject to
examination for tangible contraband.

Prison Officials Prohibited From Mail Interference
9304. Merritt v. Johnson, No. 38401 (E.D. Mich., Nov. 30,
1972). Plaintiff represented by Corey Y.S. Park, Legal Aid
& Defender Association, 600 Woodward Ave., Detroit,
Mich. 48226, (313) 964-5310, and Alan W. Houseman,
Michigan Legal Services Assistance Program, Wayne State
University Law School, Detroit, Mich. 48202, (313)
577-4822. [Here reported: 9304A Complaint (9 pp.);
9304B Plaintiff's Brief (64 pp.); 9304C Memorandum and
Order (6 pp.); 9304D Order (4 pp.).]
A district court has enjoined prison officials from
undue interference with mail to and from inmates'
attorneys, federal and state courts and public officials. Such
"special correspondence" sent out by any inmate shall be in
sealed envelopes and cannot be interfered with in any way,
even for disciplinary reasons. Special correspondence
addressed to an inmate may be examined without being
opened to check for contraband. Where contraband is
reasonably suspected after such examination, the prison
official shall summon the inmate to open and shake out the
letter to expose any contraband. Even if contraband is
discovered, the inmate shall be allowed to retain any letters.
The court maintained that the provision allowing
examination for contraband without opening the mail
adequately protects the prison's interest in security. It
stated that the inconvenience is necessary to protect
fundamental rights to counsel, free expression, and the
privilege against self-incrimination. The court also decreed
that this action should be maintained as a class action, the
class consisting of all persons subject to any mail reguClearinghouse Review
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lations who are or will be incarcerated in the state prison of
southern Michigan.
PUBLIC UTILITIES
Late Payment Charge Attacked as Unconscionable and
Unreasonable
9547. Louisville Legal Aid Society v. Louisville Gas &
Electric Co. (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n). Complainants
represented by Kurt Berggren, The Legal Aid Society of
Louisville, Inc., 307 South Fifth St., Louisville, Ky. 40202,
(502) 584-1254. [Here reported: 9547A Complaint (25
pp.).]
Complainants, subscribers of gas and electricity of the
Louisville Gas & Electric Co., filed a complaint requesting
an investigation of billing procedures used by public
utilities which allow them to charge a gross amount of five
to ten percent of the net amount for late payments.
It is alleged that the charges which are applied ten
days from the date the bill is sent out and which amount to
an annual percentage rate of 1,825% to 3,650%, if the bill is
paid on the 11 th day, are unconscionable, unreasonable and
unjustifiably discriminatory.
Complainants place heavy reliance on an analysis of
utility payment charges done by Professor Warren Samuels
of Michigan State University. Professor Samuels' analysis
discloses that there are various classes of late payers such as
those who will pay shortly after the date required for
payment and those who will try to avoid payment for as
long as they can get away with it. He also finds that
although late payment charges do encourage the dilatory
payers to be more prompt, its effect on those who try to
avoid payment for as long as possible is negligible.
Samuels, among others, also considers the cost of
working capital that the utility must pay in order to cover
late payments. He concludes that due to their ability to
attract working capital at favorable rates, that late payment
charges can not be justified on this ground alone.
As a result of his various findings, Samuels argues that
a flat rate is not necessary as a collection device if a one
month billing date is used rather than one of 10-15 days.
He maintains that such a policy would avoid undue
hardship especially among those on fixed incomes. He also
proposes a one percent flat rate for the first month, and the
publication of rate charges.
Challenge Termination for Unpaid
Attachment of Household Necessities

Arrearages

as

9596. LeBeau v. Green Mountain Power Company (Vt.
Public Service Board, filed Nov. 9, 1972). Petitioner
represented by Stephen R. Elias and Mary J. Skinner,
Vermont Legal Aid, Box 658, Montpelier, Vt. 05602. [Here
reported: 9596A Complaint (7 pp.); 9596B Memo in
Support of Claim (11 pp.).]
Petitioner, a consumer of electricity furnished by
defendant Green Mountain Power Company, brings this
action before the Vermont Public Service Board seeking to
enjoin termination of service and to provide for a system of

continued service to patrons with unpaid balances.
Petitioner fell behind in her payments and defendant
warned that it would terminate service for nonpayment.
Subsequently defendant, in November, did discontinue
service. Although a member of the Public Service Board
intervened at that time and service was temporarily
restored, defendant continued to threaten to cut off
service. When plaintiff sought immediate relief in the form
of a temporary restraining order, the Board assumed
jurisdiction of the matter and ordered defendant to
maintain service to petitioner so long as she paid for current
monthly service, pending a final determination by the
Board.
Plaintiff argues that the state granted defendant an
exclusive franchise, and that under Vermont law defendant
must sell and distribute electricity to all persons requesting
it Since at no time did plaintiff withdraw her request for
service, she argues that under the law defendant has the
duty of providing her with service.
Second, plaintiff asserts that Vermont law exempts
household necessities from attachment, and argues that
defendant's denial of services for past arrearages constitutes
attachment of household articles powered by electricity
which are necessary for the maintenance of life.
Low-Income Coalition Intervenes in Public Utility Rate
Case
9598. New England Telephone & Telegraph v. New
Hampshire, No. 6518 (N.H. Sup. Ct., filed Dec. 29, 1972).
Intervenors represented by Richard Cotton, New Hampshire Legal Assistance, 136 North Main St., Concord, N.H.
03301. Of counsel, George Charles Bruno, New Hampshire
Legal Assistance, 88 Hanover St., Manchester, N.H. 03101,
(603) 668-2900. [Here reported: 9598A Brief for
Intervenor (21 pp.).]
A statewide coalition of low-income persons has
intervened against a public utility's appeal from a decision
of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission, which

HMO Model Contracts Available
The National Health Law Program has prepared
three model HMO contracts which are now available
for distribution. The contracts include one between
the HMO Plan and the subscriber; another between
the HMO Plan and the physician group; and a third
between the HMO Plan and the hospital. Due to the
expense of printing and mailing, the Program is
charging Legal Services attorneys two dollars per
contract and all others five dollars per contract. The
contracts may be ordered from:
National Health Law Program
2477 Law Building
405 Hilgard Avenue
Los Angeles, California 90024
(213) 825-7601
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denied the public utility an allowance for attrition and set a
rate of return deemed to be reasonable. The public utility
attacks the propriety of both the Commission's denial of an
allowance for attrition and its determination of what
constitutes a reasonable rate of return.
The intervenors maintain that the New England
Telephone and Telegraph Company failed to meet its
burden of proving that it will suffer attrition in the near
term future, and therefore, the Commission was correct in
denying an allowance for attrition which, if granted, would
have the effect of violating the Economic Stabilizaticn Act
of 1970 in that it would reflect future inflationary
expectation. Intervenors also contend that the Commission
granted a more than adequate rate increase and a greater
increase should not be keyed upon a historically abnormal
period of high interest rates. Intervenors say that this
period is now past and should not be the basis for setting
future rates.
SOCIAL SECURITY
Supreme Court Affirms District Court Order Holding Social
Security Act Which Discriminated Against Illegitimate
Children Unconstitutional
7041. Richardson v. Griffin, No. 72-655 (U.S. Sup. Ct.,
Dec. 18, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by C. Christopher
Brown and Richard Rosen, Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., 341
North Calvert St., Baltimore, Md. 21202, (301) 685-1112;
Gerald L. Hockstein, Legal Aid West, 1333 West North
Ave., Baltimore, Md. 21215, (301) 669-5695. [Here reported: 7041C Decision (1 p.). Previously reported: 7041A
Complaint (8 pp.), 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 770 (April
1972); 7041B D. Ct. Opinion (20 pp.), 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 450 (November 1972).]
The Supreme Court has summarily affirmed a threejudge district court decision which had held provisions of
the Social Security Act placing illegitimate children into
special categories for allotment of benefits to be unconstitutional, and which had ordered full shares of the social
security benefits paid on the policy of deceased natural
fathers to be given to illegitimate children. Section 203 (a)
of the Social Security Act had been held to violate due
process of law in that it entitled illegitimate children to
monthly benefit payments only to the extent that payments to the widow and other children of the wage earner
did not exhaust the "maximum family benefits" allowed by
statute.
The district court had also ordered the payment of all
back benefits denied such children since the regulations
went into effect in 1968. The case affects 29,000 children
across the nation with an estimated cost of $50 million in
retroactive benefits.
Challenge

Termination

of

Social

Security

Disability

Benefits Without Prior Hearing
9515. Booker v. Richardson, No. 6801 (M.D. Tenn., filed
Dec. 19, 1972). Plaintiff represented by Walter C. Kurtz
and Ashley T. Wiltshire, Jr., Legal Services of Nashville, 607

Sudekum Bldg., Nashville, Tenn. 37219, (615) 244-6317.
Student assistant, Douglas Felchlin, Jr., above address.
[Here reported: 9515A Complaint (12 pp.); 9515B Brief in
Support of Motion for TRO (6 pp.); 9515C TRO (1 p.);
9515D Memo in Support of Motion to Amend (2 pp.);
9515E Memo in Opposition to Motion to Amend (9 pp.).]
Seeking to extend the holding in Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970), to Social Security benefits, plaintiff
filed this class action seeking to declare invalid and to
enjoin the enforcement of 42 U.S.C. §425, which along
with Disability Insurance State Manual Section 353.6A,
permits the termination of payments of benefits without
notice of the reasons and a hearing prior to the termination.
Plaintiff was granted a temporary restraining order requiring resumption of all his social security benefits denied
since the termination pending further determination of the
case by the court.
The government moved to amend the temporary
restraining order alleging that it was granted upon evidence
of nonconformance with regulations requiring that the
beneficiary of social security disability benefits be given
adequate notice and an opportunity to respond. It claims
that sufficient temporary relief could have been provided
by an order requiring compliance with those regulations,
and that the question of additional requirements and
constitutionality should have been left to a hearing on the
merits.
Class Action Challenges Retroactive Termination
Medicare Benefits Without Prior Notice or Hearing

of

9435. Himmler v. Richardson, No. 39294 (E.D. Mich.,
filed Nov. 30, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by Jeanne F.
Franklin, Sally W. Staebler, and Alan W. Houseman,
Michigan Legal Services Assistance Program, Wayne State
University Law School Annex, Detroit, Mich. 48202, (313)
577-4822. [Here reported: 9435A Complaint (21 pp.).]
Medicare beneficiaries who were denied payment for
nursing home expenses judged to be medically necessary by
their doctors have filed suit challenging the retroactive
termination of their Medicare eligibility without prior
notice or a hearing. Defendant is Michigan Blue Cross who,
as the local fiscal intermediary for the processing of
Medicare hospital insurance claims, determined the plaintiffs' ineligibility for Medicare and the Secretary of HEW
who established the policies under which Michigan Blue
Cross acted.
In this case, plaintiffs entered extended care facilities
upon their doctors' recommendations after being released
from in-patient hospital care. When plaintiffs submitted the
nursing home bills to Michigan Blue Cross for payment,
defendant retroactively overruled plaintiffs' doctors and
decided that plaintiffs ceased to need the treatment at some
point during the care. Refusing to pay for the allegedly
unnecessary treatment, defendant has left the plaintiffs
with large and unanticipated medical bills.
Representing all those who have been or are
threatened to be similarly treated, plaintiffs contest defendant's actions on two grounds. First, they argue that
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Michigan Blue Cross did not have the authority to review
their eligibility for Medicare benefits retroactively.
Interpreting the Social Security Act, plaintiffs contend that
the benefits due each Medicare beneficiary are primarily
based upon a factual finding as to the level of medical care
that the beneficiary needs. The statute vests this decision in
the patient's doctors or in a committee of physicians at the
facility where the patient is treated. The Act does not
provide for the intermediary's right to overrule the doctors'
decisions or to make its own determinations of a patient's
medical necessity. Second, plaintiffs contend that the
Social Security Act and the due process clause of the fifth
amendment require the defendant to give plaintiffs reasonable notice of an opportunity to contest the decision to
terminate benefits prior to the termination.
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Federal Employee Who Quits Work Rather Than Violate
Hatch Act Held Eligible for Unemployment Compensation
9559. In re Levold, No. 72-7556-F (Wash. Employment
Security Dep't App. Tribunal, Oct. 3, 1972). Claimant
represented by Stephen Randalls and Phillip Katzen, Legal
Services Center, 3230 Ranier Ave., South, Seattle, Wash.
98144, (206) 725-2600. [Here reported: 9559A Decision
(4 pp.); 9559B Decision (3 pp.); 9559C Proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (3 pp.).]
An Appeals Tribunal of the Washington Employment
Security Department has held that a federal employee who
quits work in order to engage in partisan political activity
prohibited by the Hatch Act cannot be denied
unemployment benefits.
The claimant was an employee of the Treasury
Department who, after 21/ years of employment felt "as a
matter of personal commitment and urgency, that it was his
duty to become involved in partisan political campaigning."
Since that type of activity is prohibited by the Hatch Act,
he felt forced to resign. His subsequent claim for unemployment compensation was denied on the grounds that he
voluntarily quit work without good cause and was
unavailable due to his political involvement.
In reversing, the Appeals Tribunal found that the
claimant left work voluntarily, but for reasons that could
not be disqualifying. Two rationales were suggested. First,
the choice of earning a living by working for the federal
government or exercising a constitutionally protected right
to engage in participatory democracy were found to be
"mutually exclusive" in this type of case. Thus the reason
for leaving employment, while personal, was sufficiently
compelling to provide the claimant with good cause.
Second, the examiner suggested that the above conflict may
provide a well founded claim that the claimant's work was
"personally
unsuitable" under RCW 50.20.100 and
50.20.110 (b).
The examiner also took note of the decision by a
three-judge district court which held the Hatch Act to be
unconstitutional. National Association of Letter Carriers
(AFL-CIO) v. United States, U.S.L.W. 1021 (D. D.C., July

31, 1972). He commented that "judicial nullification of the
Act suggests that any person working under its onus is
submitting to unsuitable conditions."
Finally, the examiner held that the political activity
in question was only a part-time endeavor and would
accomodate full-time employment. Claimant was therefore
found available for work and eligible for unemployment
benefits.
VOTING
Statutory Invalidation of Voter Registration Because of
Name Change Upon Marriage Held Unconstitutional
9427. Gallop v. Shanahan, No. 120,456 (Kan. Dist. Ct.,
Shawnee County, Nov. 2, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by
Michael J. Davis and Louise A. Wheeler, 2111 Kasold Dr.,
Lawrence,
Kan. 66044. [Here reported: 9427A
Memorandum of Points and Authorities (14 pp.); 9427B
Opinion (4 pp.).]
Under a Kansas statute, voter registrations became
invalid upon change of name, including change due to
marriage. This class action for declaratory and injunctive
relief was brought on behalf of women disenfranchised
because they married during the interval between the
closing of the registration books before elections and
election day, so that they could not re-register in time for
the coming election. The court concluded that this disenfranchisement was not supported by any compelling state
interest and therefore constituted a denial of equal protection in violation of the fourteenth amendment and the
Kansas Constitution and an abridgment of the right to vote
on account of sex in violation of the nineteenth
amendment.
WELFARE
Eligible Strikers Have Right to Assistance
6829. Lascaris v. Wyman, No. 170 (N.Y. Ct. App., Dec. 28,
1972). Intervenors-defendants represented by Bernard T.
King, 500 Chamber Bldg., 351 South Warren St., Syracuse,
N.Y. 13202, (315) 422-7111. [Here reported: 6829E
Opinion (9 pp.). Previously reported: 6829A Decision (5
pp.), 5 CLEARINGHOSUE REV. 617 (February 1972);
6829D Opinion (7 pp.), 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 111
(June 1972).]
The Court of Appeals of New York has unanimously
affirmed the right of strikers to receive welfare assistance.
The state commissioner of social services' long-standing
administrative policy of making welfare payments to
eligible strikers was challenged by a county commissioner
after a 1971 amendment to the statutory definition of an
"employable person." In the trial court the county
commissioner successfully argued that a striking employee renders
himself ineligible for assistance because the nature of the
strike makes him not available for full time employment
elsewhere and thus limits his availability on the employment market. The appellate division later unanimously
reversed, finding (1) that prior to the 1971 amendment

Vol. VI, No. 11, March 1973

HeinOnline -- 6 Clearinghouse Rev. 707 1972-1973

strikers were eligible for assistance if they registered with
the state employment office and did not refuse any new
employment opportunities and (2) that the 1971 amendment did not affect strikers' rights to receive welfare. The
court of appeals agreed with that conclusion.
The court found that the state commissioner properly
ruled that a person on strike does not, simply because he is
on strike, refuse to accept employment. The amendment
did not affect the rights of persons on strike but was found
only to list those who were deemed unemployable and
therefore beyond the statute's reach. The court alsG found
that the payment of welfare benefits to needy strikers did
not violate the state's policy of neutrality in labormanagement disputes.
AFDC Requirement of Divorce, Separation or Parent's
Absence Held Invalid
3182. Carter v. Stanton, No. IP 70-C-124 (S.D. Ind., Dec.
4, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by David F. Shadel, Legal
Services Organization of Indianapolis, Inc., 1107 Prospect
St., Indianapolis, Ind. 46203, (317) 632-8433. [Here
reported: 3182F Order and Judgment (3 pp.).]
In this class action, a three-judge federal district court
has granted a declaratory judgment that the policy of a
county department of public welfare requiring a divorce or
legal separation as a condition of receiving or applying for
aid to dependent children is inconsistent with the Social
Security Act Section 402 (c), and 42 U.S.C. §602 (a), and
may no longer be practiced. The county rules and regulations and the state public assistance manual are invalid to
the extent that they require "exceptional circumstances of
need" as a condition for receiving assistance to dependent
children, to the extent that they require either "exceptional
circumstances of need" or an "actual and bona fide"
absence of a parent as a condition of a person's filing an
application for assistance to dependent children, and to the
extent that they require, as a condition for receiving or
applying for assistance, proof of a continued absence or an
absence of at least six months of a parent or spouse prior to
the date of applying for assistance to dependent children.
The issue of retroactive payment has been taken under
advisement.
State Child Support Law Challenged as Violating Due
Process and Equal Protection
9564. Dixon v. Smith, No. 817-72 C2 (W.D. Wash., filed
Dec. 15, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by Allan B. Ament,
Seattle Legal Services, 3230 Rainier Ave., South, Seattle,
Wash. 98144, (206) 725-2600; Robert M. Reynolds, Pierce
County Legal Assistance Foundation, 1501 South "M" St.,
Tacoma, Wash. 98405, (206) 383-4804; Ruth N. Barnes
and Lar Halpern, Seattle Legal Services, 5308 Ballard Ave.,
NW, Seattle, Wash. 98107, (206) 789-2450; Owen Wales,
700 Central Bldg., Seattle, Wash. 98104, (206) 622-1264.
[Here reported: 9564A Complaint (11 pp.).]
A class action has been brought seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief declaring null and void a Washington
state law which administratively imposes child support

obligations upon plaintiffs which are greater than that
which would be imposed by a court and which allows for
the garnishment of 50% of their wages and/or execution on
property without a prior judicial hearing.
Plaintiffs, responsible parents whose children receive
public aid and who have not been ordered by a court to pay
specific amounts for child support, are allegedly made liable
to the Department of Health and Social Services of
Washington for the full amount of the public assistance
grant received by their children irrespective of their ability
to pay.
Plaintiffs contend that the statute violates equal
protection by imposing different standards for child support between plaintiffs and those who have had their
support obligation fixed by a court. Due process is also said
to be violated by allowing the defendant Department of
Health and Social Services to fix payment and to take
property without a prior hearing. Further, plaintiffs allege
that the statute is coercive in that they are forced to file for
divorce to obtain a court judgment of their support
obligation.
California Standard Work Expense Allowance Upheld
6588. Conover v. Hall, No. 13289 (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 13,
1972). Respondents represented by Daniel S. Brunner and
Valerie Vanaman, Legal Aid Foundation of Long Beach,
236 East 3rd St., Long Beach, Cal. 90812, (213) 437-0901;
Philip Goar, Community Legal Assistance Center, 1709
West Eighth St., Los Angeles, Cal. 90017, (213) 483-1491;
Clifford Sweet and F. Hayden Curry, Legal Aid Society of
Alameda County, 4600 East Fourteenth St., Oakland, Cal.
94601, (415) 532-5963; Ralph S. Abascal, San Francisco
Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, 1095 Market
St., San Francisco, Cal. 94103, (415) 626-3811. [Here
reported: 6588-1 Appellate Opinion (10 pp.). Previously
reported: 6588A Points and Authorities in Support of TRO
and Preliminary Injunction (15 pp.); 6588B Temporary
Stay Order (1 p.); 6588C Points and Authorities in
Opposition to Petition for Writ of Supersedeas (26 pp.);
6588D Order Denying Writ of Supersedeas and Vacating
Temporary Stay Order (1 p.); 6588E Preliminary Injunction (2 pp.); 6588F Opinion of Issuance of Preliminary
Injunction (4 pp.); 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 618
(February 1972).]
The California Court of Appeals has reversed the
granting of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of
a statutory $50 standard work expense allowance, exclusive
of child care, for recipients of categorical aid. Previously all
provable work-related expenses, with certain exceptions,
were deducted from income in determining financial need.
The trial court concluded that the imposition of a $50
maximum on work expense allowances violated federal law,
42 U.S.C. §602 (a) (7), which requires that consideration
be given to any expense reasonably related to the earning of
income.
The appellate court reversed, concluding that
"consideration" of all work expenses does not require
allowance thereof. Noting that the propriety of the $50
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amount had not been raised as an issue in this case, the
court concluded that a standard work expense allowance
comports with federal law. Relying heavily on a HEW
advisory opinion, and despite case law in other jurisdictions
to the contrary, the court distinguished a standard allowance from a maximum allowance, concluding that only
the former may be justified as a proper administrative
convenience. (See CCH POV. L. REP. 16, 537.)
Welfare Recipients Seek Priority in Obtaining
Subprofessional Jobs With State Welfare Department
9575. Moore v. Betit (D. Vt., filed Jan. 2, 1973). Plaintiffs
represented by Douglas L. Molde and Edward Arbuiso,
Vermont Legal Aid, Inc., 54 Lake St., St. Albans, Vt.
05478, (802) 524-6707 [Here reported: 9575A Complaint
(6 pp.).]
Plaintiffs, as members of the class of low-income
persons and welfare recipients who would be eligible for
employment as subprofessionals with the Vermont Department of Social Welfare, have requested preliminary and
permanent injunctions prohibiting state officials from
hiring subprofessional employees who are not members of
the class. The named plaintiffs had each applit
for
subprofessional positions through the state's department of
personnel but were each informed that the state was not
recruiting for those positions because they already had
enough qualified applicants.
Plaintiffs allege that sections of the Social Security
Act require the defendants, as representatives of the
Vermont Department of Social Welfare, to employ lowincome persons in certain subprofessional positions which
are within and outside of the present structure of the
department. Plaintiffs further allege that no priority has
been given to the employment of class members, that the
subprofessional staff vacancies are being filled by people
who are neither welfare recipients nor low-income persons,
and that they will be irreparably injured by virtue of the
defendants' refusal to give them jobs.
Supreme Court Holds Retroactive Social Security Disability
Benefits Protected from Legal Process
1522. Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, No.
71-5656 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Jan. 10, 1973). Petitioner represented by George Charles Bruno, New Hampshire Legal
Assistance, 88 Hanover St., Manchester, N.H. 03101, (603)
668-2900; Robert Curtis, Newark Legal Services Project,
449 Central Ave., Newark, N.J. 07107, (201) 484-4010.
[Here reported: 1522H Opinion (5 pp.). Previously reported: 1522A Complaint (2 pp.); 1522B Answer (3 pp.);
1522C Defendants' Memorandum of Law (41 pp.); 1522D
Trial Court Opinion (9 pp.); 1522E New Jersey Supreme
Court Opinion (14 pp.); 1522F Petition for Writ of
Certiorari (11 pp.); 1522G Memorandum on Writ of
Certiorari (22 pp.), 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 454
(November 1972).]
The Supreme Court has held that Section 407 of the
Social Security Act prohibits respondent county welfare
board from recovering state disability assistance paid to

petitioner, despite a reimbursement agreement executed by
him, where the recovery seeks to reach a retroactive award
for disability benefits under the Social Security Act. In
reversing the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Court found
no exception to the strict Section 407 prohibition of
subjecting benefits paid under the Act to execution,
attachment, or any other legal process.
In 1966, petitioner applied to respondent for
disability assistance, and as a condition for receiving such
aid signed an agreement, required under New Jersey law, to
reimburse the state for all payments received. On respondent's advice, petitioner then applied for federal disability
benefits under the Social Security Act, and in 1968 was
awarded retroactive benefits under the Act for the two-year
period, a total of $1,864.20.
Under the agreement to reimburse, which under New
Jersey law has the force of a judgment for the amount of
benefits received, respondent sued to reach the bank
account in which the retroactive award was deposited. The
trial court held that Section 407 barred such recovery, and
the appellate court affirmed. The state supreme court
reversed, finding that equity dictated an exception to the
clear language of Section 407, allowing respondent to
recover that part of the state disability assistance which
would not have been paid had petitioner been receiving the
federal assistance contemporaneously on a monthly basis,
rather than retroactively in a lump sum.
The Court rejected this holding, finding no implied
exemption from the strict and inclusive terms of Section
407 which would place the state in a preferred position
compared with any other creditor. (See CCH POV. L. REP.
16,569.)
Goldberg '. Kelly Pretermination Procedures Extended to
General Assistance Recipients Dismissed From Work
Project
9501. Salandich v. Milwaukee County, No. 71-C-92 (E.D.
Wis., Dec. 26, 1972). Plaintiff represented by Steven M.
Steinglass and Richard M. Klein, Freedom Through
Equality, 152 West Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, Wis. 53203,
(414) 271-7772. [Here reported: 9501A Verified Complaint (13 pp.); 9501B Memo in Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction (8 pp.); 9501C Agreed Statement of
Uncontested Facts (12 pp.); 9501D Opinion and Order (9
pp.).]
This decision requires the Milwaukee County
Department of Public Welfare to provide all persons who
are terminated from the local work project with the general
relief for which they were originally eligible unless and until
Goldberg v. Kelly pretermination procedures are followed.
Plaintiff brought this class action alleging that
defendant Milwaukee County terminated plaintiff's participation in the work project in violation of procedural due
process. Plaintiff had qualified for general relief and was
referred for participation in the Milwaukee County Work
Experience and Training Projects Division of the welfare
department. Approximately eight months thereafter, defendant terminated plaintiff because of his "attitude."
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Neither written statements nor pretermination evidentiary
hearings were afforded plaintiff. At no time was plaintiff
able to contest whether his termination was for good cause.
The case is significant in that persons referred to the
work project have their general relief cases closed. When
such persons are terminated from the work project, they
are forced to reapply for general relief and suffer delay.
Under this decision, their general relief case may no longer
be closed, and the terminated employee must receive
general relief immediately, pending a hearing to determine
eligibility.
Prohibition on Receipt of Public Assistance as a Condition
of Probation Held Unconstitutional
9551. Wisconsin ex rel Casarez v. Seraphim, No. 402-319
(Wis. Cir. Ct., Milwaukee County, Aug. 7, 1972). Plaintiff
represented by Brian A. Jeffrey, Freedom Through
Equality, Inc., 152 West Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, Wis.
53203, (414) 271-7772. [Here reported: 9551A Petition (4
pp.); 9551B Transcript of Oral Decision (4 pp.); 9551C
Order (2 pp.).]
Plaintiff successfully challenged the constitutionality
of a condition of probation imposed by defendant circuit
court judge that she not apply for public assistance. The
court held that the order was outside the scope of a state
statute concerning sentencing discretion and violated the
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause. The court
reasoned that the denial of what appears to be a right under
the law to receive welfare benefits suggests that public
assistance recipients are inferior to others or that being a
recipient is degrading and it is necessary for rehabilitation
to be off public assistance. Accordingly, the court granted
plaintiff's request for a writ of habeas corpus.
The court denied plaintiff's challenge to the restraint
that she live in her parents' home as a probation condition.
It found this latter restraint within the scope of the state
statute and the fourteenth amendment, since it directed a
particular regimen or program which is contemplated by
the statutes and the standards and since it prescribed a
condition, namely residence at a particular address, which
was consistent with a constitutionally valid program as long
as the facilities were available and the circumstances were
not shown to be unbearable.
Second Circuit Sustains Experimental Work Programs:
Appeal to Supreme Court
8604. Aguayo v. Richardson, Nos. 479 and 508 (2nd Cir.,
Jan. 18, 1973). Plaintiffs represented by Adele M. Blong,
Steven J. Cole and Henry A. Freedman, Center on Social
Welfare Policy & Law, 25 West 43rd St., 12th Fir., New
York, N.Y. 10036, (212) 354-7670; Norman Redlich and
Paula Omansky, Municipal Bldg., New York, N.Y. 10007,
(212) 566-2505. [Here reported: 8604L Second Circuit
Opinion (29 pp.); 8604M Application for Stay (38 pp.).
Previously reported: 8604A Complaint (35 pp.); 8604B
Preliminary Injunction (5 pp.); 9604D Federal Defendants'
Memo in Opposition to Preliminary Injunction (44 pp.);
8604E Brief of Amici Curiae (26 pp.); 8604F Memo of

State Defendants (49 pp.); 8604G Opinion (19 pp.), 6
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 519 (December 1972).]
Pending their application for a writ of certiorari,
plaintiffs have filed with Justice Thurgood Marshall an
application for stay of a court of appeals decision denying
them a temporary injunction in this suit to enjoin the New
York Department of Social Services from carrying out two
experimental work projects and to set aside the approval of
the programs by the Secretary of HEW.
The plaintiffs are six AFDC recipients who might be
required to take employment under the project suing
individually and as a class, the City of New York and its
commissioner of social services who would have to help
administer the projects, and seven welfare rights
organizations.
Plaintiffs allege a denial of equal protection because
the two projects will be imposed on only a portion of those
eligible for AFDC benefits and lack of due process through
the operation of New York statutes governing hearings for
the suitability of the projects and the failure of the
proposals to develop specific standards and procedures
applicable to participants. The most important statutory
claims are that the projects are so basically inconsistent
with the Social Security Act as to lie beyond the power of
approval of demonstration projects vested in the Secretary
of HEW by 42 U.S.C. §1315; that the record before the
Secretary was inadequate to warrant approval under the
standards laid down in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); and that the approval
was inadequate because of its failure to waive compliance
with the work incentive (WIN) provisions of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §602 (a) (19).
The district court denied plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction and plaintiffs appealed to the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The court of appeals
reversed the district court which held that the welfare
organizations lacked standing, holding that at least some of
the organizations did have standing under the general
federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, since their
complaints alleged that members are potential subjects of
the projects and will suffer from a worsening of the overall
welfare administrative situation if the projects are implemented. The organizations did not have standing, however,
to sue for the violation of the civil rights of members under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The court agreed with the district court's holding that
the city had standing to assert the statutory claims against
the federal defendants and that it lacked standing to assert
constitutional claims. This did not bar the commissioner of
the department of social services for the city from asserting
constitutional claims, however, since he was faced with a
conflict between his oath to support the Constitution and
his duty under state law to carry out the New York
projects.
On the question of jurisdiction, the court said it was
unwilling to follow the district court and avoid the
jurisdictional amount problem in regard to the statutory
claims by reliance on Section 10 of the Administrative
Clearinghouse Review
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Procedure Act. The question whether the Act is an
independent jurisdictional grant has not been settled by the
Second Circuit and the court avoided facing that question
by finding that combining those claims in which it had
found jurisdiction with a liberal application of pendent
jurisdiction sustained jurisdiction over both sets of
defendants since all the claims had a common nucleus of
law and fact.
On the statutory claims, the court found no merit in
plaintiffs' arguments that the New York programs were
contrary to the objects of AFDC and that the Secretary
could not waive certain requirements of the Social Security
Act. The court determined that the Secretary had a rational
basis for his determination that the programs could be
adopted, that he had before him adequate information to
make that determination, and that he could legitimatvil,! s2t
a lower threshold for persuasion for programs that are
experimental and limited in duration than for programs
that are irreversible. As to the claims of the local welfare
and employment agencies that they were incapable of
taking on the additional task of administering the experimental programs, the court decided that the Secretary's
decision would be reversible as arbitrary and capricious
only if the materials before him negated any appreciable
possibility of success.
The court met plaintiffs' claim that the Secretaiy's
action is ineffective because it did not expressly waive
compliance with 42 U.S.C. §602 (a) (19), which requires
every state plan to provide for the prompt referral of
certain welfare recipients to the Secretary of Labor for
participation in the WIN Program, by deciding that the
Secretary had only to go through the formality of adding
that section to the list of those waived. It thus avoided the
question of whether the language of the section demands
such a program or outlaws any other state work program,
the question now on appeal to the Supreme Court in
Dublino v. New York State Department of Social Service.
On the constitutional claims, the court decided that
there was no equal protection problem since the classification of AFDC recipients is reasonably related to a
legitimate state purpose. It did not consider appellants'
contention that the standards for determining eligibility
and good cause are too vague for fair enforcement, but was
greatly concerned with the adequacy of the opportunity for
a hearing. The plans for the experimental projects called for
a fair hearing under 18 N.Y.C. R.R. §385 before assistance
to an AFDC recipient can be suspended for unjustified
failure to accept a job opportunity or to continue to work
thereon. Appellants argued that their right to a fair hearing
was unconstitutionally burdened by the provisions of that
section since, if the result of the hearing is adverse, the
recipient is disqualified from receiving assistance for 30
days thereafter.
This 30-day suspension provision is one of general
application, not part of the two projects sought to be
enjoined, and neither the complaint nor the motion for
interlocutory relief sought an injunction against the enforcement of it. The state claimed that the 30-day

suspension would not be enforced as long as the Dublino
injunction remains in effect, but the court thought that
protection was necessary should that injunction be dissolved. For this reason it directed that the district court's
denial of the temporary injunction be modified so as to
enjoin the state defendants from enforcing the 30-day
suspension until its validity has been finally determined.
The order denying the preliminary injunction was affirmed
as so modified.
An interesting aspect of the case is that although the
district court had assumed that plaintiffs sought a threejudge court, they actually had not, although, had they
sought to enjoin the 30-day suspension provision on due
process grounds, a three-judge court might have been
required. Plaintiffs have now appealed to the Supreme
Court.
Oklahoma Regulation Denying AFDC Benefits to
Individuals Living in Homes Valued at More Than $10,000
Enjoined
9599. Green v. Barnes, No. Civ. 720849 (W.D. Okla., Dec.
26, 1972). Complainants represented by Stan L. Foster,
Diane Horn and Arthur Lory Rakestraw, Legal Aid Society
of Oklahoma County, Inc., 601 Mercantile Bldg., Oklahoma
City, Okla. 73102, (405) 272-9461. [Here reported: 9599A
Complaint (7 pp.); 9599B Memo in Support of TRO,
Three-Judge Panel and Class Action (12 pp.); 9599C
Complainant's Supp. Memo (3 pp.); 9599D Memo in
Opposition to Motions for TRO and Class Action (8 pp.);
9599E Respondents' Supp. Memo (3 pp.); 9599F Memo in
Support of Motion to Dismiss (2 pp.); 9599G Order (1 p.);
9599H Injunction (2 pp.).]
Declaring the challenged provision unconstitutional,
the court has permanently enjoined enforcement of an
Oklahoma welfare regulation which denies AFDC benefits
to all applicants who have purchased houses with market
values in excess of $10,000 without taking into consideration the indebtedness on each house. Through the use of
FHA Section 235 loans, plaintiffs had each purchased
houses with market values exceeding $10,000. Although
neither plaintiff had more than one percent equity in her
house, both had been refused AFDC despite being otherwise eligible for the assistance. The defendants were
members of the state welfare commission and the director
of the Welfare Department of Oklahoma.
Plaintiffs had alleged that the regulation failed to
distinguish between persons who have little or no equity
and those who have full equity, that it arbitrarily imposed
an additional condition on eligibility without any state
justification, that it was unrelated to need, income or
resources, and that it was inconsistent with 42 U.S.C.
§602, HEW guidelines, and United States Supreme Court
decisions which allow currently available income and
resources to be considered by welfare administrators.
Defendants had replied that the Social Security Act allows
states to establish their own standards of need, that giving
exemptions to houses with certain market values did not
require exemptions for all hou.ses, and that the classifi-
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cation was neither discriminatory nor in violation of the
Social Security Act.
The court, after denying the motion for a three-judge
panel, invalidated the regulation as to the individual
plaintiffs, but denied plaintiffs' request for determination
of a class action of all present and future recipients or
applicants for AFDC who would be affected detrimentally
by the regulation. The court ruled that the regulation's
attribution to applicants of income or resources not shown
to be available to them violated the supremacy clause and
ecual protection and due process of the law.
Challenge State Limitation on AFDC when Male Friend of
Recipient Present
9641. Hurley v. Van Lare, No. 72 CIV. 3423 (S.D. N.Y.,
filed Jan. 17, 1973). Plaintiff represented by Jerold S.
Slate, Martin A. Schwartz, Legal Aid Society of Westchester
County, 138 South Broadway, Yonkers, N.Y. 10701, (914)
423-0700. On the memorandum, Lawrence S. Kahn. [Here
reported: 9641A Memo of Points & Authorities (37 pp.).]
In this class action, plaintiff an AFDC recipient, seeks
restitution and injunctive and declaratory relief against a
state regulation which limits the amount of public
assistance otherwise available to a female recipient when
she is living with a man to whom she is not married.
The challenged state regulations provide that when a
female recipient is living with a man to whom she is not
married and who is unwilling to assume responsibility for
the woman or her children and does not contribute at least
$15 a month, he shall be deemed a lodger and not included
in the budget, and the family's shelter allowance shall
become a pro rata share of the regular shelter allowance. As
a result, the plaintiff, a woman with three minor dependent
children, who has been living apart from her husband for
five years and providing residence for a nonsupporting male
friend, has had her public assistance grant reduced by $30
per month.
Plaintiff maintains that the regulations are
unconstitutional under the supremacy clause in that they
conflict with the purpose of the Social Security Act of
1935 and its subsequent regulations aimed at aiding families
with dependent children, in that they incorrectly presume
that a lodger has made financial contributions to the
assistance recipient. Plaintiff also maintains that the presumption has no rational connection to fact, and that to
arbitrarily enforce the presumption denies due process
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Plaintiff further
maintains that the regulations questioned violate the equal
protection clause because they arbitrarily treat differently
two classes of needy families simply because one family has
a lodger, a fact wholly unrelated to the objectives of the
AFDC program. Finally, the plaintiff contends that the
regulations work to deny first, ninth and fourteenth
amendment rights to freedom of association and privacy by
effectively prohibiting and chilling the rights of poor people
to associate with other people in the privacy of their home.
Plaintiff argues that a summary judgment should be
granted, that a three-judge court need not be convened

because this case can be decided on the basis of statutory
claims, and that a class action is properly maintainable.
Immediate Reissuance of Lost or Stolen Checks Sought
9665. Jackson v. Friend, No. C-72-426 (W.D. Tenn., Dec.
7, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by David C. Howard, David
Seth Michaels and Leopold Freudberg, Memphis and Shelby
County Legal Services Association, 1063 North Watkins St.,
Memphis, Tenn. 38107, (901) 276-2741. [Here reported:
9665A Complaint (9 pp.); 9665B Memorandum (17 pp.);
9665C Answer (3 pp.); 9665D Proposed Agreed Order (3
pp.).]
Plaintiffs in this class action allege the unconstitutionality of Tennessee Department of Public Welfare
regulations pertaining to checks reported lost or stolen. The
named plaintiff reported her check lost or stolen in August
1972, but she had not received a replacement check prior
to the filing of this action in December 1972. This delay
was permitted by regulations that required the state to wait
for the check to be paid before making a duplicate check to
the recipient. Plaintiffs allege that this delay violates the
equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment, Section 402 (a) (10) of the Social Security
Act, and the supremacy clause. They seek to enjoin the
operation of the present regulations and to require that the
department issue a new check immediately after
notification that a recipient's check has not been received.
Seventh Circuit Upholds Award of Retroactive AABD
Payments
5000. Jordan v. Weaver, formerly Jordan v. Swank, No.
72-1380 (7th Cir., Jan. 18, 1973.). Appellants represented
by Sheldon H. Roodman and Marilyn Katz, Legal Aid
Society of Chicago, 64 East Jackson Blvd., Chicago, Ill.
60604, (312) 922-5625. Of counsel, Kenneth K. Howell,
same address. [Here reported: 5000G Appellants' Reply
Brief (43 pp.); 5000H Opinion (11 pp.). Previously reported: 5000A Temporary Restraining Order (6 pp.);
5000B Amended Complaint (12 pp.); 5000C Memo in
Support of TRO (7 pp.), 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 52
(May 1971); 5000D Preliminary Injunction (6 pp.); 5
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 335 (October 1971); 5000E
District Court Opinion & Order (4 pp.); 5000F Judgment
(8 pp.), 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 62 (May 1972).]
The Seventh Circuit has affirmed a district court
judgment ordering defendant Illinois welfare officials to
release retroactive benefit payments to persons whose
applications for Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled
(AABD) had not been processed within the time limits
prescribed by federal regulations. The court also affirmed
the lower court's decision that federal regulations do not
require that eligible applicants are entitled to receive
benefits from the date of their applications, rather than
within the prescribed time limits for processing applications, and that punitive damages should not be awarded for
the defendants' failure to make the payments on time.
In addition to its retroactive payment order, the
district court had granted a permanent injunction requiring
Clearinghouse Review
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compliance with federal regulations requiring that eligibility
determinations and payments on applications for assistance
for the aged and blind under AABD be made within 30
days, and for the disabled within 60 days.
On appeal, the court rejected defendants' principal
argument, drawn directly from the holding in Rothstein v.
Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2nd Cir. 1972), that the eleventh
amendment bars an action in federal court against state
welfare officials for retroactive benefits. In reaching a
decision clearly contrary to Rothstein, the court held that
the eleventh amendment permits such relief where appropriate to deal with defiance of federal law, and characterized the remedy afforded here as restitution rather than
damages. In addition, the court found that even if the
eleventh amendment or sovereign immunity doctrine did
bar a suit to recover welfare benefits wrongfully withheld,
the state has constructively consented to such an action by
choosing to participate in the AABD program and receive
federal funds thereunder.
Allege General Assistance Cannot Be Denied Solely on Basis
That Applicant Has Been Offered A Home With His Parents
in Another State
9633. Metcalf v. Born, No. 655-310 (Cal. Super. Ct., San
Francisco County, filed Jan. 16, 1973). Petitioners represented by Thomas W. Pulliam Jr., San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, 721 Webster St., San
Francisco, Cal. 94117, (415) 567-2804. [Here reported:
9633A Petition for Writ of Mandate & Declaratory Relief
(6 pp.); 9633B Memo of Points & Authorities in Support of
Application for Temporary Stay Order & Petition for Writ
of Mandate & Declaratory Relief (11 pp.).]
Petitioner brings this action on behalf of himself and
all other persons who have been or may be denied general
assistance benefits solely because parents or other relatives
are willing to provide a home for such persons at their
places of residence outside San Francisco. The class
representative is 23 years old and had been living in San
Francisco for over a year when he was denied general
assistance on the basis that his father had offered him a
home in Tennessee.
Petitioner alleges that this denial is an abuse of
administrative discretion in that it violates his statutory
right to general assistance under CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE § 17000. Petitioner further alleges violation of his
constitutional rights to travel, to due process and to equal
protection.
Georgia Denial of AFDC Benefits to Unborn Children
Upheld
9491. Parks v. Harden, No. 17504 (N.D. Ga., Jan. 4,
1973). Plaintiffs represented by Stephen Gottlieb and
Alfred C. Kammer II, Atlanta Legal Aid Society, Inc., 153
Pryor St., SW, Atlanta, Ga. 30303, (404) 524-5811. [Here
reported: 9491C Opinion (13 pp.); Also available: 9491A
Complaint (7 pp.); 9491B Brief (9 pp.).]
The court held that the Social Security Act did not
require the Georgia welfare assistance plan to give the

plaintiff, a pregnant AFDC mother and her class, AFDC
benefits for their unborn children. The court found that the
state scheme did not conflict with federal regulations or the
statute because there was no basis in the Social Security
Act itself or in its legislative history to conclude that an
unborn child is included in the definition of "dependent
child" in the statute. Thus the state's requirement that
AFDC be furnished with reasonable promptness to all
eligible individuals did not mandate including unborn
children.
Challenge Denial of Aid to Persons Who Transfer Property
for Less Than Fair Consideration
9614. Portner v. Wohlgemuth, No. CA-72-2428 (E.D. Pa.,
filed Dec. 8, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by Louis
Shucker, Eugene F. Zenobi, Alan N. Linder and J. Richard
Gray, Tri-County Legal Services, 524 Washington St.,
Reading, Pa. 19601, (215) 376-8656. [Here reported:
9614A Complaint (6 pp.); 9614B Memo in Support of
Motion for TRO (11 pp.).]
Plaintiff, a recipient of Aid to the Disabled, attacks
the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania Department of
Public Welfare regulation which provides that a person is
ineligible for public assistance if he has transferred property
for less than fair consideration within two years prior to his
application for assistance. Defendant, the Secretary of the
Department of Welfare, has voluntarily reinstated plaintiff
pending final disposition of the case.
Plaintiff was granted assistance in June 1972.
Defendant terminated this assistance in November pursuant
to the above regulation. Plaintiff admits that he transferred
his real property to his son in April for a nominal
consideration and defendant admits that plaintiff is eligible
for -assistance except for the regulation. Plaintiff is presently without any source of income and his disability
precludes him from employment.
Plaintiff first argues that the regulation imposes an
impermissible additional eligibility requirement in contravention of Title XVI of the Social Security Act and that it
operates to subvert the "standard of need" to which the
public assistance program is dedicated.
Second, plaintiff asserts that the regulation denies
him both due process and equal protection because it
arbitrarily creates two classes receiving different treatment
and because the regulation does not bear a reasonable
relation to the aims of the program. Additionally plaintiff
alleges that the regulation is against expressed legislative
intent.
Court Denies Motion to Stay Order for Retroactive
Payment of AFDC Benefits
2958. Roberson v. White, No. 14,003 (D. Conn., Jan. 7,
1973), consolidated with 3996. Campagnuolo v. White.
Plaintiffs represented by William H. Clendenen and David
Lesser, 152 Temple St., New Haven, Conn. 06510, (203)
787-1183; Kenneth Kreiling and Stuart Bear, New Haven
Legal Assistance Association, 265 Church St., New Haven,
Conn. 06510, (203) 777-7601. [Here reported: 2958K
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Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment (4 pp.).
Previously reported: 2958A Complaint (11 pp.); 2958B
Brief (44 pp.); 2958C Complaint (11 pp.); 2958D Memorandum (42 pp.), 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 339
(November 1970); 2958F Brief (44 pp.), 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 612 (April 1971); 2958G 2nd Cir. Opinion
(3 pp.), 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 115 (June 1971);
2958J Ruling on Motion for Contempt (5 pp.), 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 699 (March 1972); 3996D Ruling on
Motion to Convene Three-Judge Court (9 pp.), 4
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 561 (March 1971); 3996F 2nd
Cir. Opinion (3 pp.), 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 115
(June 1971); 3996G Ruling on Motion for Contempt &
Other Relief (6 pp.), 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 559
(January 1972).]
The court has denied defendant Connecticut Welfare
Commissioner's motion to stay the operation of the
injunction issued in these cases by the court in October
1971, which ordered defendant to make retroactive AFDC
payments to persons denied such aid due to improper
computation of income for determining eligibility. To date
over $1.6 million in retroactive payments have been made
to the plaintiff class pursuant to the order.
Under the order, defendant was instructed to notify
all AFDC recipients and applicants who had income from
employment and who would have been eligible for AFDC
but for defendant's erroneous application of earned income
disregard provisions of the Social Security Act, of their
entitlement to a recomputation of income and retroactive
payment of benefits for the period after July 1, 1969.
Defendant had improperly computed earned income disregards and failed to deduct work expenses from gross
income in determining eligibility, in violation of the Act
and HEW regulations.
Defendant argued that the order was invalid under
the decision in Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir.
1972), which held that the eleventh amendment deprives a
federal court of jurisdiction to order retroactive welfare
benefits wrongfully denied by state authorities. The court
rejected this argument, holding that the October 1971
order was not a judgment against the state as in Rothstein,
and that the order only calls for compliance with applicable
HEW regulations. The court further found that the rule in
Rothstein should not be retroactively applied to modify
judgments previously entered.
Florida AFDC Requirement of Support Suit Against
Putative Father Held Unconstitutional; Retroactive Benefits
Awarded
8883. Story v. Roberts, No. 72-641-Civ-J-M (W.D. Fla.,
Dec. 20, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by William J.
Gibbons and Paul C. Doyle, Duval County Legal Aid
Association, 5566 Avenue "B", Jacksonville, Fla. 32209,
(904) 764-5671. [Here reported: 8883D Opinion & Order
(16 pp.). Also available: 8883A Complaint (12 pp.); 8883B
Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law (3 pp.); 8883C Temporary
Restraining Order (3 pp.).]
This class action was brought on behalf of AFDC
recipients and their children, challenging the imminent

termination of their AFDC grants for failure to comply
with the Florida statutory requirement that the applicant
institute and in good faith prosecute a civil support action
against those persons legally responsible for the support of
her dependent children. A three-judge federal district court
was convened to hear plaintiffs' allegations that the statute
and regulations thereunder violated the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. In
exercise of its pendent jurisdiction, the court concluded
that the Florida statute and regulations constituted an
eligibility standard "clearly inconsistent" with the Social
Security Act of 1935 and therefore invalid under the
supremacy clause.
In addition to a declaratory judgment and an
injunction, the court ordered payment of retroactive
benefits to those plaintiffs denied benefits solely on
account of the unconstitutional statute. The defendants'
contention that the requirement of substantial payments of
state funds made this a suit against the state in violation of
the eleventh amendment was rejected. The court concluded
that retroactive benefits would accord with federal policy
without unnecessarily exacerbating federal-state relations,
and since HEW and the United States Supreme Court had
declared a requirement such as Florida's invalid more than
one year before institution of this suit, and since plaintiffs'
ofjections were timely, the retroactive award will be
"remedial and not compensatory."
Attorney Sues for Release of General Assistance Manuals
9634. Pulliam v. Born, No. 650-259 (Cal. Super. Ct., San
Francisco County, filed Aug. 31, 1972). Plaintiff represented by San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance
Foundation, 721 Webster St., San Francisco, Cal. 94117,
(415) 567-2804. [Here reported: 9634A Complaint (3
pp.).]
This class action, brought by a staff attorney of the
San Francisco Neighborhood Assistance Foundation, seeks
to obtain a copy of the GENERAL ASSISTANCE
MANUAL, which contains standards pursuant to which the
general assistance program is administered and eligibility for
general assistance benefits is determined. Plaintiff alleges
that neither he nor any other member of the plaintiff class
have a copy of the Manuel and pertinent updating
materials, which are public records within the definition of
CAL. GOV'T CODE §6252. Plaintiff alleges that he has
made several requests to receive such material, but has
received no response whatsover. Plaintiff further alleges
that pursuant to CAL. GOV'T CODE § §6252 et seq., he is
entitled to receive copies of these public records and to
continue to receive such copies as and when they are
printed and disseminated to the San Francisco Department
of Social Services. Plaintiff asks that these materials be
provided free of charge or that he be allowed to make
copies of these materials. Plaintiff finally asks that the
court declare that every San Francisco Legal Assistance
attorney has a right to receive copies of all such materials in
the future without having to make separate or additional
requests for each additional writing.
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Since the complaint was filed, both sides have filed
motions for pretrial discovery, interrogatories, and various
answers.
Welfare Recipients Attack Conveyance of Second
Mortgages to Welfare Department in Certain Circumstances
9648. Akins v. Lavine (N.D. N.Y., filed January 1973).
Plaintiffs represented by Douglas A. Eldridge and Steven U.
Mullens, Onondaga Neighborhood Legal Services, Inc., 633
South Warren St., Syracuse, N.Y. 13202, (315) 475-3127.
[Here reported: 9648A Complaint (16 pp.); 9648B
Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law (25 pp.).]
This action attacks the department of social service's
policy of requiring welfare recipients to convey second
mortgages on their residences as a condition of eligibility.
Defendants are the commissioners of the Department of
Social Services for New York State and Onondaga County.
Plaintiffs in this class action, recipients or former recipients
of welfare, do not attack the general right of the department to require them to grant such mortgages. Rather, they
challenge the legality of the requirement in three specific
circumstances, and seek declaratory and injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs first contend that where the recipient has
purchased his home under the Section 235 Program of the
National Housing Act, the requirement of a second mortgage is void under the supremacy clause and the preemption
doctrine. They argue that the conveyance requirement
conflicts with the congressional purpose of making home
ownership available to low and moderate income families so
as to enhance the pride and dignity of the family and
stabilize and improve the community.
Second, plaintiffs contend that the policy of
termination of aid to an entire family where the parents
refused to convey second mortgages deprives the children
of equal protection in a situation where they have no
control over their parents' actions. They rely on the rule of
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), that children are not
to be denied AFDC for the improper acts of their parents.
Third, plaintiffs charge that the requirement of
second mortgages violate their rights to substantive due
process of law because the department fails to consider
criteria set forth in New York social services law in
determining whether the mortgages should be taken. A
regulation provides the relevant factors such as recipient's
age, health, and social situation must be examined before a
determination to require a second mortgage is made.
Plaintiffs contend that the welfare officials' invariable
failure to consider these factors is an abuse of discretion.
Court of Appeals Prohibits Texas' Regulatory Assumption
That All of an AFDC Dependent Child's Income Defrays
the Child's Own Needs
8361. Rodriguez v. Vowell, No. 72-1663 (5th Cir., Jan. 24,
1973). Appellants represented by Nancy Duff Levy, Steven
J. Cole and Henry A. Freedman, Center on Social Welfare
Policy & Law25 West 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10036,
(212) 354-7570; Melvin N. Eichelbaum and Frederick J.
Deyeso, 203 West Nueva St., San Antonio, Tex. 78207; J.
Vol. Vl,

L. Covington, 1205 East Monroe, Brownsville, Tex. 78520.
Of counsel, Michael B. Trister, Washington Research Project, 1823 Jefferson PI., NW, Washington, D.C., (202)
483-1470. [Here reported: 8361B Opinion (11 pp.). Previously reported: 8361A Reply Brief (14 pp.), 6
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 455 (November 1972).]
The Fifth Circuit has reversed and remanded a district
court decision which upheld the validity of two regulations
of the Texas Department of Public Welfare. The challenged
regulations denied AFDC payments to families in which the
child had income "accruing in his own right" greater than
his state-defined recognizable needs, even where such
income was less than the recognizable needs of both the
child and his caretaker relative, on the ground that the child
was therefore not dependent.
Basing its opinion on the Social Security Act, HEW
regulations and Supreme Court decisions thereunder, the
court held: 1) the AFDC eligibility requirements outlined
in the Social Security Act and HEW regulations are
mandatory and not precatory upon participating states; 2)
since AFDC payments represent assistance to "needy
families" the state's procedure for measuring the needs of
an AFDC family must take into account the group needs of
the family as a whole including the needs of the caretaker
relative; and 3) the Texas regulations are invalid insofar as
they automatically assume that all of the income accruing
to a child is available to meet the child's needs, whereas, in
fact the child may share his income with other members of
his AFDC family.
California Hearing Regulations Enjoined; Aid Continues
Pending Hearing
6875. Yee-Litt v. Richardson, No. C-71-2286-OJC (N.D.
Cal., Jan. 17, 1973). Plaintiffs represented by Armando M.
Menocal III and Christopher N. May, San Francisco
Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, 2701 Folsom
St., San Francisco, Cal. 94110, (415) 648-7580. Of counsel,
Donald R. Prigo. [Here reported: 6875-1 Memorandum and

Source Catalog on Housing and
Communities Available
Source catalog, a comprehensive collection of data
describing the housing crisis in the United States from the
perspective of what can be done about it, is now available at
bookstores and from the publishers. Source Volume II
describes hundreds of tenant unions, housing development
corporations, city-wide tenant coalitions, co-ops, third world
housing resource groups, open housing groups, legal aid
offices, and others, as well as annotating books, films and
periodicals. Brief introductions explain the problems in each
area, list basic demands and outline strategies for action.
Prices: $2.95; $7.00 (hardcover), 264 pp.
Volume I on Communications is also available. Price:
$1.75, 116 pp.
Both volumes may be ordered from Source, P.O. Box
21066, Washington, D.C. 20009.
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Order (10 pp.). Previously reported: 6875A Complaint (18
pp.); 6875B Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion for TRO and for Three-Judge Court (24
pp.); 6875C Supplemental Memorandum (32 pp.); 6875D
Temporary Restraining Order (1 p.); 6875E Amendment to
TRO (2 pp.), 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 112 (June
1972).]
California welfare recipients who file a timely fair
hearing request cannot have their benefits reduced or
terminated until a decision pursuant to the hearing is
reached. A three-judge court specifically barred the state
from continuing its practice of denying aid pending the
hearing to recipients whose fair hearing requests failed to
state an issue of fact or judgment. The court noted that its
previous injunction had been lifted to allow the state to
experiment with new regulations but that there were many
erroneous prehearing terminations which arose, in part,
"from what appears to be the State's misuse of these
regulations." The court concluded that the "fact-policy
distinction is not viable in the welfare context for making
the critical determination of whether aid will be paid
pending a hearing."
WOMEN'S RIGHTS
Female Students Seek Admission to Auto Mechanics
Vocational Courses
9308. Casa v. Gaffney, No. 171-673 (Cal. Super. Ct., San
Mateo County, filed Nov. 8, 1972). Plaintiffs represented
by Susanne Martinez, Youth Law Center, 795 Turk St., San
Francisco, Cal. 94102, (415) 474-5865; Kenneth Hecht,
Employment Law Center, 795 Turk St., San Francisco, Cal.
94102, (415) 474-5865; Dolores A. Donovan, Charles C.
Marson, and Peter E. Sheehan, American Civil Liberties
Union Foundation of Northern California, Inc., 593 Market
St., San Francisco, Cal. 94105, (415) 433-2750. [Here
reported: 9308A Complaint (10 pp.).]
Female public high school students have brought this
class action for declaratory and injunctive relief to gain the
opportunity to enroll in auto mechanics vocational courses
equally with male students. They allege denial of such
opportunity solely on the basis of sex, in violation of their
fundamental right to an education, the equal protection
clauses of the federal and state constitutions, the employment provision of the California Constitution against sex
discrimination, and various provisions of the state
Education and Administrative Code.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Challenge Employer's Right of Automatic Suspension of
Benefit Payments Without Notice and Hearing
9528. Farina v. Smith, No. 72-1983 (E.D. Pa., filed Nov.
27, 1972). Plaintiffs represented by Andrew S. Price,
Harold I. Goodman, and Bruce E. Endy, Community Legal
Services, Inc., 313 South Juniper St., Philadelphia, Pa.
19107, (215) 735-6101. [Here reported: 9528A Complaint
(11 pp.); 9528B Memorandum (15 pp.).]

The named plaintiff in this class action represents all
of those who have been found eligible for workmen's
compensation benefits, but whose benefits have been
automatically suspended by the employer without notice or
a prior evidentiary hearing. The plaintiff asks the court to
declare unconstitutional and enjoin the operation of the
section of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act
which allows this procedure, and also to recover all lost
income resulting from this ex parte termination of benefits.
The plaintiff asserts that the employers are granted immediate relief in contested cases by this ex parte termination
until the issue is subsequently ruled on at a hearing, while
the employees who petition for reinstatement of benefits
must wait without compensation during the delay between
the date of their petition and the date of the hearing.
The defendant has moved to dismiss for want of a
case and controversy, and on the basis of mootness,
predicated upon its reinstatement of the named plaintiff's
workmen's compensation benefits. The plaintiffs argue that
this temporary reinstatement of the named plaintiff's
benefits does not eliminate the controversy since the
contested section of the Pennsylvania Act continues to
deprive the other members in the class of their constitutional and civil rights. The plaintiffs contend that dismissal
is not appropriate when the named individual purports to
represent a class, and that the defendant cannot meet the
challenge to a constitutionally deficient practice by such a
temporary voluntary cessation. Even if the plaintiffs had
not brought this action as class litigation, the plaintiffs
assert that there still remains an actual controversy, because
the acts complained of may conceivably be repeated, and
the issues are of such public importance that judicial relief
is appropriate.

BOOK RE VIEW
Prisoners of Psychiatry: Mental Patients, Psychiatrists, and
the Law, by Bruce Ennis, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.,
1973. Pp. xix, 232. Price: $6.95
The book describes the author's experiences and
strategies as an ACLU attorney defending past and presently institutionalized mental patients from the deprivation of their legal rights by established legal, medical and
social structures. Perhaps the most disturbing revelation
from a lawyer's point of view is that mental patients are
often denied the procedural and due process rights that
would be given as a matter of course to defendants in
criminal cases. This is so despite the fact that commitment
for "psychiatric care" can easily result in confinement for
time periods far exceeding the norm for serious criminal
cases, and subject the committed mental patient to conditions just as brutal as those endured by inmates who have
been convicted of crimes.
Ennis does not believe that public custodial
institutions are effective. He documents that institutionalization is antitherapeutic, and cites with favor England's
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plan to close all of its large public mental institutions
within 20 years. Besides supporting the proposal to put all
mental health services on an out-patient basis, he has a
suggestion that is of particular interest to lawyers, namely
that the courts should assign every practicing attorney in
the nation the defense of four mental commitment cases a
year, thus hopefully making sure that all the subjects of
mental commitment procedures will receive some measure
of their procedural and substantive rights. This procedure
would also have the beneficial effect of alerting the general
attorney population to the abuses of involuntary
psychiatry.
Geoffrey Groshong
Associate Student Editor

POVERTY LAW BIBLIOGRAPHY
Copies of the current books and articles listed below are not
available from the Ntional Clearinghouse unless otherwise noted.

Consumer:
Boodell, Hope for the Future: The Contract Buyer's
League, 31 NLADA BRIEFCASE 298 (1972).
Conclusive Presumptions and Administrative Lawmaking:
The Invalidation of Truth in Lending's More Than Four
Installments Rule, 52 BU. L. REV. 621 (1972).
Eisenberg, Warning From Wisconsin: New Regulatory Laws
for Collection of Consumer Debt, 77 COM. L.J. 246
(1972).
Halliburton, UCCC: A Tool for Creditors, 28 MO. B.J. 324
(1972).
Pitch, Consumer Credit Reform: The Case for A Renewed
Federal Initiative, 5 OTTAWA L. REV. 324 (1972).
Proposed FTC Regulation of Consumer Financing, 60 GEO.
L.J. 1563 (1972).
Robertson, Myth and Reality in Consumer Credit Rate
Regulation, 43 MISS. L.J. 429 (1972).

Administrative:

Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 7 LAND & WATER REV.
663 (1972).

ABA Proposals for Amendments to the Administrative
Procedure Act, 24 AD. L. REV. 371 (1972).

Wage Assignments: A Creditor Remedy in Need of Reform,
18 WAYNE L. REV. 1535 (1972).

Cramton, Cases and Causes of Administrative Delay, 58
ABA J. 937 (1972).

Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Revolving Charge Accounts and
Usury, 10 HOUSTON L. REV. 140 (1972).

Gellhorn, Public Participation in
Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359 (1972).

Criminal:

Administrative

Public Participation in Federal Administrative Proceedings,
120 U. PA. L. REV. 702 (1972).
Wilson, Discretion and the Analysis of Administrative
Process, 10 OSGOODE L.J. 117 (1972).
Civil Procedure:
Beatty, State Court Evasion of United States Supreme
Court Mandates During the Last Decade of the Warren
Court, 6 VAL. U. L. REV. 260 (1972).
Kennedy, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Under
the Warren Court, 26 SW. L.J. 282 (1972).
LaFrance, Federal Litigation for the Poor, 1 LAW &
SOCIAL ORDER 1972 (1972).
Right to Counsel in Civil Matters, 31 NLADA BRIEFCASE
302 (1972).
Civil Rights:
Reid, The Burger Court and the Civil Rights Movement:
The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh
Away, 3 RUTGERS CAMDEN L.J. 410 (1972).

Campbell, Proposals for Improvements in the
Administration of Criminal Justice, 54 CHI. B. REC. 75
(1972).
Criminal Procedure-Confession Obtained After Minor
Defendant's Request to See Parents Held Inadmissible, 23
SYRACUSE L. REV. 950 (1972).
Feldman, Legal Rights of Prisoners, 28 MO. B.J. 293
(1972).
Habeas Corpus: Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 47 N.D. L.
REV. 521 (1971).
Hug, Presumptions and Inferences in Criminal Law, 56
MILWAUKEE L. REV. 81 (1972).
Pre-Arrest Delay: Ross Revisited, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 811
(1972).
Probable Cause at the Initial Appearance in Warrantless
Arrests, 45 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1128 (1972).
Proposed Standards for Defining Indigents in Criminal and
Civil Cases in Illinois, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59 (1971).

Class Actions:

Removing the Stigma of Arrest: The Courts, the
Legislatures and Unconvicted Arrestees, 47 WASH. L. REV.
659 (1972).

Use of A Preliminary Hearing in a 23 (b) (3) Class Action,
1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 588 (1972).

Rosett, Discretion, Severity and Legality in Criminal
Justice, 46 SO. CAL. L. REV. 12 (1972).

Constitutional Law:

Domestic Relations:

Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 60 GEO.
L.J. 1139, 1181 (1972).

Collger, Due Process for the Unwed Father, 46 FLA. B.J.
508 (1972).
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Education:
Schoen, Nationalization of Public Education: The
Constitutional Question, 4 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 63
(1972).
Serrano v. Priest: Renaissance for School Financing
Through the Equal Protection Clause, 21 AMER. U. L.
REV. 685 (1972).

Scheider, Civil Commitment of the Mentally III, 58 ABA J.
1059 (1972).
Police:
Clark, Courts, the Police and the Community, 46 SO. CAL.
L. REV. 1 (1972).
Prisons:

Smalls, Path and Promised Land: School Desegregation, 21
AMER. U. L. REV. 636 (1972).

Attorney-Prisoner Communication: The
Uncensored Mail, 1 AM. J. CRIM. L. 28 (1972).

GALLEY 3
Employment:

Brant, Prison Disciplinary Procedures: Creating Rules, 21
CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 83 (1972).

Minority Workers and the Continuing Effects of Racial
Discrimination-The Limits of Remedial Treatment, 58

Meyer, Change and Obstacles to Change
Management, 36 FED. PROB. 39 (1972).

INS. L. REV. 143 (1972).

Parsons & Lewis, Due Process in Parole Release Decisions,
60 CAL. L. REV. 1518 (1972).

Protecting the Older Worker, 66 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 214
(1972).
Environmental:
Bryson, Public Nuisance, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, and Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241
(1972).
Murphy, National Environmental Policy Act and the
Licensing Process: Environmental Magna Carta or Agency
Coup de Grace?, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 963 (1972).
Housing:
A buses in the Low-Income Home Ownership Program- The
Need for Consumer Protection Response by FHA, 45
TEMP. L.Q. 461 (1972).
Landlord and Tenant-Retaliatory Eviction and the
Absolute Right to Choose Not to Have Any Tenants, 51
N.C. L. REV. 162 (1972).
Public Housing and Discrimination in Site Selection, 47
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 253 (1972).
Relocation Assistance: An Open Door Policy to Equal
Housing Opportunity, 21 CATH. U. L. REV. 639 (1972).

Right

in

to

Prison

Prison Discipline and the Eighth Amendment: Out of the
Quagmire?, 1 AM. J. CRIM. L. 4 (1972).
Smith, Less, Not More: Police, Courts, Prisons, 36 FED.
PROB. 12 (1972).
Public Utilities:
Emerging Constitutional Issues in Public Utility Consumer
Law, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 744 (1972).
Pontz, Consumer Interest-Is It Being Protected by the
Public Utility Commission?, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 315 (1972).
Workmen's Compensation:
Lavorci, Summary of the Report of the National
Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws,
1972 INS. L.J. 573 (1972).

POSITIONS AVAILABLE IN
LEGAL SERVICES
Applications and inquiries concerning the positions listed below
should be submitted directly to the organizations announcing the
positions.

In Forma Pauperis:
Abram, Access to the Judicial Process, 6 GA. L. REV. 247
(1972).
Juveniles:
Double Jeopardy and the Waiver of Jurisdiction in
California's Juvenile Courts, 24 STAN. L. REV. 874
(1972).
Wang, Continuing Turbulence Surrounding the Parens
Patriae Concept in American Juvenile Courts, 18 McG ILL
L.J. 219 (1972).
Weiss, Emerging Rights of Minors, 4 U. TOLEDO L. REV.
25 (1972).
Mental Health:
Giannini, Rights of the Retarded, 6 INST. ESTATE PLAN
72. 1200 (1972).

Charlottesville-Albemarle Legal Aid Society, 230 Court
Square, Charlottesville, Va. 22901, (703) 293-5131.
The Charlottesville-Albemarle Legal Aid Society has
an immediate opening for a staff attorney. Applicants for
this position must be aggressive and sincere in their desire
to serve the needs of the poor. Applicants must be admitted
to the Virginia Bar or expect to be admitted in the near
future. Preference will be given to minority attorneys. The
Legal Aid Society consists of two attorneys at this time and
serves a population of approximately 77,000. Salary information is available on request. Interested persons should
send resumes to the above address.
Cumberland County Legal Services Association, Inc.,
Kronenberg Bldg., Carlisle, Pa. 17013. (Attn: Charlotte
Neagle, Director.)
Clearinghouse Review

HeinOnline -- 6 Clearinghouse Rev. 718 1972-1973

Cumberland County Legal Services Association, Inc.,
has an opening for a staff attorney. Normal caseload
responsibilities are handled by Dickinson School of Law
students. The attorney will be in charge of our out-reach
offices and supervise students' work at these locations. It is
expected that the attorney will be involved primarily in test
case litigation. Applicants should have at least one year's
experience in poverty law. Spring graduates with extensive
clinical experience will be considered. Pennsylvania bar
membership not required. The salary is commensurate with
experience to a maximum of $12,000. Equal opportunity
employer. Interested persons should send a resume to the
above address.
ECCO, Inc., East Central Committee for Opportunity, Inc.,
Central Administration Bldg., Mayfield, Ga. 31059, (404)
465-3201. (Attn: Jordan D. Luttrell, General Counsel.)
ECCO, Inc., a predominantly black organization in a
rural Georgia county with 80% black population and
black-controlled county government, seeks house counsel
to advise on legal, financial and business aspects of small
and medium size business and housing investments. Present
financial resources of organization (including conservative
estimate of institutional financing available) between $5
and $10 million.
Experience desired: two to five years corporate or
business practice. Present admission to Georgia Bar not
essential. Salary open. Please contact the above.

Fresno County Legal Services, Inc., 1221 Fulton Mall, Rm.
505, Fresno, Cal. 93721, (209) 485-9880. (Attn: Brett
Dorian, Director.)
Fresno County Legal Services, Inc., which operates a
federally-funded program of civil legal services to the
low-income community of Fresno County has an opening
for a staff attorney. Salary minimum $10,800 annually.
Membership in the California Bar is a prerequisite to
employment. Minority and female attorneys are especially
encouraged to apply. Applications must be submitted
immediately to the above.
Georgia Legal Services Program, Inc.-Georgia Indigents
Legal Services, Inc., 15 Peachtree St., Rm. 909, Atlanta,
Ga. 30303, (404) 522-3553. (Attn: John L. Cromartie, Jr.,
Associate Director.)
Georgia Legal Services Program, Georgia Indigents
Legal Services, funded by OEO, United Givers, the State of
Georgia, and HEW serve the State of Georgia outside the
five county metropolitan Atlanta area. The program has 40
staff attorneys, two VISTA lawyers, eight VISTA generalists and four Reginald Heber Smith Fellows working in its
nine branch offices located throughout the state and in the
administrative and backup office located in Atlanta,
Georgia.
The program is seeking managing attorneys for the
Savannah and Augusta branch offices. The Savannah office
is funded for five attorneys with one Reginald Heber Smith

Fellow and two VISTA generalists and serves Chatham
County, along with the seven surrounding counties. There is
unlimited potential for litigation in the areas of consumer
law, housing law, and equalization of municipal services.
Much work is being done in economic development. The
Augusta office services Richmond County and the surrounding counties, is funded for three attorneys with one
Reginald Heber Smith Fellow and the addition of VISTA
generalists in March. Augusta is the "home improvement
capital of the world" and much of the work of the office
has been directed toward this problem with substantial TIL
litigation.
Experience in poverty law, commitment to quality
legal services for the poor, and ability and willingness to
lead and direct staff attorneys are prerequisites for both
positions. Applicants need not be members of the Georgia
bar but they would be expected to take the Georgia bar
exam at the first opportunity. Salary up to $15,000 based
on ability and experience. Other staff attorney positions
develop from time to time throughout the state. Beginning
salary in the program is $10,200.
Greater Lansing Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., P.O. Box 1071,
300 North Washington Ave., Rm. 302, Lansing, Mich.
48933. (Attn: Richard Guilford, Chairman, Personnel
Committee.)
The Bureau is seeking an executive director as of
March 1, 1973, to direct this OEO, Model Cities, United
Way funded, nine-lawyer Legal Services program centered
in Lansing and serving the mid-Michigan area. The director
is responsible for overall project administration, including
supervision of litigation.
The program is committed to concepts of innovative
law reform litigation and quality service to the client
community. Applicants should have a minimum of two
years of Legal Services experience as well as some administrative background. Salary commensurate with experience
to $17,000 maximum. Interested applicants should submit
inquiries, resumes and applications to the above address.
Health Law Project, 133 South 36th St., Philadelphia, Pa.
19104, (215) 594-6951. (Attn: Richard K. Barlow, Staff
Director.)
A health professional is being sought for the Health
Law Project of the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
The project is funded by OEO to work on health delivery
systems issues affecting the poor and the near-poor. The
project is looking for a health professional who has a
reasonable amount of knowledge of both medical technology (i.e., diagnosis and treatment criteria and processes)
and health delivery systems (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid,
HMOs, etc.). Salary is negotiable up to approximately
$15,500. Please send all inquiries and resumes to the above.
Indianapolis Law School, 735 West New York St.,
Indianapolis, Ind. 46202. (Attn: Professor Jeremy S.
Williams.)
The Indianapolis Law School invites applications for
a full-time clinical legal education instructor. Any appoint719
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ment will be made at a rank and salary commensurate with
the qualifications of the applicant selected. Selection will
be made without regard to race, color, creed or national
origin. Applicants should write, enclosing a full resume, to
the above.
Land of Lincoln Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc., 234
Collinsville Ave., East St. Louis, II1. 66201. (Attn: Martin
Mendelsohn, Executive Director.)
The Land of Lincoln Legal Assistance Foundation,
Inc., a regional Legal Services program serving downstate
Illinois with a staff of 24 attorneys and seven area offices
(Champaign, East St. Louis, Alton, Cairo, Danville, Centralia, and Carbondale), is seeking several aggressive and
imaginative attorneys for the positions of directing attorney
and staff attorney. The directing attorney should have two
or three years experience, preferably with a background of
poverty law. Salary is commensurate with ability and
experience. Inquiries and resumes should be forwarded
immediately to the above.
The Legal Aid Bureau of New Britain, Inc., 111 Franklin
Square, New Britain, Conn. 06051, (203) 225-8678. (Attn:
Robert G. Fracasso, Executive Director.)
An opening for executive director exists in this
project. The program serves an area having a population of
90,000 with a staff comprised of one staff attorney, one
paralegal and two office personnel. Minimum of three years
legal experience is required; poverty law background is
highly desirable. Salary depends upon qualifications and
experience. Resumes should be sent to the above address.
Legal Referral Bureau of Lake County, Inc., 11 South
County St., Waukegan, III. 60085, (312) 662-6925. (Attn:
Gary L. Schlesinger, Staff Attorney.)
This office is currently in need of two staff attorneys
exhibiting a special interest in the field of poverty law and,
preferably, having one to two years experience in the
general practice of law. Admission to the Illnois bar is a
necessity as our need is immediate. The salary range is
negotiable, commensurate with experience and background.
All inquires should be made by letter, to the above,
enclosing a resume and an annual salary requirement.
Legal Services for Laramie County, Inc., 1810 Pioneer Ave.,
Cheyenne, Wyo. 82001, (307) 634-1566.
Laramie County Legal Services is currently seeking
applicants for directing attorney and staff attorney. Beginning salaries negotiable based on experience ($12,000 to
$14,000 director) and ($9,500 to $10,500 staff attorney).
Attorneys should be a member of the Wyoming bar or in a
position to become a member. Litigation and administrative
experience is desired for the position of directing attorney.
Interested persons should immediately direct all inquiries
and applications to the above.
MFY Legal Services, Inc., 214 East Second St., New York,
N.Y. 10009, (212) 777-5250. (Attn: George C. Stewart,
Director.)

MFY Legal Services seeks a managing attorney for its
neighborhood office in Manhattan. Duties include supervision of three to six lawyers; administration of the office;
and some personal caseload. Only applicants admitted to
practice in New York with four or more years experience,
including some poverty law work, will be considered. Salary
is approximately $18,000. Send resumes to the above.

Micronesian Legal Services Corporation, P.O. Box 826,
Saipan, Mariana Islands 96950. Cable: MICROLEX (Attn:
Theodore Mitchell, Executive Director).
MLSC has a few openings for staff attorneys in its
district offices. The program maintains offices on Saipan in
the Mariana Islands as well as district offices to serve the
Yap Islands, Palau Islands, Truk Islands, Ponape Islands,
and Marshall Islands. Micronesia is presently governed by
the United States Government under a trusteeship
agreement with the United Nations.
MLSC commenced operations about two years ago,
and has a thriving caseload ranging from local problems
which involve Micronesian customary law to major
litigation against the Department of Defense or Interior.
Salaries range upwards from $11,000 per year. MLSC
has a total staff of about 50 people, including 15 attorneys
and 12 Micronesian counselors.
Contrary to the popular American myth, adjusting to
life on a tropical island has many stresses. But once the
adjustment is made, living and working in Micronesia can be
a most important experience. We are looking for topnotch
attorneys who, together with their wives or husbands, are
not utterly dependent upon urban amenities for their well
being. An absolute minimum commitment of two years is
mandatory. We prefer applicants with two or more years
experience in a neighborhood office and in the federal
court. Admission to at least one state bar is required.
Interested applicants should apply immediately by sending
a resume and example of written work. Interviews will be
arranged in the United States in the near future.
National Association of Attorneys General, 320 West Jones
St., Raleigh, N.C. 27603, (919) 834-3386. (Attn: Patton G.
Wheeler, Executive Director.)
NAAG has received a one-year LEAA grant which
will fund a member of our staff to work on consumer
protection matters. The position would be in Raleigh, and
the salary depends on qualifications and experience. The
person must be an attorney, but need not be a member of
the North Carolina bar. He would serve as coordinator for
the NAAG Consumer Protection Committee and publish a
periodic newsletter, which would be distributed to state
attorneys general's offices.
Ohio Migrant Legal Action Program, One Stranahan Square,
Toledo, Ohio. (Attn: Earl Staelin.)
The Ohio Migrant Legal Action Program is accepting
applications for the positions of executive director and staff
attorney. The director will supervise approximately ten
Clearinghouse Review
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employees including staff attorneys, administrative and
clerical personnel. He will be responsible for the overall
administration, operation, and supervision of the program.
In conjunction with the program board and advisory
committees, he will establish policy and guidelines for
conduct of the program; develop strategies and plans for
the representation of migrant farmworkers; develop and
administer personnel policies, funding proposals, hiring, and
staff training.
The director will also supervise and participate in the
litigation of affirmative actions on behalf of the client
community. Candidates for the position should have
significant experience in the general practice of law,
including experience in the trial and appeal of complex
legal issues. The candidate's previous experience should
evidence an ability to provide effective leadership in terms
of client advocacy. Salary is negotiable, conditioned upon
experience.
Positions are also available for two staff attorneys.
Resumes and inquiries should be directed to the above.
Pennsylvania Legal Services Center, 130 Walnut St.,
Harrisburg, Pa. 17101, (717) 236-9487. (Attn: Gerald
Kaufman, Executive Director.)
Pennsylvania Legal Services Center, a recently created
statewide backup center located in the state capital is
seeking applicants for staff attorney positions who demonstrate initiative and sensitivity to the problems of the poor.
The Center, primarily funded by HEW, provides backup
services to 20 separate Legal Services programs; conducts an
active administrative and legislative advocacy program;
funds existing local Legal Services programs within the
state; develops new local programs primarily in rural areas;
and provides technical assistance and training services to
local programs. There are vacancies for staff attorneys to
perform all of the above functions.
Requirements include a minimum of two years Legal
Services experience. Preference will be given to applicants
interested in providing backup service who are aggressive
and demonstrate an ability to develop and pursue law
reform issues by working with existing local Legal Services
programs. Admission to the bar of any state allows practice
in Pennsylvania for 2/ years prior to admission to
Pennsylvania courts. Salary is negotiable based on
experience. Inquiries and resumes should be forwarded to
the above address.
Pikes Peak Legal Services, 104 South Tejon, Suite 300,
Colorado Springs, Colo. 80902, (303) 471-0380. (Attn:
Phillip Kendall.)
Pikes Peak Legal Services is looking for a director.
The program serves a two county area which includes
Colorado Springs, the fastest growing city in the United
States. The director is in charge of supervising three staff
attorneys, two VISTA attorneys and one Smith Fellow as
well as handling a limited caseload. Legal experience is a
prerequisite and admission to the Colorado bar is highly
desirable. The position is available for persons interested in

aggressive law reform and total commitment to Legal
Services program. Salary range from $12,000 to $15,000
annually. Please forward resumes to the above.
Rock Hill Legal Aid Office, P.O. Box 2891 CRS, Rock Hill,
S.C. 29730. (Attn: Legal Aid Committee.)
Attorney wanted as director of Rock Hill Legal Aid
Office, Rock Hill, S.C. Approximately two years general
law experience is required. Salary is approximately
$14,000. Interested persons please send resumes to the
above.
Southeast Legal Aid Center, 1331 East Compton Blvd.,
Compton, Cal. 90221, (213) 638-6194.
This project is seeking an executive director who will
have complete administrative responsibility for the program
according to the policies determined by the Board of
Directors. Broad administrative and professional experience, with a special interest in the problems of poverty, is
required along with a minimum of five years experience and
membership in the California bar. Resumes should be
submitted immediately to the above. Applicants must be
available for interview in Compton on 48 hours notice.

LEGAL SERVICES NATIONAL RESEARCH
AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CENTERS
Center on Social Welfare Policy & Law
25 West 43rd Street, 12th Floor
New York, New York 10036
(212) 354-7670
Harvard Center for Law & Education
61 Kirkland Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
(617) 495-4666
Legal Action Support Project
Bureau of Social Science Research
1990 "M" Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 2234300
Legal Services for the Elderly Poor
2095 Broadway
New York, New York 10023
(212) 595-1340
Legal Services Training Program
Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C. 20017
(202) 832-3900
Migrant Legal Action Program
1820 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 785-2475
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National Paralegal Institute
2000 "P" Street, NW, Suite 600
Washington D.C. 20036
(202) 872-0655

National Clearinghouse for Legal Services
Northwestern University School of Law
710 North Lake Shore Drive-Mezzanine Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60611
(312) 943-2866
National Consumer Law Center, Inc.
One Court Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02108
(617) 523-8010

National Resource Center on Correctional Law
and Legal Services
1705 DeSales St., NW
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 293-1712

National Employment Law Project
423 West 118th Street
New York, New York 10027
(212) 866-8591

National Senior Citizens Law Center
1709 West 8th Street
Los Angeles, California 90017
(213) 483-1491

National Health Law Program
University of California
2477 Law Building, 405 Hilgard Avenue
Los Angeles, California 90024
(213) 825-7601

Native American Rights Fund
1506 Broadway
Boulder, Colorado 80302
(303) 447-8760
Technical Assistance Project
National Legal Aid & Defender Association
1601 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 777
Washington, D.C. 20009
(202) 462-4254

National Housing & Economic Development Law Project
Earl Warren Legal Institute
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720
(415) 642-2826

Youth Law Center*
Western States Project
795 Turk Street
San Francisco, California 94102
(415) 474-5865

National Juvenile Law Center*
St. Louis University School of Law
3642 Lindell Boulevard
St. Louis, Missouri 63108
(314) 533-8868

*Juvenile matters for Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah and Washington are
handled by the Youth Law Center. The National Juvenile Law Center serves the remaining states.
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